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1. INTRODUCTION 
The principle of donor coordination has been around in international 
development thinking for more than six decades. From the very outset of 
international development cooperation in the 1950s, donor countries have 
sought ways to better coordinate their aid programmes (Esman & Cheever, 
1967; Hayman, 1975; Delputte, 2013). A case in point was the establishment 
of the OECD-DAC in 1961, which marked the first major attempt to improve 
coordination among Western development donors (Verschaeve & Orbie, 
2016a). At that time, coordination was mainly understood as meaning ‘by 
donors among donors’ with a central role for the OECD-DAC, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank (WB) 
(Hayman, 2006). Only at the end of the 1980s, more emphasis was put on the 
principle of ownership (Aldasoro et al., 2010).  
However, it was not until more recently that the principle of donor 
coordination became ‘incontournable’ in development thinking, most 
notably in the context of the OECD’s High Level Forums (HLFs) on aid 
effectiveness in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). 
The European Union (EU) has also actively engaged with these debates since 
the 2000s (EU, 2005, 2011, 2016). Following a period of general aid fatigue in 
the 1990s whereby the added value of development programmes was 
frequently criticised, the international community sought ways to improve the 
effectiveness of aid. In doing so, the blame for the allegedly limited impact of 
aid was linked not only to the behaviour of partner countries, but also to the 
proliferation and fragmentation of donor countries’ aid programmes (Carbone, 
2016; Klingebiel, Mano & Negro, 2016; Eyben, 2012 Birdsall, 2008; Fengler & 
Kharas, 2011). Indeed, recent years have witnessed growing aid 
fragmentation, referring to the situation whereby too many donors provide too 
little aid to too many countries in an uncoordinated way. This creates an 
international development landscape in which international efforts 
strongly overlap in certain countries (and sectors) – the so-called “aid 
darlings” – whereas elsewhere, in the so-called “aid orphans”, aid 
programmes are largely absent (Nunnenkamp, Sotirova & Thiele, 2016; 
OECD, 2011a).  
Aid fragmentation has important unintended consequences, which 
undermine overall aid effectiveness (OECD, 2011b). These can be 
overcome through improved donor coordination. Across countries and 
sectors, improved coordination contributes to a better global aid allocation 
pattern, e.g. by addressing the issue of aid darlings and orphans (OECD, 
2011a). Within countries, donor coordination contributes to more aid 
effectiveness by reducing transaction costs for donor and partner countries. 
Starting with the latter group of partner countries, each aid relationship entails 
transaction costs, which burden their administrative capacity. In the absence 
of donor coordination, these transaction costs quickly expand partner 
countries’ aid absorption capacities as donors typically have their own 
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priorities, strategies, reporting requirements and procurement rules 
(Nunnenkamp, Sotirova & Thiele, 2016; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015; Faust & 
Messner, 2007; Aldasoro et al., 2010; Birdsall, 2008). Furthermore, donor 
countries often compete for visibility and short-term results, further 
undermining the partner countries’ public sector capacities (Delputte, 2013; 
Barry & Boidin, 2012; Brautigam in Birdsall, 2008). A lack of coordination 
imposes high transaction costs on donor countries as well. This stems from 
the fact that duplication and competition lead to inefficiency and even wastage 
of scarce aid resources (Bourguignon & Platteau, 2015; Delputte & Orbie, 
2014; Furness & Vollmer, 2013; OECD, 2011). For example, a 2009 study for 
the European Commission estimates that EU institutions and Member States 
could save EUR 3-6 billion per year by reducing the fragmentation of 
European aid programmes (Carlsson et al., 2009, p. 13). At a more general 
level, other studies also show the positive impact of improved donor 
coordination on aid effectiveness (e.g. Bigsten & Tengstam, 2015; Leblanc & 
Beaulieu, 2006).  
The central focus of this literature review is on donor coordination in 
fragile states1. Fragile states constitute one of the most challenging working 
environments in which to achieve sustainable development (OECD, 2016a; 
World Bank, 2011). This stems from the fact that fragile states suffer from 
violent conflicts, climate-related crises, natural disasters or migration flows, 
often in combination, resulting in an increasing concentration of extreme 
poverty and crises within their borders (Stockholm Declaration, 2016). The 
Brookings Institution, for example, recently predicted that by 2030 two-third of 
the world’s poorest will live in a situation of conflict and fragility (Chandy, 
Ledlie & Penciakova, 2013). Therefore, fragile states have become a key 
priority for development actors at the bilateral (e.g. DFID, 2015), regional (e.g. 
EU, 2011, 2015) and multilateral level (New Deal, 2011; OECD, 2016a; 
Stockholm Declaration, 2016; UN, 2015; World Bank, 2011). Of particular 
relevance for this study are the initiatives taken at the European level to 
improve donor coordination in fragile states. Already in 2009, the European 
Report for Development called upon the EU institutions and Member States to 
forge a new European approach, prioritizing improving coordination, to help 
overcoming fragility in Africa (ERD, 2009, p. 105). Also more recently, various 
initiatives have been taken at the European level in this regard, including but 
not limited to, the communication on Resilience (2017), the new EU global 
strategy (2016) and the revised European Consensus on Development 
(2017).   
                                                             
1  In line with the OECD’s 2015 State of Fragility report (2015) and current international 
development thinking, this literature review adopts a comprehensive view on ‘fragile states’. 
More specifically, we recognise the diversity of risks and vulnerabilities that lead to fragility and 
define fragile states as countries which score low on five interrelated criteria: (1) violence, (2) 
access to justice for all, (3) effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, (4) economic 
foundations and (5) capacity to adapt to social, economic and environmental shocks and 
disasters (see OECD, 2015). 
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A key challenge for fragile states is the need to improve aid effectiveness, 
since ineffective development programmes are more likely to occur in 
situations of fragility as these are typically characterised by (i) lower 
administrative capacities on the part of the partner countries, a (ii) broader 
and more diverse spectrum of involved international actors, and (iii) a more 
complex and challenging political, social and economic environment (ECDPM, 
2015; Wennmann, 2010). From the very outset, the international aid 
effectiveness agenda has paid particular attention to fragile states, pioneered 
by the UK’s Department for International Cooperation (DFID) with the 
publication of two seminal documents on “Why we need to work more 
effectively in fragile states” (2005) and “Improving the Development Response 
in Difficult Environments” (2004). This is reflected most clearly in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action 
(2008) – putting strong emphasis on fragile states – as well as in the OECD’s 
Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (2005) and the 
New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011) – putting strong emphasis 
on aid effectiveness. Furthermore, regional players, most notably the EU, 
have recently highlighted the importance of improving aid effectiveness in 
contexts of fragility (EU, 2011; 2013, 2016). The 2009 European Report on 
Development aimed to ‘overcome fragility in Africa’ by ‘forging a new 
European approach’ which includes ‘a better coordination between the EC 
and its member states’ (ERD, 2009, 105). 
Of particular relevance for this literature review is the fact that the above 
international commitments place strong emphasis on improving donor 
coordination in fragile states. Fragile states are especially vulnerable to aid 
ineffectiveness (Hearn, 2016; Furness & Vollmer, 2013; OECD, 2011). 
Indeed, not only do fragile states tend to have lower aid absorption capacity 
due to limited institutional resources (e.g. Toh & Kasturi, 2014); they are often 
confronted with a highly fragmented aid landscape. This is especially true for 
(post)crisis situations where both development and humanitarian actors 
operate within the borders of the same country. Furthermore, situations of 
fragility can rapidly evolve in the contexts of crises, making donor coordination 
all the more relevant in many cases (ECDPM, 2016; Hearn, 2016; Keddir, 
2011).  
The central aim of this study is to improve our understanding of current 
knowledge on donor coordination in fragile states. Through a 
systematic review of the literature on this topic, covering both academic 
research and policy evaluations, we aim to identify relevant enabling 
and constraining factors for successful donor coordination and joint 
implementation. This is a timely undertaking, as despite the strong political 
commitments at headquarters political level, there continues to be a strong 
need for improved donor coordination on the ground. Furthermore, the 
successful implementation of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (2015) will depend, amongst other things, upon 
improving aid effectiveness and donor coordination in situations of fragility.  
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In the remainder of this document, we will first provide a general overview of 
the academic literature on donor coordination, elaborating on the various 
ways in which donor coordination can be defined. Section 3 then discusses 
general progress on donor coordination in fragile states and provides an 
overview of the main approaches, instruments and actors involved in donor 
coordination. The fourth and final section provides a detailed overview of the 
main constraining and enabling factors for donor coordination in fragile states, 
distinguishing between factors related to (i) donor and (ii) partner countries.   
2. DEFINING DONOR COORDINATION 
Defining donor coordination is a challenging, if not impossible, task given its 
multi-dimensional and complex nature. The most basic understanding of 
donor coordination is that different actors work together to solve a collective 
problem (Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard & Strand, 2003). A more complex and 
comprehensive definition – which is widely applied within academia and policy 
circles – is the one provided by the World Bank, defining coordination as  
“the activities of two or more development partners that are intended to 
mobilize aid resources or to harmonize their policies, programmes, 
procedures and practices so as to maximize the development 
effectiveness of aid resources” (World Bank, 1999: 3).  
Taking the latter definition as a point of departure, the reminder of this section 
further breaks down the concept of donor coordination alongside the different 
dimensions that are put forward in the literature, specifically:  (i) objectives of 
coordination, (ii) governance of coordination, (iii) time of coordination, (iv) 
level of coordination, (v) degree of coordination and (vi) area of coordination.  
2.1. Objectives of coordination 
First and foremost, donor coordination aims to maximise the effectiveness of 
development programmes, as has already been highlighted in the 
introduction. Through improved coordination, both donor and partner 
countries are able to reduce the transaction costs of their aid relationships, 
thus ensuring more value for money. For donor countries, improved donor 
coordination results in a reduction of the number of aid relations as it 
significantly reduces transaction costs for the government. For donors, it 
decreases competition and duplication of efforts, resulting in a more efficient 
and effective allocation of official development assistance (ODA) 
(Nunnenkamp, Sotirova & Thiele, 2016; Bigsten & Tengstam, 2015; Faust & 
Messner, 2007; Kjellman et al., 2003).  
At the same time, donor coordination may also serve a political objective, i.e. 
maximising the influence of the coordinating donors vis-à-vis the government 
of the partner country (Bigsten et al., 2011). For example, the EU – meaning 
both the EU institutions and Member States – openly acknowledges that 
improved donor coordination adds to the Union’s political clout (e.g. EU, 2016; 
European Commission, 2016). This political leverage may be used to promote 
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development as well as other donors’ policy objectives (Dearden, 2011; 
Bigsten et al., 2011). Indeed, some have pointed to the ‘self-promotional side 
of aid coordination’ (Forster and Stokke, 1999, cited in Hayman, 2009), 
referring to the broader political and economic benefits for donors that take 
the lead in coordination efforts. This leads us to consider the next dimension 
of coordination, namely the governance dimension. 
2.2. Governance of coordination  
The governance of coordination concerns the questions of (i) which actors 
are involved in donor coordination, (ii) who takes the lead in the process 
and (iii) what should be coordinated (Bourguignon & Platteau, 2015; 
Delputte, 2013; Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013).  
First, which actors are involved largely depends on the specific context and 
their respective preferences. Hence, donor coordination at country level can 
have different compositions. In theory, it may range from a small initiative 
between only two actors to a large-scale initiative involving all relevant actors 
present in the country. Furthermore, coordination can be limited to 
development actors only or be (much) broader, also including humanitarian, 
security, diplomatic and other actors. The latter is particularly true in contexts 
of fragility, which are often characterised by a wide range of different types of 
actors and challenges, requiring ‘whole-of-government’ approaches 
(Hearn, 2016; ECDPM, 2016; OECD, 2006), or in the case of the EU a 
‘whole-of-Union response’ (EU, 2013: 12). In this regard, Example 1 provides 
insights from the EU’s comprehensive approach to Somalia.  
Example 1: The European Union’s comprehensive approach to Somalia 
The EU’s comprehensive approach to Somalia is a clear example of a ‘whole-
of-government’ approach in a context of fragility, seeking to improve 
coordination across the various EU actors operating within the country. More 
specifically, the EU is engaged in Somalia in various ways, i.e. providing 
political and diplomatic support, development assistance, humanitarian aid 
and security support. To assure coordination across these efforts, the EU 
adopted a comprehensive approach, linked to the Somalia Compact, which 
was drafted by the partner country in the context of the New Deal on Fragile 
States and endorsed by the European Union at the EU-Somalia summit in 
2013. Intra-EU coordination is structured around the five Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding Goals (PSGs). For example, the EU is strongly involved in 
peace and stability building through a number of missions (e.g. EU NAVFOR, 
EUCAP), which in turn also facilitates its humanitarian efforts (e.g. protecting 
aid shipments from piracy) and trade (e.g. establishing safe naval trade 
routes) (e.g. Pirozzi, 2013; Erhart & Petretto, 2012).  
Second, the question is who takes the lead in the coordination process. In line 
with the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the 
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011), 
coordination should ideally be led by the government of the partner 
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country based on the principle of ownership (Delputte, 2013). This is 
particularly relevant in contexts of fragility as the New Deal for Engagement in 
Fragile States (2011) explicitly envisages peace and statebuilding through 
supporting nationally-owned and led development plans. In the absence of 
clear leadership by the partner government, which is all the more 
challenging in fragile states, the thorny question arises of who should take 
the lead (Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013). In most partner countries, 
coordination has been driven by donors, usually under the lead of UNDP, 
the WB or an alliance of like-minded donors. This may sometimes lead to 
tensions, or as neatly put by Whittington and Calhoun (1988) “all donors want 
to coordinate but no one wants to be coordinated” (pp. 306-307).  
Third, the potential scope of what should be coordinated is extremely 
wide. Attempts at forging coordination can be hampered by conceptual 
ambiguity – both in policy discourse and in academic literature – on what 
exactly coordination involves. The wide-ranging consensus on the need for 
more and better coordination obscures the fact that there is a 
considerable lack of clarity about what should be coordinated (Delputte, 
2013). Donors and governments can decide to coordinate information 
exchange, policies, aid allocation, aid instruments, procedures and/or 
programming. Donor coordination can imply working towards a consensus on 
policies, principles, guidelines and strategic objectives and better integrating 
individual programmes and projects with national priorities (Penh, Medina, & 
Behrend, 2004), although it might also link to sectoral policies and priorities 
(World Bank, 1999). Furthermore, coordination can involve the simplification 
and ultimately the harmonisation of procedures, practices and requirements in 
planning, implementation, disbursement mechanisms and evaluations (Faust 
& Messner, 2007). This can, for example, involve a reduction of missions and 
reports (de Renzio et al., 2004). The latter are more technical forms of 
coordination than, for example, the harmonisation of goals, which are more 
political. All this can be governed through more or less formal mechanisms. 
2.3. Timing of coordination  
The third dimension of coordination refers to the time at which donors seek to 
harmonise their policies, programmes, procedures and practices. More 
specifically, a distinction needs to be made between ex ante coordination 
and ex post coordination (Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013; Woods, 
2011). In the literature, the ex ante coordination is generally considered 
the more desirable option and refers to those instances where donors seek 
to harmonise their efforts prior to making key decisions (Woods, 2011). A 
case in point is the EU’s Joint Programming initiative as it establishes a 
framework to harmonise donor efforts in the planning phase (Furness & 
Vollmer, 2013). Another example concerns the international efforts 
undertaken by the OECD-DAC and others to address the issue of aid 
orphans, which essentially aim to coordinate aid allocation patterns across 
donors in the programming phase to assure adequate funding to aid orphans 
(Hearn, 2016; OECD, 2014a).  
14 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
Ex post coordination, on the other hand, refers to the situation whereby 
donors seek to harmonise their efforts after key decisions on policy priorities 
or aid allocation have been made. While such efforts are considered to be 
less efficient from an economic point of view (Schulpen & Habraken, 2016), 
they do have the potential to greatly improve aid effectiveness. For 
instance, they can remedy specific problems that had not been anticipated in 
the ex ante phase. Also, they could serve as a stepping stone towards ex ante 
coordination in related areas between the same donors (Woods, 2011). A 
textbook example is information sharing among donors about the 
development programmes that are being implemented in a particular partner 
country and/or sector (Woods, 2011; Stratmann, 2000). Joint multi-donor 
evaluation exercises (see, for example, OECD-DAC, 2000, 2005) which aim 
to reduce transaction costs (i.e. avoiding overlapping bilateral evaluations) 
constitute another example of ex post coordination. This can pave the way for 
better donor coordination in the future through the development of a shared 
understanding of what went wrong and what went right (Andersen & 
Broegaard, 2012; OECD, 2010). Unfortunately, despite their crucial 
importance, systematic and comprehensive evaluations are relatively limited 
in number and not always publicly available. Example 2 provides insights from 
a joint evaluation exercise relating to the international response to the Indian 
Ocean tsunami. Importantly, ex post coordination can be achieved at the field 
level in the absence of (and as a second best alternative to) coordination 
steered from the headquarters level. This also links to the next dimension, 
namely the level of coordination. 
 
Example 2: Joint evaluation(s) of the international response to the 
Indian Ocean tsunami 
A textbook example of coordination in the context of evaluation is the joint 
evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami. On 26 
December 2004, a massive earthquake off the west coast of Northern 
Sumatra generated a series of tsunamis that killed people in 14 countries 
around the Indian Ocean, including fragile states such as Bangladesh, 
Myanmar and Sri Lanka.  More than 227,000 people lost their lives and 
another 1.7 million people were displaced. This led to a massive global 
response – fuelled by the media – producing the inflow of $13.5 billion of ODA 
in less than two years. For understandable reasons, this resulted in 
substantial coordination issues (Bennet, Bertrand & Harkin, 2006). Hence, to 
learn lessons on what could be improved in similar situations in the future, a 
large group of donors (i.e. Sida, TEC, Actionaid, BMZ, CIDA, Coraid, Danida, 
Dara, Irish Aid, DFID, FAO, IFRD, JICA, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 
France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Luxembourg, Norad, NZAID, 
DEZA, UN, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, USAID, WFP, WHO, World Vision) 
joined efforts to establish the Tsunami Evaluation Commission, which 
conducted a series of joint evaluations into the topic (e.g. Bennet, Betrand & 
Harkin, 2006; Telford ,Cosgrave & Houghton, 2006), leading to several 
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recommendations on how to improve donor coordination in the future (e.g. 
prioritising the strengthening of capacity of both donor and partner countries, 
changing institutional regulations of several international NGOS – e.g. 
International Red Cross). 
 
2.4. Level of coordination 
Donor coordination takes place at different levels. The literature distinguishes 
between three broad levels of coordination: the (i) policy formulation, (ii) 
programming and (iii) implementation level (Klingebiel, Mano & Negro, 
2016; Delputte, 2013).  
First, the policy formulation level, as evident from its name, is the broadest 
and most political and is all about setting principles, standards, strategic 
approaches and allocation patterns. This is done almost exclusively at 
headquarter (HQ) level, typically within the framework of existing 
international/plurilateral/regional organisations and/or conferences. Classic 
examples are the OECD-DAC, the EU, the GPEDC, G20 and UN-DCF, which, 
apart from their varying memberships, have in common that they seek to 
achieve greater coherence and harmonisation of the development activities of 
different development actors (Verschaeve & Orbie, 2016; Fues & Saltzmann, 
2015; Janus, Klingebiel & Mahn, 2014). Of particular relevance for donor 
coordination in fragile states are the efforts of the OECD-DAC’s Network on 
Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding 
and Statebuilding, which resulted in, respectively, the adoption of the 
Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007) and 
the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States with its five PSGs (2011).  
Second, coordination at programming level is about agreeing upon certain 
approaches and strategies in the aid programming phase, taking into account, 
for example, the partner country’s development strategy and systems 
(Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013: 23). This is done both at HQ and 
country level. Importantly, a growing number of donors are increasingly 
placing their country delegations at the centre of the programming 
phase, which has two major advantages that are particularly relevant in 
the context of fragile states. First, it allows for flexibility to respond to 
partner country needs, which are particularly challenging in fragile countries. 
Second, it allows maximum involvement of the partner countries’ government, 
which has already been identified as a major challenge in fragile states. 
However, these advantages do not diminish the importance of steering and 
political support from the HQ level. A key example of coordination at 
programming level is the EU’s initiative on Joint Programming (2006). 
Third, coordination at the implementation level refers to those efforts which 
are intended to harmonise the aid provision phase ass well as those designed 
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to recognize existing aid procedures (Delputte & Orbie, 2014; Klingebiel, 
Morazan & Negre, 2013). Examples are decisions to move towards common 
funding or pooled resourcing. This form of coordination largely – but not 
exclusively – takes place at the country level and is also referred to as Joint 
Implementation.  
2.5. Degree of coordination 
The fifth and final dimension of coordination relates to the fact that donor 
coordination takes place in various degrees. More specifically, there is a 
widespread consensus in the literature that coordination initiatives can be 
ranked on a spectrum ranging from basic to more complex approaches (see 
Figure 1). The higher donors move up this spectrum, the more complex 
coordination becomes (Delputte, 2013; Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013; 
World Bank, 1999).  
 
Figure 1: Donor Coordination Spectrum 
 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the lower boundary of the spectrum starts 
with situations of ‘non-coordination’. However, research has shown that such 
situations are virtually non-existent as donors almost always interact in some 
way or another (Ronald, 2011). Therefore, the de facto most basic degree of 
coordination is the ‘informal interactions’ that take place among donors. A 
more advanced degree of coordination is information exchange. This can be 
done in an informal basis as well as in a more structured and institutionalised 
way, e.g. through regular coordination meetings. A more far-reaching step is 
the conduct of joint analysis and evaluation. These forms of coordination can 
then enable donors to identify where they duplicate each other’s efforts in 
order to adapt themselves. This can lead to ad hoc coordinated responses or 
to more structural joint positions, strategies and/or divisions of labour (Fengler 
& Kharas, 2011; Faust & Messner, 2007). The highest and most complex form 
of donor coordination consists of fully integrated approaches. Such 
approaches can take different forms. For example, the European 
Development Fund (EDF) is often portrayed as one of the most integrated – 
but also complex – donor coordination approaches (Klingebiel, Morazan & 
Negre, 2013).  
It is important to point out that the highest degree of coordination does not 
necessarily mean the best degree of coordination. First, higher degrees of 
coordination also imply higher transaction costs and the risk of coordination 
17 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
fatigue for the actors involved, whilst also increasing perceived political costs 
for the donors in terms of losing visibility. Second, more intensive coordination 
between donors might lead to a decrease in autonomy and ownership on the 
part of both donor and partner countries (Bourguignon & Platteau, 2015; 
Delputte, 2013; Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013). In fact, coordination at 
the degree of information exchange can already be quite an achievement in 
some contexts, while also paving the way for more far-reaching coordination 
initiatives. 
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3. THE CHALLENGE OF DONOR COORDINATION IN 
FRAGILE STATES 
The central objective of this review is to conduct a systematic review of the 
literature on donor coordination in fragile states, covering both academic and 
policy-related studies and evaluations. In order to obtain an in-depth 
understanding of the challenge of donor coordination in fragile states, Section 
3 will therefore take stock of donor coordination in fragile states, starting with 
a number of general reflections on the literature (Section 3.1.), followed by an 
overview of overall progress on donor coordination in fragile states (Section 
3.2.), the main instruments and approaches taken by donors (Section 3.3.), 
and the main actors involved in coordination initiatives (Section 3.4).   
3.1. General reflections on the state of the literature 
We can distinguish between four strands of literature that have looked into 
the issue of donor coordination in fragile states through their respective 
lenses. These are the studies on (i) aid effectiveness, (ii) fragile states, (iii) 
humanitarian aid and (iv) aid allocation. For example, the literature on aid 
effectiveness pays ample attention to the issue of aid coordination, although 
only a selection of these studies focuses on donor coordination at country 
level. Those studies looking at the country level in fragile states are usually 
limited to one or more case studies. In a similar vein, the literature on aid 
allocation pays much attention to the harmonisation of donors’ ODA spending, 
although only a subset of this literature focuses on the issue of better 
coordination of aid allocations to aid orphans, which are often fragile states 
(e.g. Guinea, Sierra Leone, Niger). Schematically, the existing literature can 
thus be visualised as follows (figure 2).  
Figure 2: Overview of literature on donor coordination in fragile states
 
Based on a closer look at these four strands of literature, as well as the way in 
which they interact and intersect, three important gaps can be identified.  
First, quite ironically, studies that deal with the issue of donor coordination (in 
fragile states) are at present poorly integrated, typically approaching the 
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issue from their respective fields without sufficiently taking into account what 
has been done by others. Indeed, to our knowledge, there have been no 
efforts to integrate the main findings of the different strands of literature (see 
Figure 2) on what works and what does not work in terms of donor 
coordination in fragile states.  
Second, most research on donor coordination in fragile states focuses on 
efforts at the policy and programming level, whereas the implementation 
level has been studied to a much lesser extent (e.g. Hearn, 2016; Bigsten 
& Tengstam, 2015; Toh & Kasturi, 2014; Delputte, 2013; Furness & Vollmer, 
2013). This is particularly true with regard to the fundamental academic 
studies on this topic, although policy-oriented studies also show a bias 
towards the former two levels. Illustrative examples are the evaluations on the 
mainstreaming of the PSGs and New Deal principles in donors’ policies (e.g. 
OECD-DAC peer reviews) or the programming of aid (e.g. EU joint 
programming evaluations).  
Third, studies insufficiently grasp the complexity of donor coordination 
in fragile states. Indeed, while it has been established that situations of 
fragility are often difficult to study (ECDPM, 2016; Toh & Kasturi, 2014; 
Keddir, 2011), stemming from the fact that they are characterised by a larger 
number of variables at play – e.g. the far greater diversity of actors in fragile 
states - studies do little to accommodate to this context, typically taking 
insufficient account of the local context by only engaging in desk research 
and/or approaching the issue from a narrow perspective. Hence, studies 
should ideally approach the topic from a more holistic perspective, inter alia 
by engaging in field research in the fragile states.  
3.2. Progress on donor coordination in fragile states 
According to the literature, overall progress on donor coordination in 
fragile states is limited. Despite the fact that the issue has featured 
prominently on the international agenda for over a decade – examples are the 
Paris Declaration (2005), the OECD’s Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States (2005) and the New Deal for Engagement in 
Fragile States (2011) – most fragile states continue to suffer from low levels of 
donor coordination (e.g. Carbone, 2016; Leiderer, 2015; Nunnenkamp, 
Sotirova & Thiele, 2016; OECD, 2011). This claim has been established both 
in academic (e.g. Carbone, 2016; ECDPM, 2016; Hearn, 2016; Nunnenkamp, 
Sotirova & Thiele, 2016; Leiderer, 2015; Furness & Vollmer, 2013) and in 
policy studies and evaluations, such as the OECD’s follow-up surveys on the 
implementation of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile 
States and Situations (OECD, 2011; 2009) or more recently the monitoring 
reports of the GPEDC and the IDPS on the implementation of the New Deal 
for Engagement in Fragile States (GPECD, 2014; IDPS, 2014).  
Importantly, the above studies also indicate that progress towards improved 
donor coordination in fragile states has stalled in recent years (Leiderer, 
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2015; IDPS, 2014; OECD, 2011; OPM/IDL, 2008). While initially, i.e. in the 
period between 2005 and 2009, several donors took important steps to 
achieve more coordination, recent years have witnessed a trend of stalling – 
and in some cases even declining – efforts (Hearn, 2016; Leiderer, 2015; 
Keddir, 2011; OECD, 2011; 2009). Therefore, various scholars and policy-
makers have openly come to wonder whether donors are suffering from 
“harmonisation and coordination fatigue” (Leiderer, 2015: 445; but also 
Carbone, 2016; Eyben, 2012; OECD, 2011).  
Example 3: Joint Donor Team in South Sudan 
An illustrative example of the waning momentum for aid coordination is the 
evolution of the Joint Donor Team (JDT) in South Sudan. The JDT was 
established in 2005 by the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK, and 
Denmark and Canada joined at a later date. For quite some time, this JDT 
was regarded by the international community as a flagship example of 
advanced donor coordination in fragile contexts, including delegated 
cooperation (e.g. DFID, 2010; OPM/IDL, 2008). However, its role and 
relevance started to decline from 2011 onwards as most of the above donors 
established bilateral relations with South Sudan after its independence, 
through which they also represented their respective development 
programmes (e.g. DFID, 2014; Rijksoverheid Nederland, 2012; ERD, 2009).  
Literature on donor coordination in fragile states reveals a second general 
pattern, namely that thus far most progress has been made at the policy 
level 2 , whereas fewer improvements have been made at the 
programming and implementation level (Carbone, 2016; European 
Parliament, 2015; IDPS, 2014; Furness & Vollmer, 2013). This issue echoes a 
larger, more structural problem in international development cooperation, 
which is the divide between headquarters level and the field. More 
specifically, while it is crucial to establish policy principles, strategies and 
instruments at headquarters level – which is in itself not an easy task – the 
real challenge typically lies in translating and adapting these to the specific 
contexts and conditions in the field (e.g. Bodenstein, Faust & Furness, 2016; 
Carbone, 2013, Bué, 2010).   
Again, however, systematic and comprehensive assessments of coordination 
at field level are lacking. It thus remains unclear whether practitioners have 
effectively established in-country coordination initiatives that are more 
ambitious than the waning political climate for coordination at headquarters 
                                                             
2  Notable examples are the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the OECD’s 
Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (2005) – in particular Principle 8 
– and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011) which has recently been reaffirmed 
in the Stockholm Declaration on Addressing Fragility and Building Peace in a Changing World 
(2016). Furthermore, at regional level, the EU has (re)affirmed and/or further advanced these 
principles on several occasions, e.g. in the Code of Conduct on Complementary and Division of 
Labour in Development Policy (2007), the Agenda for Change (2011) and the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (2013). 
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level would suggest. At the same time, it should be noticed that in recent 
years a wide set of instruments has been developed for the purpose of 
coordination, which continues to be refined and elaborated as will be 
illustrated in the next section.   
3.3. Instruments and approaches for donor coordination in 
fragile states 
Despite the supposedly waning political interest in donor coordination 
(see previous section), recent years have witnessed a proliferation of 
coordination instruments and approaches that are currently being 
refined and elaborated. This section provides an overview of the most 
relevant ones, as put forward in the literature, with a specific focus on 
instruments and approaches at the programming and implementation 
level, as that these are the levels at which the members of the PN operate. 
Importantly, it should be noted that while the different instruments and 
approaches are presented separately, they are often interlinked and/or 
overlapping in nature.  
Coordination structures at sector, country and regional level 
The most common way of improving donor coordination in fragile states 
is through the use or establishment of coordination structures at sector, 
country and regional level (Carbone, 2016; Delputte & Orbie, 2014; Klingebiel, 
Morazan & Negre, 2013; DFID, 2010). These coordination structures vary 
considerably in terms of their (i) institutionalisation level, (ii) scope and 
(iii) membership.  
First, the level of institutionalisation of coordination structures varies 
significantly. Coordination can be highly institutionalised, for example when a 
fixed body of donors meets on a regular basis, or when joint strategies or 
common agreements for planning, management and delivery of aid are 
developed. However, donors can also coordinate on an ad hoc basis, for 
example in the context of discussions on policies, priorities and principles in 
the political dialogue with the partner country or, in a specific crisis, donors 
can decide to adopt a common position or coordinate their responses 
(Delputte, 2013). The partner country may also seek to establish donor-
specific and/or broader coordination structures (see below).  
Second, coordination structures can be set up to improve coordination at the 
national or regional level or focus on a specific sector (e.g. health) and/or 
theme (e.g. Ebola). Sub-groups, task forces and working groups may also be 
established and may serve as a venue for joint action or simply be used as 
platforms for information exchange (e.g. Carbone, 2016, Nunnenkamp, 
Sotirova & Thiele, 2016; Fuchs, Nunnenkamp & Ohler, 2015).  
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Third, in terms of membership, coordination structures at regional, country 
and sector level can be very broad (e.g. including development, humanitarian, 
security and political actors) or have a much more restricted membership 
which is linked to, for example, affiliation to the EU or Nordic Plus countries 
(Delputte & Orbie, 2014; Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008). Importantly, the 
involvement of the partner country can also vary. One example of strong 
partner country ownership on coordination is the Donor Assistance Group 
(DAG) in Ethiopia, which was established in 2001 to improve coordination 
between the government and 30 bi- and multilateral donors (DFID, 2010). 
However, in fragile countries, effective involvement of the partner country can 
be more difficult. 
In sum, there is no fixed template for coordination structures at regional, 
country and sector level. Rather, the literature shows that they vary 
considerably, depending on the specific local context as well as on the 
interests and preferences of their respective stakeholders. For that reason, it 
is also impossible to draw general conclusions about their added value from 
the literature. However, it has been established that coordination structures 
can be highly relevant instruments for improved donor coordination and 
may also serve as a stepping stone for more advanced degrees of donor 
coordination (Nunnenkamp, Sotirova & Thiele, 2016; Delputte, 2013; DFID, 
2010).  
Joint needs assessments and analysis  
Developing a common understanding of the specific context and causes of 
fragility through joint needs assessments and analysis is typically not an end 
in itself but a means to more advanced forms of donor coordination (Hearn, 
2016; DFID, 2010). The most relevant joint needs assessments and analysis 
instruments for fragile states are: (i) Post-Conflict Need Assessments 
(PCNAs) / Post-Disaster Need Assessments (PDNAs) and (ii) Fragility 
Assessments.  
PCNAs and PDNAs are multilateral exercises undertaken by the EU, UN and 
WB in association with regional development banks under national 
government leadership. They were introduced in 2008 in a joint declaration by 
the EU, UN and WB as an attempt to develop a common approach to joint 
needs assessments and recovery planning. This declaration covered the 
assessments needed after a conflict (i.e. PCNA) and disaster (i.e. PDNA), 
putting forward the specific processes and methodologies to follow (EU, UN & 
WB, 2008). The overarching objective was to come up with unified responses 
to post-crisis situations in fragile and non-fragile countries (Garassi & Allen, 
2016).   
Fragility Assessments, on the other hand, are exclusively developed for 
fragile states, in particular the g7+ countries. They are put forward as a key 
pillar of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011) and refer to 
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periodic country-led assessments in which all stakeholders take part, 
potentially including donor countries. More specifically, through a set of 
established methodologies (e.g. the fragility spectrum), these assessments 
aim to identify the causes and features of fragility. This assessment should 
serve as the basis for a national development strategy – the ‘one vision, one 
plan’ – upon which coordination efforts can build (Hearn, 2016; Hughes, 
Hooley, Hage & Ingram, 2014). Important in this regard are also the existence 
of several early warning systems, including the EU Early Warning System 
analysis, as they allow for timely collective action and feed into fragility 
assessments.  
Importantly, both the PCNAs/PDNAs and Fragility Assessments are 
reviewed positively in the literature. This stems from the fact that they are 
widely applied and have proven their merits in several situations (Garassi & 
Allen, 2016; Hearn, 2016; GPEDC, 2014; Hughes, Hooley, Hage & Ingram, 
2014). Despite these advantages, a number of shortcomings have also been 
Observed. First, there has been an overlap between the different approaches 
(and thus potential duplication of efforts). Second, the quality of the process 
has not always been optimal due to the exclusion of certain actors (e.g. non-
traditional aid providers) (Garass & Allen, 2016; Hearn, 2016). Third, some 
fragile states allow insufficient time for the fragility assessment process 
(Hearn, 2016).  
Joint strategic frameworks  
Joint strategic frameworks – also commonly referred to as joint country 
assistance strategies – are a popular instrument to reduce aid fragmentation 
at the country level (Woods, 2011; DFID, 2010). In its purest form, joint 
strategic frameworks bring the different partner countries together under an 
agreed assistance framework which aligns with the local partner’s overarching 
development strategy. More specifically, the document puts forward a 
common strategy which ensures that donors and the partner country’s  
government share a common vision, operate on the basis of shared principles 
and put forward common targets and benchmarks which are specific and 
measurable. For this reason, joint strategic frameworks ideally build upon a 
joint needs assessment and analysis (DFID, 2010; Linn, 2009). Joint strategic 
frameworks can be – and have been – drafted without the involvement of local 
stakeholders (e.g. Ernst, 2011), although this is only a second-best option 
given that ownership is a precondition for aid effectiveness (Faust, 2010).    
Importantly, the international aid effectiveness agenda did not initially 
envisage joint strategic frameworks, both in general and with regard to fragile 
states. Indeed, the Paris Declaration (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008) 
and OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 
(2005) departed from the idea that donor coordination should be based on the 
national planning and strategy documents. However, in practice, this turned 
out to be impossible in most cases as country strategies typically focus on 
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what the respective country is planning to do, rather than on the specific 
contributions of each donor (Linn, 2009).  Here lies the biggest added value 
of joint strategic frameworks as they translate general principles from 
HQ level into specific deliverables at country level on the basis of which 
donors can coordinate their actions (DFID, 2010; Linn, 2009). This has 
been picked up at the policy level and the New Deal for Engagement in 
Fragile States (2011) explicitly envisages the creation of ‘one vision, one plan’ 
(i.e. a national strategy to move out of fragility with short-, medium- and long-
term targets) to be implemented through ‘compacts’ (i.e. a joint strategic 
framework between the country and other stakeholders on how to implement 
the national development strategy) (Hearn, 2016).   
From a donor coordination point of view, joint strategic frameworks thus 
provide – at least on paper – a detailed document as a basis for their attempts 
at coordination. This coordination can take different forms, ranging from 
improved information exchange and/or joint monitoring systems on the 
specific targets that are put forward, to much more advanced forms of 
cooperation such as division of labour (see infra). The drafting of a joint 
strategic framework can also serve as a stepping stone for further 
coordination in the (near) future (Linn, 2011; DFID, 2010. Woods, 2010). The 
main (potential) shortcomings of joint strategic frameworks that are identified 
in the literature relate to the fact that the drafting of these documents can be 
transaction-intensive, especially if a large group of stakeholders is involved, 
and that the documents remain too vague on the issue of who should take the 
lead on certain aspects of the agreements (Ernst, 2011: DFID, 2010).  
Example 4: Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) 
One of the very first joint strategic frameworks, both in general and in fragile states, 
was the UJAS. The UJAS was signed in 2005 by the African Development Bank 
(AfDB), Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the World 
Bank Group and, in 2006, Austria. Together, it accounted for about one third of all aid 
in Uganda. Furthermore, other large donors such as the US, European Commission 
and Denmark collaborated with the UJAS signatories, although they did not enter the 
agreement themselves. Content-wise, the ambition of the UJAS was to translate the 
2004 revision of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan into coordinated donor actions. 
Specific objectives were, for example, limiting the number of UJAS partners per 
sector, having shared representation (i.e. one UJAS partner representing the rest of 
the group vis-à-vis the government) and establishing joint analytical frameworks for 
needs assessments and evaluations. However, while the establishment of the 
UJAS agreements heralded an important step towards improved donor 
coordination, it did suffer from a number of challenges. For example, (i) it turned 
out to be very hard to reduce the number of UJAS partners in popular/important 
sectors, (ii) different opinions existed on how to address corruption and governance 
issues and (iii) the process was very time- consuming due to the need to consult with 
HQ (Ernst, 2011). For these and other reasons, the signatory partners agreed in 
2010 to let the UJAS expire, while maintaining the level of coordination at 
implementation level.  
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Division of labour agreements  
Linked to the previous section, division of labour (DoL) agreements are one 
particular type of joint strategic frameworks which help reduce aid 
fragmentation in developing countries, including fragile states. More 
specifically, the main goal of DoL agreements is to tackle aid fragmentation by 
reducing the number of donors involved in the same kind of activities. This is 
achieved through specialisation, i.e. identifying the particular strengths of 
each donor upon which it should focus its development activities. This 
essentially entails donor specialisation, something that can be pursued at 
country level  (e.g. reducing the number of donors per sector) and cross-
country level (e.g. reducing the number of donors per country) (Klingebiel, 
Mahn & Negre, 2016; Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013; Schulz, 2009; 
Mürle, 2007). Finally, DoL agreements are particularly useful when donors 
are unable or unwilling to fully harmonise their approaches (DFID, 2010). 
Indeed, and as pointed out by the WB, “when donor objectives cannot be fully 
harmonised, it is important that they at least be complementary” (WB, 2006: 
30).  
In the context of fragile states, DoL agreements are seen in the literature 
as important instruments to improve donor coordination (e.g. 
Pietschmann, 2016; Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013; OECD, 2011; DFID, 
2010; Mürle, 2007). This stems, first of all, from the fact that fragile states 
suffer from high levels of aid fragmentation, both at country and cross-country 
level, making the potential efficiency gains of DoL agreements much higher. 
At country level, as fragile states are high-risk environments to operate 
within, donors typically have a tendency to spread their risk by setting up 
activities in multiple sectors (OECD, 2011; DFID, 2010).3 A similar dynamic of 
risk avoidance can be found at cross-country level where donors allocate 
more funding to fragile states which are considered to be less risky. This 
creates very unbalanced aid allocation patterns among fragile states 
(Schulpen & Habraken; OECD, 2015; Ericsson & Steensen, 2014).  
At the same time, however, the literature also shows that progress on DoL in 
fragile states is limited, despite the efforts of several actors – notably 
the EU with its Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of 
Labour (EU, 2007). First, DoL agreements are often the product of difficult 
and time-consuming processes, especially when in “fashionable” sectors (e.g. 
climate change) and/or countries (i.e. aid darlings) (Mackie, 2016; Wenzel, 
Buercky & Knill, 2010). Second, participation by partner countries is limited in 
most cases (e.g. Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia), often due to a lack of capacities 
and/or interests (Leiderer, 2015; Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013; DFID, 
2010). Third, the implementation of DoL agreements remains a challenge in 
several cases due to the fact that they require the reprogramming of aid 
                                                             
3  There may be other reasons why donors’ aid is fragmented across sectors at country 
level. For instance, donors may think that they have the capacities to do work in different sectors, 
or they may respond to various, often decentralised requests by the partner country.  
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decisions and development of exit strategies for specific countries and/or 
sectors, which both require time and the involvement of HQ levels (Mackie, 
2016; Bürcky, 2011). Fourth, effective division of labour in fragile states is 
particularly difficult in more political areas of development cooperation, such 
as support to governance (ERD, 2009). Fifth, arguments on ‘division of labour 
commitments’ have sometimes been (mis)used by donors to withdraw from 
certain sectors within a partner country although less development-related 
and political motivations were at play, when it would have been more rational 
to stay in the sector based on expertise and comparative advantages (e.g. 
Delputte, 2013). This ‘sector-exit strategy’ has been used by Belgium to step 
out of the health sector in the DRC in 2000, a decision that was criticised and 
eventually reversed (BTC, 2013), and there are more examples where ‘the EU 
Division of Labour policy has not been good for health’ (AFGH, 2011).  
Sixth and final, DoL agreements have thus far mainly addressed 
fragmentation at country level, whereas virtually no attention has been paid to 
aid fragmentation at cross-country level, referring to the issue of aid orphans 
and darlings (Schulpen & Habraken, 2016; Pietschmann, 2016). This may be 
an important shortcoming because some recent studies put forward the 
hypothesis that it is most efficient to first tackle aid fragmentation at 
macro level – i.e. across countries – before developing DoL agreements 
on how to reduce fragmentation within countries (e.g. Schulpen & 
Habraken, 2016). In reality, however, the idea of cross-country DoLs has not 
yet been tested. For example, in the context of the EU, these ideas were 
advanced by Spain during its presidency of the Council (2010), although few 
actual commitments were made at that time, let alone specific actions taken 
by the different EU Member States.  
 Multi-Donor Trust Funds 
Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) are increasingly popular instruments for 
donor coordination in fragile contexts (Reinsberg, 2016; UN, 2013; DFID, 
2010). MDTFs serve as a pooled funding modality, typically large in scale 
and established for a specific development purpose with financial 
contributions from one or more donors and, at the risk of oversimplification, 
typically address three types of challenges which are commonly found in 
fragile state contexts: (i) natural disasters [e.g. UN ESCAP Trust Fund for 
Tsunami, Disaster and Climate Preparedness (UN-ESCAP)], (ii) wars or post-
war interventions [e.g. Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)] and 
(iii) global and regional critical issues [e.g. Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)] and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa] (European Union, 2015; Reinsberg, Michaelowa & Eichenauer, 2015). 
In terms of governance architecture, most MDTFs are set up very similarly as 
they are typically managed by an administrative agent, often the World Bank 
or the UN agencies, and involve some kind of central steering committee 
(Reinsberg, Michaelowa & Eichenauer, 2015; WB, 2011). Finally, it is 
important to point out that MDTFs can be composed of ‘traditional’ donors 
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only, or also include non-state actors such as private foundations (e.g. the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation is a major contributor to the GFATM). 
Furthermore, MDTFs can be set up as instruments to finance specific 
development projects, but also serve as blending instruments whereby its 
funds are strategically used to attract additional financing (e.g. the EU-Africa 
Infrastructure Trust Fund).  
For donors, MDTFs have the potential to reduce the costs of information 
sharing, administration and coordination and to serve as a stepping stone for 
other coordinated actions (OECD, 2015; WB, 2011; DFID, 2010). 
Furthermore, research has indicated that they can increase tolerance for the 
risks of using country systems in fragile situations (Manuel et al., 2012). 
Specifically for fragile states, the added value of MDTFs involves at least 
four aspects. First, MDTFs offer the opportunity to work with a group of 
donors through a common framework, thus easing the burden on the partner 
countries’ governments (WB, 2011; OPM/IDL, 2008). Second, MDTFs 
typically improve the predictability and flexibility of resource flows, which are 
both essential in the process of state- and peacebuilding (Manuel et al., 2012; 
DFID, 2010). Third, MDTFs are (much) more flexible in terms of responding 
rapidly to humanitarian disasters and other crises, which makes them 
particularly well-suited for international engagement in fragile states 
(Mossello, Mason & Aludra, 2016). Fourth and final, MDTFs are generally 
considered to be one of the most advanced tools for Joint 
Implementation. For example, in a recent PN review of three EU trust funds 
– the Bêkou Trust Fund, the Madad Trust Fund, and the three windows of the 
EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (North of Africa, Sahel and Lake Chad 
and Horn of Africa) – it has been pointed out that MDTFs have great potential 
for improving aid effectiveness in fragile states due to the fact that they allow 
donors to ‘deliver European aid to specific objectives in target regions, sharing 
analysis and implementing capacities under a common umbrella of a variety 
of European actors’ (PN, 2017).  
The literature, however, also reveals a number of shortcomings to MDTFs 
from a coordination point of view. First, in most cases – even the most 
successful – donors find coordination processes too time-consuming. This 
raises questions about the extent to which they genuinely reduce transaction 
costs on the donor side (WB, 2011). Second, MDTFs are often too ambitious 
or unrealistic as they take insufficient account of the local context in fragile 
states, often due to strong involvement of the HQ level in the design of the 
fund (Barakat, Rzeszut & Martin, 2012). Third, while MDTFs improve 
coordination among the participating donors, they often fail to coordinate with 
those donors outside the pool (WB, 2011). Fourth, while on paper MDTFs – in 
line with international aid effectiveness principles – aim to support fragile 
states’ development strategies and country systems, research shows that 
donors often continue to earmark funds for specific sectors and priorities 
(Eichenauer & Knack, 2016; Barakat, Rzeszut & Martin, 2012), thereby 
constraining local ownership. Fifth, and related to the previous point, MDTFs 
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tend to be less aligned to partner country systems than other aid modalities 
such as budget support or basket funds (see also Figure 5). Sixth, 
proliferation of MDTFs – and by extension other forms of pooled funding – has 
entailed the risk of fragmentation of pooled funding instruments. This 
happened, for example, in South Sudan with pooled funding instruments and 
programmes, including the Capacity Building Trust Fund, the European 
Commission’s Humanitarian Plus Programme, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund – 
South, the Basic Services Fund and the European Commission’s Recovery 
and Rehabilitation Programme (Chandy, 2011; Ndikumana, 2015). Seventh, 
in terms of EU coordination, research indicates that due to capacity 
constraints, the European Commission has not been able to become an 
important host of trust funds whereas it extensively participates in trust funds 
at other international development organisations. Moreover, when the 
Commission delegates to these organisations, it does not impose strong 
substantive earmarking, but requires a high level of legal and administrative 
(micro-management) controls (Michaelowa et al, 2016). 
Finally, and on a more general note, it also needs to be pointed out that 
MDTFs – and pooled funding arrangements more generally – have become 
increasingly popular in recent years as a means to advance aid effectiveness 
in fragile states (Coppin, 2012). This may be good news since, theoretically at 
least, a ‘good pooled fund’ is broadly in line with the Paris Declaration 
Principles. However, comparative research on this topic is largely lacking. 
There is therefore an urgent need for more systematic data and studies on the 
effectiveness of MDTFs and pooled funding more generally in order to test the 
expectations on all sides about what MDTFs can (and cannot) deliver. This is 
particularly relevant given that pooled funding arrangements exist in various 
forms and shapes with different levels of ownership by the partner 
government(s) (Coppin et al. 2011; Reinsberg, Michaelowa & Eichenauer, 
2015). Indeed, the few comparative studies that do exist – most notably the 
ODI study of 2012 by Erin Coppin on three pooled funding arrangements, 
namely the ARTF, the Southern Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF-SS)] 
and the Liberia Health Sector Pooled Fund (LHSPF) – show a great deal of 
variation in their compliance with Paris-related indicators (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: MDTFs and pooled funds’ performance based on Paris indicators 
 
Basket Funds  
Similar to MDTFs, basket funds (BFs) – also commonly referred to as pooled 
funds – have become an increasingly popular aid modality for donor 
coordination in fragile contexts in recent years.  However, despite their 
growing popularity, there is no clear-cut definition of BFs among donors, 
stemming from the fact that they come in all shapes and sizes (De 
Maesschalck, Gagiano, Molenaers, Renard & Verbeke, 2014; Manuel et al., 
2012). Sticking to the OECD’s DAC reporting directives, BFs can be seen as 
an aid modality whereby donors contribute  
‘funds to an autonomous account, managed jointly with other donors 
and/or the recipient. The account will have specific purposes, modes of 
disbursement and accountability mechanisms and a limited time frame. 
Basket Funds are characterised by common project documents, 
common funding contracts and common reporting/audit procedures 
with all donors’ (OECD, 2016c).  
As such, in the context of the various financing mechanisms that donors have 
at their disposal for funding PBAs and Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs), 
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BFs are a middle ground between budget support instruments, which rely 
predominantly on partner country systems, and MDTFs and other aid 
modalities (e.g. project aid), which rely on country systems to a much lesser 
extent (see Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Financing instruments for PBAs and SWAPs 
 
(Source: De Maesschalck et. al., 2014, p. 8) 
In the context of fragile states, BFs are considered a very significant 
instrument to improve donor coordination and joint implementation. This 
is the case for two main reasons. First, the existing literature shows that the 
move towards BFs has substantially reduced transaction costs for donors and 
partner countries, including fragile states. Furthermore, it has been 
established that BFs (have the potential to) foster more congruence between 
donors’ priorities as well as closer alignment between donors and partner 
countries (Leiderer, 2015; IOB, 2011; OPM, 2010). Second, it has been 
shown that BFs are particularly useful in the context of fragile states as they 
fill an important gap in donors’ aid portfolios. More specifically, while in the 
spirit of the aid and development effectiveness agenda donors are supposed 
to shift their ODA away from projects towards more harmonised aid modalities 
(i.e. general and sectoral budget support), the latter is often considered to be 
problematic in contexts of fragility due to the political climate or poor 
government capacities on the recipient side. BFs thus offer donors the 
possibility to comply with the Paris principles as they facilitate a harmonised 
approach (see Figure 5) while at the same time offering enough leeway to 
align to the recipient to a greater or lesser extent, based upon the local 
context (De Maesschalck et. al., 2014).   
At the same time, the literature identifies a number of shortcomings. First, 
studies show that while policy-makers in partner countries have a general 
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awareness of BFs, they often still lack an in-depth understanding of the 
potential and shortcomings of this aid modality, which in turn hampers strong 
local buy-in (Meghani, Abdulwahab, Privor-Dumm & Wonodi, 2015). 
Furthermore, donors tend to have unrealistically high expectation of BFs 
(Ndikumana, 2015; Coppin, 2012), according to the limited systematic 
research on this topic (see supra). Second, a number of scholars argue that 
the recent proliferation of this aid modality simply adds new structures to the 
already complex development landscape, creating a paradoxical situation 
whereby there is a need to coordinate coordination mechanisms in a number 
of countries (Woods & Welsch, 2007). This seems to be particularly true in 
fragile states. Again, South Sudan is a case in point, as it has witnessed a 
strong proliferation of BFs and other pooled funding arrangements (e.g. 
MDTFs), resulting in high levels of aid fragmentation (Ndikumana, 2015; 
OECD, 2014b).   
Multi-donor budget support 
Multi-donor budget support (MDBS) is another approach to improve donor 
coordination in fragile states and partner countries more generally. Budget 
support involves the direct transfer of funds to a partner country’s budget so 
that it can be managed through the existing national systems. It serves as a 
means to strengthen country ownership, fund national development strategies 
and promote sound and transparent public finances (Koch & Molenaers, 
2016; Faust, Koch & Leiderer, 2011). As can also be seen from Figure 5, 
budget support takes country systems much more explicitly into account than 
other modalities such as basket funds and multi-donor trust funds. Budget 
support is therefore typically considered to be the most advanced form of 
program-based approach4 (PBA) (SIDA, 2008). MDBS emerged in the second 
half of the 2000s as a particular form of budget support, its main feature being 
that budget support is provided jointly by a group of donors. For this purpose, 
donors typically set up a donor group to coordinate policy dialogue with 
the partner country’s government. For this purpose, they jointly agree upon 
the conditions that need to be in place for the disbursement of the funds. 
These donor groups are generally chaired by one or more donors on a 
rotating basis. In this way, MDBS typically provide a strong framework for 
donor coordination (Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013; Leiderer, 2010).   
However, the actual impact of MDBS as an instrument for donors to 
engage in fragile contexts is unclear. A number of shortcomings have been 
noted in the literature. While theoretically MDBS has great potential to reduce 
transaction costs for donors, several studies show that this is not the case 
                                                             
4  PBAs were proposed by the OECD-DAC in 2008 in the context of the Accra Agenda for 
Action. It defines PBAs as a way of engaging in development cooperation based on the principles 
of coordinated support for locally owned initiatives, such as national development strategies 
and/or sector and thematic programmes. PBAs are characterised by (i) host country leadership, 
ii) a single comprehensive programme and budget framework, (iii) a formalised process for 
donor coordination and harmonisation and (iv) efforts to increase the use of local systems for 
programme design and implementation (Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013).  
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(Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013; Dijkstra, de Kemp & Bergkamp, 2012; 
OPM/IDL, 2008). On the contrary, in the case of Mali and Zambia, some 
evaluations of MDBS show that, in reality, the instrument often complements 
rather than substitutes for other forms of aid (Leiderer, 2013; Leiderer & 
Faust, 2012). Another criticism that is frequently raised in the literature is that 
MDBS can only work effectively if donors reach a clear consensus on the 
political conditionality attached to the disbursement of funds, which is seldom 
the case (Faust, Koch & Leiderer, 2011). Moreover, a lack of coordination at 
cross-country level (i.e. double standards) further undermines the 
effectiveness of MDBS (de Catheu, 2013; Del Biondo, 2011).  
Joint programming  
In recent years, joint programming has become a popular instrument to 
advance donor coordination at country level. While being used and promoted 
by different actors (e.g. the United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework, UNDAF), it is particularly relevant in the context of the EU and its 
Member States. Within the EU, joint programming has been strongly 
promoted in recent years as a key approach to reduce aid 
fragmentation. It emerged from the EU Code of Conduct on 
Complementarity and Division of Labour (EU, 2007) and is set to become the 
new norm for European donor coordination (ECDPM, 2015; Furness & 
Vollmer, 2013). The main objective of joint programming is to incorporate the 
bilateral country programming of the EU Member States and institutions into a 
single EU country strategy which aligns with the partner country’s national 
development plan. Importantly, if deemed appropriate, other non-EU donors 
can be consulted and invited to participate as well (Klingebiel, Mahn & Negre, 
2016). The actual process of joint programming does not follow a fixed 
template. However, it consists on paper of different elements, several of which 
have already been mentioned above: (i) a joint analysis and response, (ii) 
indication of the intervention sectors of EU and Member States active in 
that country, (iii) division of labour, and (iv) indicative multi-annual 
financial allocations per sector and donor (ECDPM, 2013). It is important to 
point out that joint programming is considered by some (e.g. the European 
Commission) as a stepping stone for Joint Implementation, motivated by 
the fact that the latter should be easier to achieve in a context of prior joint 
planning among European donors  (Furness & Vollmer, 2013; Klingebiel, 
Morazan & Negre, 2013). 
At present, joint programming has been implemented, at different stages, in 
55 countries, including several fragile states such as Ethiopia, Haiti, Myanmar, 
Mali and South Sudan (ECDPM, 2015). In fact, joint programming has been 
piloted by the EU in fragile states, more specifically in Haiti and South Sudan. 
Based on these first experiences, the literature is rather critical about the 
instrument. While various studies show that it has potential to become a 
useful and valuable coordination tool, it has thus far not lived up to its full 
potential (Carbone, 2016; ECDPM, 2015; Furness & Vollmer, 2013). At least 
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three areas of shortcomings have been noticed. First, thus far, European 
donors have only succeeded in adopting a joint programming strategy in 20 
countries, while being blocked in the process of debating on how and whether 
or not to embark on joint programming in the remaining 35 countries (DEVCO, 
EEAS & NEAR, 2016). Hence, the biggest advantage of the instrument thus 
far seems to be improved information exchange among European donors 
(ECDPM, 2015; Furness & Vollmer, 2013). Second, the claim that joint 
programming paves the way for Joint Implementation has only 
materialised in a small number of countries (i.e. Kenya and Cambodia) 
(ECDPM, 2015). Third and final, in a number of cases (e.g. South Sudan), 
joint programming of country strategy papers demonstrated a lack of 
flexibility to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, raising questions 
aboutits added value in fragile situations (Furness & Vollmer, 2013; 
Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013).  
Joint Implementation arrangements 
Last but not least, donor coordination in fragile states can be pursued through 
Joint Implementation arrangements. While the term is regularly used in 
Brussels’ policy-making contexts, there is no clear definition. As a working 
definition, we can define Joint Implementation as a set of arrangements that 
seek to advance coordination in the field at the implementation level. 
Contrary to most of the coordination arrangements discussed above, this is 
where the ‘practitioners’ or ‘development actors’ can and should play a pivotal 
role. Joint Implementation is often seen as the logical result and full realisation 
of joint programming; however, it could be argued that point programming can 
result from Joint Implemention arrangements as well.  
Furthermore, we can distinguish between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of Joint 
Implementation. The former concern joint efforts for sharing analytical and 
logistical capacities. Analytical capacities could include joint studies, 
evaluations, monitoring and training, whereas logistical capacities concern 
offices, cars and equipment that could be shared. Joint missions and sharing 
of staff would also fall within this category. Sharing of staff arguably improves 
the capacities of donors – especially the smaller ones – to analyse and deal 
with the complex situations of fragile states (DFID, 2010). However, there is 
almost no research on such ‘soft’ forms of joint programming. This stems not 
only from its limited use by donors and practitioners, but also from the 
relatively confined budgetary and institutional implications of these shared 
analytical and logistical capacities. Despite the lack of in-depth research into 
its implications, there seems to be much ‘low hanging fruit’ in engaging in soft 
Joint Implementation. Hard Joint Implementation implies more tangible 
budgetary and institutional commitments, such as the establishment of the 
pooled funding arrangements (e.g. MDTF, BF) discussed in the previous 
sections. Here too, literature is relatively limited. Whereas it is clear that a 
large variety of pooled funding arrangements exists, not least when it comes 
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to the alignment with partner government, their effectiveness and coordination 
potential have scarcely been analysed in a systematic way.   
As with almost all forms of coordination without harmonisation, Joint 
Implementation has the disadvantage that overcoming differences between 
donors’ visions, objectives and procedures can be time-consuming, raising 
questions about whether reductions in transaction costs are sufficiently 
achieved. The latter is particularly true when donors have engaged with a 
specific country through a mixture of bilateral and joint relations (European 
Parliament, 2015; DFID, 2010; Mürle, 2007). 
A specific and far-reaching form of Joint Implementation is delegated 
cooperation (DC). Delegated cooperation means that one development actor 
– i.e. the ‘lead actor’ or ‘lead donor’ – acts with authority on behalf of one or 
more other donors – i.e. the ‘delegating actors’, ‘delegating donors’ or ‘silent 
partners’ (OECD, 2003). As such, delegated cooperation can also be seen as 
a form of division of labour (see above). The actual level and form of 
delegation vary from delegating responsibility for a specific element of a joint 
project (e.g. conducting a specific evaluation) to responsibility for the project 
as a whole or an entire sector/country programme (DFID, 2010; NORAD, 
2009, 2006; OECD, 2003). The underlying rationale is that delegated 
cooperation reduces transaction costs for donors – i.e. lead donors 
typically have comparative advantages over the other donors in a specific 
country or sector – and partner countries – i.e. partner country governments 
have to deal with fewer donors (EuropeAid, 2011; OECD, 2003). Chandy 
states that delegated cooperation is ‘particularly useful in fragile states, both 
to moderate the burden on recipients and to facilitate a more efficient 
allocation of resources among donors toward those with the expertise and 
appetite to engage deeply in the recipient country’ (Chandy, 2011). However, 
delegated cooperation, and Joint Implementation arrangements more 
generally, do not always result in structural changes. The Joint Donor Team in 
South Sudan (see above) is one case in point. 
The EU was already advocating DC in its Code of Conduct (2007) and the 
modality has increasingly used by the EU and some Member States (in 
particular Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands). Between 2007 
and 2012, the Commission signed 71 Delegation Agreements (DAs) and 31 
Transfer Agreements (TAs) with Member State bodies (European Parliament, 
2015), and the number of DAs has further increased since then. That said, the 
share of DC remains less than 1% of the total in the overall EU and Member 
States’ aid budget. A recent evaluation concluded that delegated cooperation 
by the EU ‘has mainly been designed and used as an operational tool 
contributing to strengthened relations between EU institutions and the 
Member States, in particular the relations between the EU and some 
implementing agencies’, but that its impact on aid efficiency and aid 
effectiveness has been limited (ECORYS, 2016). The study also notes that 
the focus on relations with the Member States has mostly been operational, 
35 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
whereas ‘the EU has never put DC high on the agenda in its discussions with 
Member States and therefore they still consider DC as an EU instrument and 
not as a joint tool’. Participation by Member States is unequal and 
unbalanced, and DCs could be turned into a stronger joint instrument. 
Interestingly, DC has been most effective at the sector level and when it 
builds on specific expertise and/or previous experience within the sector 
concerned. In this regard, there are good examples in ‘politically sensitive 
situations and when it comes to sharing risks’ (ECORYS, 2016) – 
conditions that clearly apply to contexts of crisis and fragility.  
Joint Implementation can also involve more ‘bottom-up’ coordination by 
practitioners for the shared provision of public goods, here defined as 
those goods and services that cannot be provided by single donors as they 
require the pooling of resources, while at the same time offer clear benefits for 
several donors. Examples – not necessarily always – include joint studies, 
shared logistics, joint analysis, joint mapping exercises, joint field visits and 
common reporting. Whereas such initiatives, as highlighted by the PN 
(Working Paper Series No.1), seem promising in the sense that they provide 
public goods without dramatically increasing coordination costs and can 
provide the building blocks for wider donor coordination schemes such as joint 
programming, we have not come across recent research on such initiatives. 
 
3.4. Main actors engaged in donor coordination in fragile 
states 
Providing a comprehensive overview of which (and to what extent) donors are 
involved in donor coordination in fragile states is a mission impossible. This 
stems from the fact that donors are involved in various – often parallel – 
forms and types of coordination at different levels.  
That said,  the literature clearly shows that a number of actors are much more 
prominently involved in donor coordination than others. At the multilateral 
level, these are the UN and WB.5 Due to their global legitimacy, credibility 
and authority, both actors often take up the role of lead donor and/or 
coordinator in fragile states (e.g. Delputte & Orbie, 2014; Lawson, 2013; 
Söderbaum & Stalgren, 2008). This is illustrated by the fact that the UN and 
WB frequently serve as administrators of MDTFs (see Section 3.3.5).  
At the regional level, the actors that are most strongly involved in the donor 
coordination in fragile states are the EU and Nordic Plus grouping. Both 
actors have been involved in donor coordination at country level for quite 
some time, as is evident from donor coordination groups for their respective 
                                                             
5  Note that we do not focus on coordination at the policy level, which is why we do not list 
organisations such as the OECD-DAC or IDPS.  
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members or advanced forms of Joint Implementation agreements, such as 
delegated cooperation (Klingebiel, Mano & Negre, 2016; Delputte & Orbie, 
2014; DFID, 2010; NORAD, 2006). However, it should be noted out that the 
relevance of the Nordic Plus grouping has been declining in recent years 
because of the strong overlap in membership with the EU, amongst other 
reasons (Elgström & Delputte, 2016). On the other hand, the relevance of the 
EU for donor coordination in fragile states is substantial. Joint programming, 
for example, is an EU- specific instrument to reduce aid fragmentation (see 
Section 3.3.6.). Furthermore, the EU is typically perceived by the international 
community as a champion of aid coordination (OECD, 2012; Gänzle, Grimm & 
Makhan, 2012) and for that reason it often assumes a lead coordinating role 
alongside multilateral actors such as the UN or WB (e.g. EU, UN & WB, 
2008). 
Finally, at individual donor level, the literature identifies the Nordic Plus 
countries and EU15 Member States – referred to as the ‘old’ EU Member 
States – as main actors involved in donor coordination. More specifically, and 
in contrast to other influential donors such as the US or Japan, these donors 
are much more prominently involved in coordination initiatives, both in general 
and in the context of EU initiatives, for example (e.g. Klingebiel, Mahn & 
Negre, 2016; IDPS, 2014; Bürcky, 2011; OECD, 2008b). Pinpointing 
individual donors is impossible based on the existing literature due to the 
considerable variation between donors’ specific instruments, approaches and 
focus on specific fragile states. For example, an 2014 INCAF survey on the 
use of MDTFs in a selection of fragile states reveals that Germany, the US 
and the UK are fairly similar in terms of using MDTFs as a coordination 
instrument (see Figure 6), while other studies show that these countries vary 
considerably in their use of other coordination instruments and approaches 
(e.g. Fitzgerald, 2016; Nunnenkamp, Sotirovo & Thiele, 2016). 
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Figure 6: Use of MDTFs 
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4. EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF DONOR 
COORDINATION IN FRAGILE STATES 
The previous section clearly demonstrated that recent years have witnessed a 
proliferation of initiatives, instruments and approaches to improve donor 
coordination in fragile states. However, overall progress to reduce aid 
fragmentation in fragile states remains limited, especially when focusing at the 
programming and implementation level, and there are indications that the 
political momentum for donor coordination is waning. Therefore, this fourth 
and final section elaborates on the main variables that are put forward in the 
literature to explain success and/or failure of donor coordination in fragile 
states. In doing so, we distinguish between two types of factors related to the 
(i) donor and (ii) the partner country. 
 
 
Figure 7: Explanatory factors for donor coordination 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
 
 
 
Importantly, donor and partner country factors are mutually influenced by the 
larger context (see Figure 7). To give one example, the specific type of crisis 
(e.g. humanitarian vs. security crises) shapes and constrains what is possible 
in terms of donor coordination on the part of both the donor and partner 
countries. For fragile states, humanitarian aid crises might severely affect the 
government capacities (e.g. an earthquake can severely hamper local 
infrastructure), whereas that is not necessarily the case for security crises 
(e.g. violent conflicts can be induced by the government itself). In a similar 
vein, for donors, humanitarian crises might have little to no impact on their 
interests in a given fragile state, whereas in the context of violence, these 
might be jeopardised much more severely. The lesson to be learned from 
both these hypothetical examples is that it makes little sense to discuss 
context-related factors separately as what matters is the way in which they 
Context-related factors 
Donor-related factors Partner-country related factors 
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shape donor- and partner country-related factors. Therefore, the remainder of 
this section will discuss the latter in more detail, outlining – if relevant – how 
larger context- related factors play a role as well.  
4.1. Donor-related factors 
The literature identifies a wide range of factors that impact on donor 
coordination in fragile states. A first set of factors relates to the national 
interests of donor countries. The underlying idea is that the primary 
concern of donors is to maximise their influence over partner countries. This 
may be for political reasons (e.g. securing support for certain policy 
objectives) and/or economic motivations (e.g. securing import/export of 
certain products and foreign investment) (Carbone, 2016; Calleja, Rachael & 
Dane, 2015; Fuchs, Nunnenkamp & Ohler, 2015; Delputte, 2013). Hence, by 
engaging in coordination, donors run the risk of being confronted with an 
outcome that conflicts with their interests, explaining why “all donors want to 
co-ordinate but no one wants to be coordinated” (Whittington & Calhoun, 
1988: pp. 306-307). The importance of ‘interests’ as a factor plays out 
differently for different types of countries. For example, it has been 
established that large donors (e.g. US, UK, France, Germany) and/or 
donors with a special relationship vis-à-vis a particular partner country 
(e.g. a former colonial power) are more inclined to engage in power 
politics, whereas smaller donors are generally more open to 
coordination (Carbone, 2016; Fuchs, Nunnenkamp & Ohler, 2015). This is at 
least the case when looking at the issue from a ‘national interest’ perspective, 
given that smaller donors also tend to have lower capacities to engage in 
coordination (see donors’ staff capacities).     
A second set of explanatory factors links to the bureaucratic interests of 
institutions within donor countries. Donor coordination in fragile states 
ideally involves a broad range of institutions, including those responsible for 
humanitarian, development, security and diplomatic affairs (ECDPM, 2016). 
Each of these institutions has its own preferences and interests which might 
be jeopardised by engaging in coordination processes. The latter are likely to 
become veto players during the coordination process, especially when 
coordination would (potentially) reduce the power of certain institutions 
(Carbone, 2016).  
A third set of factors relates to visibility concerns. Hoisting the national flag 
in third countries has often been a politically important consideration in 
development policy. One of the main disadvantages of coordination is a 
decreasing or even loss of individual visibility as a donor. This potentially 
hampers coordination efforts as some countries aim for high individual 
visibility to increase their political leverage vis-à-vis the partner country and/or 
to increase their own legitimacy towards their constituency (Bodenstein, Faust 
& Furness, 2016; Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013).  
A fourth set of factors links to the administrative set-up of donor countries. 
More specifically, some donors are by design more capable of engaging in 
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coordination efforts than others. For example, a number of donors have legal 
and administrative provisions in place which prevent them from engaging in 
(advanced) forms of Joint Implementation such as delegated cooperation 
(Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013; EuropeAid, 2011; Mürle, 2007). These 
can be overcome through administrative reforms at the level of the respective 
donor countries and/or a sound understanding of the specific institutional 
limitations of each donor prior to entering in negotiations on Joint 
Implementation agreements (NORAD, 2006; OECD, 2003). Other 
administrative factors that shape/constrain donor coordination are donor 
programming cycles – influencing joint programming initiatives, for example 
(ECDPM, 2015; Furness & Vollmer, 2013) – and electoral cycles – influencing 
general policy directions and risk-avoiding behaviour by donors (Bodenstein, 
Faust & Furness, 2016).   
 
A fifth set of factors concerns donors’ staff capacities, both at HQ and 
country level. As evident from Section 3, donor coordination instruments and 
approaches in fragile states can be complex and time-consuming. As such, 
they often require substantial input from staff. Consequently, small, 
understaffed and overstretched administrations are less inclined to engage in 
coordination processes and if they do, they tend to be less successful due to 
the fact that an in-depth understanding of the context of fragility is essential 
for establishing effective coordination initiatives (Carbone, 2016; ECDPM, 
2015; DFID, 2010; OECD, 2003). Importantly, the literature identifies various 
ways to increase donor capacities, ranging from staff training (Klingebiel, 
Morazan & Negre, 2013) to the hiring of shared personnel (DFID, 2010; 
OECD, 2003). Furthermore, the need for donor capacity can be reduced by 
engaging in delegated cooperation and other forms of DoL (Wenzel, Bürkcy & 
Knill, 2010; Mürle, 2007) as well as by making use of multilateral 
organisations such as the UN or WB to administer MDTFs (DFID, 2010) or 
deal with the logistics of humanitarian interventions, for example (Balcik et al., 
2010).  
A sixth set of factors concerns the role of individuals and the personal 
relations within and across donors. Indeed, in recent years a growing 
number of studies have come to highlight the importance of the individual 
level, referring to the expertise, motivation and personal relationships between 
practitioners (Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2016; ECDPM, 2015; Delputte & 
Orbie, 2014; Delputte, 2013). In this regard, the presence of ‘coordination 
champions’ has been recognised as an important factor contributing to the 
success of coordination. Additionally, good professional relationships at the 
individual level serve as an enabling factor for donor coordination. These 
relationships can build upon a similar professional background and/or 
expertise, but might also stem from Joint Implementation practices such as 
working in shared offices/buildings (ECDPM, 2016; Klingebiel, Morazan & 
Negre, 2016; DFID, 2010).  
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Last but not least, a seventh set of factors relates to the prevailing ideas and 
identities of donors. More specifically, most – if not all – donors have a set 
of ideas about the ideal level, framework and principles underlying 
coordination. For example, while some donors consider the EU level to be the 
most ideal level of coordination, others are more inclined towards other 
groupings, such as the Nordic Plus grouping or the UN. In a similar vein, 
some donors prefer fully integrated coordination approaches, whereas others 
prefer to engage in DoL arrangements. What is important in this regard is that 
a lack of common understanding on coordination is a strong constraining 
factor (Bodenstein, Faust & Furness, 2016; ECDPM, 2016; Delputte, 2013; 
Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2013). This is most likely to occur when donors 
have a strong identity in international development matters. For example, 
donors with a strong self-perception of being a good donor (e.g. UK) are less 
likely to engage in coordination (Carbone, 2016). In a similar vein, like-
mindedness may be more important for successful coordination than formal 
membership of an institution or organisation. The like-minded Nordic Plus 
group is an example in this regard (e.g. Orbie & Delputte, 2014).  
4.2. Partner country-related factors 
As outlined in Section 3, partner countries ideally play a central role in donor 
coordination processes in fragile states. It therefore comes as no surprise that 
the specific nature of a fragile state has a strong impact on the success 
or failure of donor coordination. A first set of factors that impact on donor 
coordination relates to the interests of partner countries. More specifically, 
depending on their policy priorities, they can oppose or facilitate donor 
coordination. High levels of donor coordination, for example, entail higher 
risks for increased conditionality (e.g. on governance issues), lower levels of 
ownership and a reduced ability to maintain independent relationships with 
donor countries. At the same time, coordination may reduce aid 
fragmentation, which in turn results in higher levels of aid effectiveness. Low 
levels of donor coordination, on the other hand, may result in high levels of aid 
fragmentation, which is detrimental from a development point of view. 
However, it also creates a situation in which fragile states are less likely to be 
confronted with conditionality and puts them in a stronger bargaining position 
vis-à-vis donor countries (Klingebiel, Morazan & Negre, 2016; Bourguignon & 
Platteau, 2015; Keddir, 2011). Governments in fragile states may therefore 
have a short-term political interest in limited donor coordination. 
A second factor that is important to take into account is the capacity of the 
partner country. More specifically, a key enabling factor for donor 
coordination in fragile states is local ownership. For example, it has been 
established that donor coordination is more likely to take place and be 
successful if the partner country government takes the lead in the process 
through the establishment of a national development strategy (e.g. for g7+ 
countries, ‘one vision, one plan’) upon which coordination efforts can build 
(Carbone, 2016; Hearn, 2016; Hooley, Hage & Ingram, 2014; IDPS, 2014; 
DFID, 2010).  
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A third factor that is put forward in the literature is the prevalence of natural 
resources in the partner country. More specifically, studies have indicated 
that it is much harder to achieve donor coordination in developing countries – 
including fragile states – with abundant natural resources (Carbone, 2016; 
Calleja, Rachael & Dane, 2015; Fuchs, Nunnenkamp & Ohler, 2015). 
Essentially, this directly links to national interests of donor countries which are 
more likely to engage in power politics – and therefore less likely to coordinate 
their action – in countries of strategic interest (see supra). Furthermore, it 
illustrates once more how the  ‘resource curse’ (see Sachs & Warner, 2001) – 
also commonly referred to as the paradox of plenty – undermines 
development.  
A fourth factor relates to the ideas and identity of partner countries. The 
argument is similar to the one presented in Section 4.1. on donor-related 
factors, namely that donor coordination is more likely to take place and be 
successful if a common understanding exists among all stakeholders. Given 
the central role of fragile states in donor coordination processes – at least in 
an ideal scenario – like-mindedness between donors and partner countries 
may also contribute to increased coordination (Horita, 2014; DFID, 2010; 
Seybolt, 2009; OPM/IDL, 2008). 
A fifth factor concerns the structure of the donor landscape in partner 
countries. More specifically, studies have shown that the composition of 
donors has an impact on how the dynamics of donor fragmentation – and thus 
also coordination – play out. Indeed, econometric studies have shown that aid 
fragmentation is more severe in partner countries – including fragile states – 
which lack a leading donor in terms of budget, due to ineffective competition 
among smaller donors (Calleja & Rowlands, 205; Annen & Moers, 2012). 
Hence, from a theoretical point of view, donor coordination is more 
challenging in these countries due to the higher level of fragmentation, 
although, on the other hand, Section 4.1. also showed that the presence of 
one larger donor and/or donors with a special relationship vis-à-vis partner 
country hampers donor coordination as well (e.g. Carbone, 2016; Fuchs, 
Nunnenkamp & Ohler, 2015).  
A sixth factor which influences donor coordination is the presence of China 
and other BRICs in fragile states. On the one hand, donor coordination may 
be more challenging in a country where China and other BRICs have a strong 
presence. On the other hand, this may be perceived as an enabling factor for 
increased coordination – i.e. differences among ‘traditional’ donors fade in 
contrast to non-traditional donors. In the limited literature on this issue so far, 
support for the first perspective seems stronger as an increasing number of 
studies have shown that the presence of China or other BRICS makes 
coordination more challenging. More specifically, due to the presence of a 
large emerging donor, traditional donors are more likely to engage in 
competition with one another in order to secure their access to the local 
government (Carbone, 2016; Fuchs, Nunnenkamp & Ohler, 2015).    
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A seventh and final factor that is put forward in the literature is the set of 
existing donor coordination initiatives. This is important in two ways. First, 
donor coordination in fragile states typically does not start from scratch. On 
the contrary, most partner countries have already a set of existing initiatives 
and frameworks in place that need to be taken into account and limit what is 
possible in the future. For example, research has shown that the existence of 
Nordic Plus and donor-wide coordination frameworks in Tanzania and Zambia 
constrained EU donor coordination in both countries (Delputte & Orbie, 2014). 
Furthermore, at a more general level, various studies show that donor and 
partner countries are increasingly experiencing “general aid effectiveness 
fatigue” (Leiderer, 2015; 445) and even coordination overdose, which hamper 
their willingness to engage in new or existing coordination efforts. For obvious 
reasons, this constraining factor is more likely to appear in fragile states with a 
high number of existing donor coordination initiatives (Carbone, 2016; 
Leiderer, 2015; Eyben, 2012; OECD, 2011).   
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
The central aim of this study was to improve our understanding of current 
knowledge on donor coordination in fragile states through a systematic review 
of the literature on this topic, covering both academic research and policy 
evaluations. In Section 2, we established conceptual clarity and provided a 
better understanding of the different dimensions of coordination. Section 3 
identified the specific challenges of donor coordination in fragile states, 
reflecting on overall progress, reviewing the different instruments and 
approaches, and assessing the role of the main actors engaged in donor 
coordination in fragile states. Finally, Section 4 identified the relevant enabling 
and constraining factors for successful coordination and Joint Implementation 
in fragile states.  
 
In this final section we summarise the six major conclusions of the study. 
 
• First, this literature review points to a fascinating paradox about the 
general climate for donor coordination in recent years. On the one hand, 
over the past decade, support for coordination has declined remarkably. 
Indeed, the spirit of the Paris Agenda and the momentum that this created 
for increased donor coordination has clearly waned. Interestingly, 
coordination efforts of all types and formats are still taking place and new 
initiatives are still being launched. This paradox merits further investigation 
into the motivations of development donors to engage in coordination 
efforts. 
• Second, so far, no comprehensive and systematic study has been done on 
donor coordination in fragile states. Existing studies typically focus on one 
specific aspect or level of coordination, often in relation to a particular 
country or sector. Also, no attempts have been made to integrate findings 
from the different strands of literature that have been identified in this 
study on what works and what does not work. This clearly indicates the 
need for a comprehensive and systematic study into donor coordination at 
different levels, taking into account not only coordination initiatives at 
headquarters level (top down), but also, and even more importantly, the 
mechanisms at the partner country level (bottom up). 
• Third, there is an overall consensus in the literature that all the 
coordination initiatives have the potential to contribute to improved aid 
effectiveness in fragile states, eventually leading to better development 
outcomes. However, all coordination mechanisms suffer from different 
shortcomings, which have again not been systematically investigated.  
• Fourth, this applies in particular to joint implementation, as research into 
both the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ variants has been relatively limited. The 
proliferation of pooled funding arrangements, which differ considerably on 
various indicators and not least in terms of alignment with the partner 
country’s systems, can be difficult in fragile states and requires more in-
depth evaluation.  
• Fifth, the literature has identified a wide variety of constraining and 
enabling factors for successful coordination. However, so far, no in-depth 
understanding has been gained of the mechanisms behind these 
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explanations. Hence the need for a deeper analysis of how these factors 
interact with each during coordination processes in the partner countries. 
• Sixth, existing studies are unclear about the role of the EU regarding donor 
coordination in fragile states. While the EU is certainly considered to be 
more than just another (European) donor, there is far less clarity about its 
role in terms of coordination. This fuzziness about what the EU is and 
ought to be calls for more evidence-based analysis of its dual role as a 
donor and coordinator.  
 
  
46 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
6. REFERENCES 
AFGH (2011). Aid effectiveness for health Towards the 4th High-Level Forum, 
Busan 2011: Making Health Aid Work Better. Action for Global Health, April. 
Andersen, O.W. & Broegaard, E. (2012). The political economy of joint 
evaluations. Evaluation 18(1) 
Annen, K. & Moers, L. (2012). Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid 
Fragmentation. IMF working paper, 12/204.  
Balcik, B., Beamon, B.M., Krejci, C., Muramatsu, K. & Ramirez, M. (2010). 
Coordination in humanitarian relief chains: Practices, challenges and 
opportunities. International Journal of Production Economics, 126(1). 
Barakat, S., Rzeszut, K., and Martin, N. (2012). 'What is the Track Record of 
Multi Donor Trust Funds in Improving Aid Effectiveness? An Assessment of 
the Available Evidence'. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research 
Unit, Institute of Education, University of London. 
Bigsten, A. & Tengstam, S. (2015). International coordination and the 
effectiveness of aid. World Development, 69.  
Bigsten A, Platteau J & Tengstam S. (2011). The Aid Effectiveness Agenda: 
The benefits of going ahead. Study commissioned by the European 
Commission. 
Bodenstein, T., Faust, J. & Furness, M. (2016). European Union Development 
Policy: collective action in times of global transformation and domestic crisis͛, 
Development Policy Review, 2016, 0(0): 1-13. 
Bourguignon, F. & Platteau, J.P. (2015). The Hard Challenge of Aid 
Coordination. World Development, Vol 69, May 2015, pp. 86–97. 
BTC (2013). Reflectie over Belgische bilaterale ontwikkelingssamenwerking in 
de gezondheidssector. Democratische Republiek Congo. Zendingsverslag 
Dr. Paul Bossyns Dr. Marleen Bosmans Eric de Milliano Dr. Paul Verle, 7-12 
April. 
Bué, C. (2010) La politique de développement de l’Union Européenne. 
Construction et projection de l’Europe par le Sud, PhD Thesis, Institut 
d’Etudes Politiques, Paris. 
Bürcky, U. (2011). Trends in In-country Aid Fragmentation and Donor 
Proliferation. An Analysis of Changes in Aid Allocation Patterns between 
2005 and 2009. Report on behalf of the OECD Task Team on Division of 
Labour and Complementarity.  
Carbone, M. (2016). Make Europe happen on the ground? Enabling and 
constraining factors for European Union aid coordination in Africa. Dev 
Policy Rev. doi:10.1111/dpr.12194. 
Carbone, M. (2013). Between EU actorness and aid effectiveness: the logics 
of EU aid to sub-Saharan Africa. International Relations, 27(3), pp. 341-355. 
Calleja, D., Rachael, D. & Rowlands, D. (2015). Donor competition for 
influence in recipient countries. NPSIA working paper series, No 2.  
Carlsson, B.T., Schubert, C.B. & Robinson, S. (2009). ‘The aid effectiveness 
Agenda: benefits of a European Approach’, Hemel Hempstead, Brussels, 
HTSPE, European Commission.  
Coppin, E., Manuel, M., and McKechnie, A. (2011b). ‘Fragile states: 
measuring what makes a good pooled fund’, Project Briefing 58. 
47 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/7266.pdf London: ODI. 
Daerden, S. (2011). EU Aid Co-ordination and Aid Effectiveness, Manchester 
Metropolitan University (online paper).  
De Catheu, J. (2013). Budget Support in Fragile States: Feeding the Beast or 
Building Resilience? EUI Working Papers, 2013/25.  
Del Biondo, K. (2011). EU aid conditionality in ACP countries: explaining 
inconsistency in EU sanctions practice. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH, 7(3), 380–395. 
Delputte, S. & Orbie, J. (2014). The EU and Donor Coordination on the 
Ground: Perspectives from Tanzania and Zambia. European Journal of 
Development Research 26(5). 
DEVCO, EEAS & NEAR (2016). Joint Programming Technical Seminar, 
presentation, Brussels, 14 November.  
Delputte, S. (2013). The European Union as an emerging coordinator in 
development cooperation: an analysis of EU coordination in Tanzania, 
Zambia, Burkina Faso and Senegal. Ph.D. dissertation, Ghent University. 
De Maesschalck, F., Gagiano, A., Molenaers, N., Renard, R. & Verbeke, K. 
(2014). Report. Basket Funds in fragile states. IOB, Antwerp.  
DFID (2014). Operational Plan 2011-2016 - South Sudan: Updated December 
2014. 
DFID (2010). Working effectively in conflict-affected and fragile situations. 
Briefing paper, March. 
DFID (2005). ‘Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states’ DFID, 
Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments Team/ Aid Effectiveness Team 
Policy Division, DFID. 
DFID (2004). Improving the Development Response in Difficult Environments: 
Lessons from DFID Experience PRDE Working Paper 4 Poverty Reduction 
in Difficult Environments, Team/ Aid Effectiveness Team Policy Division. 
Dijkstra, G., de Kemp, A. & Bergkamp, D. (2012). Case studies budget 
support: conditional results. Review of an instrument (2000-2011). Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, IOB, The Hague.  
Eichenauer, V. & Knack, S. (2016). Poverty and Policy Selectivity of World 
Bank Trust Funds, Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank Group.  
ECDPM. (2016). ‘Living apart together – EU development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid in situations of fragility and protracted crisis’, Discussion 
Paper No 206. 
ECDPM. (2015). Stepping up? Best practice in Joint Programming and 
Prospect for EU Joint Cooperation Strategies. Discussion paper, No. 183, 
Decembe.  
ECDPM. (2013). All for one, free-for-all? Early experiences in joint 
programming. Briefing note, No 50. 
ECORYS. (2016).  ￼Evaluation of the EU aid delivery mechanism of 
delegated cooperation (2007-2014) – Executive Summary. valuation carried 
out on behalf of the European Commission, November. 
Elgström, O. & Delputte, S. (2016). An end to Nordic exceptionalism? 
Europeanisation and Nordic development policies. European Politics and 
Society, vol 17(1).  
48 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
ERD (2009) Overcoming Fragility in Africa, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole. 
Ericsson, F. and S. Steensen (2014). “Where do we stand on the aid 
orphans?”, OECD-DAC Development Brief, OECD, Paris, available at: 
www.oecd.org/dac/aid-
architecture/Aid%20Orphans%20Development%20Brief.pdf. 
Esman, M. & Cheever, D. (1967). The common aid effort: the development 
assistance activities of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. Ohio: State University Press.  
Ehrhart, H. G., & Petretto, K. (2012). EU, the Somalia Challenge, and 
Counter-piracy: Towards a Comprehensive Approach, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 17, 261. 
EuropeAid (2011). Delegated cooperation: state of play. Presentation 13 
December.  
European Union, United Nations & World Bank (2008). Joint Declaration on 
Post Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning.  
European Parliament (2015). The challenge of coordinating European 
development policies. Fragmentation, a disaster? Brussels, European 
Parliament Research Service (EPRS).  
European Union (2016). Proposal for a new European Consensus on 
Development. Our world, our dignity, our future. Brussels.  
European Union (2015). Information note on multidonor trust funds supported 
by the European Union, DG DEVCO, Brussels.  
European Union (2013). The EU’s comprehensive approach to external 
conflicts and crises. Joint Communication by the European Commission and 
the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. Brussels.  
European Union (2011). Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an 
Agenda for Change, SEC(2011)1172_final, Brussels.  
European Union (2007). Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the 
Division of Labour in Development Policy, Brussels.  
European Union (2005). The European Consensus on Development. 
Brussels.  
Ernst, J. (2011). Aid collaboration in Uganda. International Affairs Review, vol. 
XX(1).  
Faust, J., Koch, S. & Leiderer, S. (2011). Multi-Donor Budget Support: Only 
Halfway to Effective Coordination, GDI/DIE briefing paper, 8/2011.  
Faust, J. (2010). Policy Experiments, Democratic Ownership and 
Development Assistance. Development Policy Review, 28: 515–534. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.2010.00496. 
Fitzgerald, S. (2016).  Delivering Effective Aid to Fragile States. Paper 
presented at NCUR, 7-9 April, 2016.  
Fuess, T. & Saltzmann, M. (2015). What can the G20 contribute to 
international development cooperation? GDI/DIE, Column, September.  
Fuchs, A., P., & Öhler, H. (2015). Why donors of foreign aid do not 
coordinate: The role of competition for export markets and political support. 
The World Economy, 38(2), 255-285. 
ISO 690  
49 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
Furness, M. & Vollmer, F. (2013). EU joint programming: Lessons from South 
Sudan for EU aid coordination. GDI/DIE briefing paper 18/2013.  
GPEDC (2014). Progress since Busan: Supporting transitions towards 
resilience. Preliminary results of global monitoring of the New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States, Presented at HLM GPEDC, Mexico City, 15-
16 April. 
IDPS (2014). New Deal Monitoring Report 2014.  
IOB (2011). Unfinished Business: Making a Difference in Basic Education. An 
Evaluation of the Impact of Education Policies in Zambia and the Role of 
Budget Support. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (IOB 
Evaluation no. 352): the Hague. 
Janus, H., Klingebiel, S. and Mahn, T. (2014). How to Shape Development 
Cooperation? The Global Partnership and the Development Cooperation 
Forum. Briefing Paper 3/2014.  
Gänzle, S., Makhan, D. & Grimm, S. (eds.) (2012). The European Union and 
global development : an enlightened superpower in the making? Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Garassi, D. & Allen, R. (2016). Review of Experiences with Post-Conflict 
Needs Assessments. Study commissioned by the World Bank Group, 
European Union and United Nations.  
Hayman, R. (2006). The Complexity of Aid: Government strategies, donor 
agendas and the coordination of development assistance in Rwanda 1994-
2004. (Unpublished PhD Thesis), The University of Edinburgh.  
Hearn, S. (2016). Independent Review Of The New Deal For Engagement In 
Fragile States. New York University.  
Hearn, S. & Zimmerman, T. (2014). A New Deal for Somalia? : The Somali 
Compact and its Implications for Peacebuilding. New York University.  
Hayman, A. (1975). The international aid effort: sharing the burden. World 
Affairs, 138(1). 
Horita, A. (2014). Examining the Conceptual Frameworks of Aid Effectiveness 
and Development Effectiveness in the Context of Cambodia’s Agricultural 
Sector. PhD, University of Auckland.  
Hughes, J., Hooley, T., Hage, S. & Ingram, G. (2014). Implementing the New 
Deal for Fragile States, The Brookings Institution, Policy Paper, 2014-02. 
Keddir, A. (2011). Donor Coordination in Fragile States of Africa: Capacity 
building for peace and poverty reduction. World Journal of Entrepreneurship, 
Management and Sustainable Development, 7(2), pp. 307-356.  
Kjelmman, K.E., Harpviken, K., Millard, A. & Strand, A. (2003). Acting as one? 
Co-ordinating responses to the landmine problem. Third World Quarterly, 
24(5).  
Klingebiel, S., Negre, M. & Morazán, P. (2016). Costs, Benefits and the 
Political Economy of Aid Coordination: The Case of the European Union 
European Journal of Development Research, doi:10.1057/ejdr.2015.84. 
Klingebiel, S., Mahn, T. & Negre, M. (eds.) (2016). The Fragmentation of Aid: 
Concepts, Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation, 
London: Palgrave Mac Millan.  
Klingebiel, S., Morazán, P. and Negre, M. (2013). Cost of Non-Europe in 
Development Policy. Research paper by the Südwest Institut. 
50 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
Koch, S. & Molenaers, N. (2016). The Europeanisation of budget support: do 
government capacity and autonomy matter? European Politics and Society, 
vol. 17(1).  
Lawson, M.L. (2013). Foreign Aid: International Donor Coordination of 
Development Assistance. CRS report for US Congress.  
Leblanc, R. & Beaulieu, P. (2006). Evaluation of Coordination and 
Complementarity of European Assistance to Local Development: with 
Reference to the 3C Principles of the Maastricht Treaty. Joint evaluation 
commissioned by SIDA, ADA, DGD et al.  
Leiderer, S. (2015). Donor Coordination for Effective Government Policies?. 
Journal of International Development, 27: 1422–1445. doi: 10.1002/jid.3184. 
Leiderer, S. (2013). Donor coordination for effective government policies. 
Implementation of the new aid effectiveness agenda in health and education 
in Zambia. UNU-WIDER, Working paper, No 49/2013.  
Leiderer, S. & Faust, J. (2012). Evaluation of budget support in Zambia: 
implementation, direct effects and political economy. GDI/DIE studies, vol. 
68.  
Leiderer, S. (2010). Budget support as an aid instrument. Neither 
pandemonium nor panacea. GDI/DIE briefing paper, 9/2010.  
Mackie, J. (2016). How Serious Is the EU on Aid Fragmentation? In 
Klingebiel, S., Mahn, T. & Negre, M. (eds.) (2016). The Fragmentation of Aid: 
Concepts, Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation, 
London: Palgrave Mac Millan.  
Manuel, M. et al. (2012). Innovative aid instruments and flexible financing: 
Providing better support to fragile states, Overseas Development Institute, 
London. 
Michaelowa, K., Reinsberg, B., & Schneider, C. (2016). Multi‐bi Aid in 
European Development Assistance: The Role of Capacity Constraints and 
Member State Politics. Development Policy Review. 
Meghani, A., Abdulwahab, A., Privor-Dumm, L. Wonodi, C. (2015). Basket 
Funds: A pooled arrangement to finance primary health care delivery and 
address the funding flow in Nigeria. John Hopkins Policy paper. Accessed at: 
http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-
institutes/ivac/resources/Basket_Funds_pooled_arrangement_to_finance_pri
mary_health_care.pdf 
Mossello, B., Mason, N. & Aludra, R. (2016). Improving WASH service 
delivery in protracted crises. The case of South-Sudan. ODI report, August.  
Mürle, H. (2007). Towards a Division of Labour in European Development Co-
operation: Operational Costs. GDI/DIE discussion paper, 6/2007.   
Ndikumana, L. (2015). The Role of Foreign Aid in Post-Conflict Countries 
Léonce Ndikumana, CRPD Working Paper No. 30. 
Nunnenkamp, P., Sotirova, A. & Thiele, R. (2016). Do aid donors specialize 
and coordinate within recipient countries? The case of Malawi. Development 
Policy Review, 34(6).  
NORAD (2009). Nordic Plus Practical guide to delegated cooperation. 
NORAD (2006). Nordic Plus Practical guide to delegation cooperation.  
OECD (2000). Effective Practices in Conducting a Joint Multi-Donor 
Evaluation. 
51 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
OECD (2005). Joint Evaluations: Recent Experiences, Lessons Learned and 
Options for the Future.  
OECD (2016a). States of Fragility 2016: understanding violence. OECD 
publishing: Paris.  
OECD (2016b). Good Development Support In Fragile, At-Risk And Crisis 
Affected Contexts. OECD Development Policy Papers, March 2016  No. 4. 
OECD (2016c). Converged Statistical Reporting Directives, 
DCD/DAC(2016)3Final.  
OECD (2015). States of Fragility 2015: Meeting post-2015. OECD publishing: 
Paris.  
OECD (2014a). Where do we stand on the aid orphans? OECD-DAC 
Development Brief.  
OECD (2014b). Fragile States 2014: Domestic Revenue Mobilisation. Paris: 
OECD. 
OECD (2012). Peer review 2012: European Union. Paris: OECD.  
OECD (2011a). Where do we stand on aid orphans. OECD Development 
Brief. 
OECD (2011b). Report on division of labour: addressing cross-country 
fragmentation of aid. 
OECD (2010). Managing Joint Evaluations.  
OECD (2008). Accra Agenda for Action. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2008b). Aid Effectiveness. A Progress Report On Implementing The 
Paris Declaration. Paris: OECD.  
OECD (2006). Whole Of Government Approaches To Fragile States. Paris: 
OECD.  
OECD (2005). Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Paris: OECD.  
OECD (2003). Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery. Paris: 
OECD publishing. 
OPM (2010). Evaluation of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) 
2007–2010: Oxford Policy Management; online: 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/zambia/46750073.pdfOPM/IDL (2008). 
Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration. Thematic Study – 
The applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict-affected 
situations.   
Orbie, J. (2012). The EU as an actor in development: just another donor, 
European norm maker, or eclipsed by superpower temptations? In S. Grimm, 
D. Makhan, & S. Gänzle (eds.), The European Union and global 
development : an enlightened superpower in the making? (pp. 17–36). 
Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Pirozzi, N. (2013). The EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management. 
DCAF Brussels, EU Crisis Management Paper Series.  
Reinsberg, B. (2016). The Implications of Multi-bi Financing for Multilateral 
Agencies: The Example of the World Bank, in Klingebiel, S., Mahn, T. & 
Negre, M. (eds.) (2016). The Fragmentation of Aid: Concepts, 
Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation, London: 
Palgrave Mac Millan. 
Reinsberg, B., Michaelowa, K., & Eichenauer, V. (2015). “The rise of multi-bi 
aid and the proliferation of trust funds.” In: Arvin, M.B., and Lew, B. (eds.). 
Handbook on the Economics of Foreign Aid. Edward Elgar.  
52 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
Rijksoverheid Nederland, (2012). Meerjarige Strategische Plannen Zuid-
Sudan. Den Haag. Ronald, C. (2011). Costs and benefits of coordination of 
United Nations Operational Activities for Development, Study commissioned 
by UN DESA. 
Sachs, J.; Warner, A. (2001). "The curse of natural resources". European 
Economic Review. 45 (4–6): 827–838. doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8.  
Seybolt, T. (2009). Harmonizing the Humanitarian Aid Network: Adaptive 
Change in a Complex System. International Studies Quarterly, 53, pp. 1027-
1050.  
SIDA (2008). Program based approaches. Guiding principles for SIDA. 
Sweden: Stockholm.  
Schulz, N.J. (2009). International Division of Labour: A Test Case for the 
Partnership Paradigm. Analytical framework and methodology for country 
studies. Fride working paper, 79, February 2009.  
Schulpen, L. & Habraken, R. (2016). Measuring Cross-Country Proliferation: 
Towards a New Non-proliferation Treaty?, in Klingebiel, S., Mahn, T. & 
Negre, M. (eds.) (2016). The Fragmentation of Aid: Concepts, 
Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation, London: 
Palgrave Mac Millan.  
Stratmann, G. (2000). Donor Coordination of Economic Assistance to Eastern 
Europe: Mechanisms and Origins of Sectoral Governance in International 
Relations. Münster: LIT Verlag.  
Söderbaum, F. & Stalgren, P. (2008). EU Development Co-operation and the 
ACP Countries, EUIA conference, 2008, Brussels: 24 April. 
Telford, J., Cosgrave, J. and Houghton, R. (2006) Joint evaluation of the 
international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report. TEC.  
Toh, K. & Kasturi, P. (2014). Rethinking Foreign Aid for Fragile States. 
Journal of Economics and Development Studies, 2(4).   
Verschaeve, J. & Orbie, J. (2016). The DAC is dead, long live the DCF? A 
comparative analysis of the legitimacy of the OECD’s DAC and the UN’s 
DCF. Development Policy Review.  
Wennmann, A. (2010). Grasping the Strengths of Fragile States: Aid 
Effectiveness Between 'Top-Down' and 'Bottom-Up' Statebuilding, Graduate 
Institute of International and Development Studies, CCDP Working Paper 
No. 6. 
Wenzel, S., Bürcky, U. & Knill, P. (2010). Third Monitoring Report and 
Progress review of the EU fast track initiative on division of labour. Brussels: 
European Commission.  
Whittington, D. and Calhoun, C. (1988). Who Really Wants Donor Co-
ordination? Development Policy Review, 6: 295–309. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
7679.1988.tb00457. 
Wohlgemuth, L. and Saasa, O. (2008). Changing aid relations in Zambia. 
Maastricht, the Netherlands: ECDPM. Discussion Paper No. 83.  
Woods, N. (2011). Rethinking  aid coordination, in H. Kharas, K. Makino, and 
W. Jung (eds.) Catalyzing Development. A new vision for aid, Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press.  
Woods, N., Welsch, J. (2007). Exporting good governance: Temptations and 
challenges in Canada’s Aid Program. Center for International Governance 
Innovation: Wilfried Laurier University Press.  
53 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
World Bank (2011). World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and 
Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank (2011b). Trust Fund Support for Development. An Evaluation of 
the World Bank’s Trust Fund Portfolio. IEG review.  
World Bank (2006). Engaging with fragile states: an IEG review of World Bank 
support to low-income countries under stress. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank. (1999). The Drive to Partnership: Aid Coordination and the World 
Bank. Washington: World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
54 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
 
II. HEADQUARTER ANALYSIS 
 
 
The analysis of headquarter (HQ) centered initiatives on European 
coordination reveal a paradox: while the number of new initiatives is 
limited, in line with the generally declining political momentum for 
European coordination, we equally notice a growing dynamic for 
coordination through (1) shared analysis and trainings from EU institutions, 
(2) the emergence of trust fund initiatives, (3) the application of joint 
programming, and most notably (4) field-driven coordination initiatives. 
Following an analysis of these evolutions, this report summarizes the 
enabling and constraining factors have been identified to account for these 
tendencies. Finally, we conclude with some reflections on the role of the EU in 
this regard. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Phase 1 concerns the headquarters (HQ) level analysis of European 
coordination in fragile states. It builds on the literature review and sets the 
basis for research at field level. 
The general objectives of this phase are (a) mapping which coordination 
initiatives have been steered from HQs, with particular attention for examples 
that are considered successful and from which lessons can be drawn, and (b) 
better understanding the emergence of these coordination initiatives, the level 
of ownership at HQ level, formalization etc, with particular attention for 
enabling and constraining factors as they are perceived by interviewees.  
Methodologically, 57 interviews have been taken with representatives of 
different donors and agencies based in Brussels and other European capitals. 
The interviews were semi-structured as the survey and framework outlined in 
the methodological note has been used as a guideline, while sufficient room 
was left for flexibility depending on the interviewees’ input. The interviewees 
represent both diplomats and practitioners (including fragility experts) and 
altogether cover 8 member states. Within the EU institutions, 4 officials 
working at the European External Action Service (EEAS) and 7 officials 
working at the European Commission (DEVCO B7, DEVCO A2 and ECHO) 
have been interviewed. While most interviewees are based in European 
capitals, also a number of practitioners at field level have been interviewed 
(e.g. for the Gaziantep case). Interviews were attended by at least two team 
members and have generally been followed-up by providing the interviewee 
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with the provisional findings in the framework and asking for further additions, 
clarifications and modifications.  
This phase has resulted in this synthesis document with a summary of and 
reflections on the main findings from this HQ phase, and an elaboration of the 
Gaziantep and Somali Compact case studies (see Notes 1.1 and 1.2 in 
annex).  
2. WHAT? PARADOX 
2.1. Limited headquarter-centered initiatives 
Interviews largely confirmed the finding from the literature review that the 
momentum for EU coordination for development, which characterized many 
initiatives since the mid-2000s in the stream of the international aid 
effectiveness agenda, has been declining in the European capitals. 
References to the EU initiatives on division of labour and complementarity, to 
the aid effectiveness agenda, or to the (old and new) European Consensus 
are very limited. Interviewees would rarely refer spontaneously to these 
initiatives. 
Instead, most interviewees (including fragility experts) spontaneously 
refer to initiatives in the field. Even when probing explicitly for HQ steered 
initiatives on European coordination in fragile states, examples given would 
mostly refer to coordination activities within countries of the Global South (and 
not only fragile countries). This is particularly true for interviewees based in 
European capitals. While one might have expected a diversity of European 
cooperation initiatives in relation to fragile states – either highly or lowly 
institutionalized, involving few or many member states – the main finding is 
that these have not emerged from the interviews.6 
This finding does not only hold for EU/Europe-wide coordination initiatives. It 
was equally difficult to find ‘mini-lateral’ or ‘intra-European’ initiatives for 
coordination in fragile states between a limited number of European countries. 
Given the different visions on development policy within Europe, that are 
historically grown and anchored in domestic politics, one might have expected 
that smaller groups of like-minded countries would more easily engage in 
coordination initiatives among themselves instead of at the EU-wide level. 
However, at least at HQ level, such ‘mini-lateral’ or ‘intra-European’ initiatives 
barely emerged.  
While the Visegrad countries (in particular Czech Republic and Slovak 
Republic) have intentions to cooperate more intensively in specific countries, 
this remains at an embryonic level. There has been some coordination 
between the ‘Southern’ member states (specifically, Spain, Italy and/or 
                                                             
6 Interestingly, the PN was often mentioned as a useful forum for European coordination, but this 
is obviously not intended to be the focus of the study. Also the Capacity4Dev initiative and its 
‘resilience and fragility group’ were mentioned a few times. 
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France) but only in the context of Trust Funds in Africa (see below). Although 
the Nordics have long been considered like-minded countries in development, 
their coordination towards fragile states has not been strengthened in recent 
years. It was even indicated that Nordic cooperation has been declining over 
the past year, a finding that corresponds with recent studies on this topic (see 
literature review). However, the Somali Compact example may indicate that 
Nordic like-mindedness continues to play in some cases, and also reference 
was made to delegated cooperation between Nordic countries in fragile states 
such as Niger, Somalia and Zimbabwe. No explicit references were made to 
the Nordic+ group. 
In the absence of concrete information on European coordination initiatives, a 
number of general EU policy documents have been mentioned by 
interviewees. For example, there were references to the EU Gender Action 
Plan (2015); the EU Action Plan on human rights and democracy (2015); the 
Commission Communication on Resilience (2012); the EEAS/Commission 
Communication on the EU’s comprehensive approach to conflict and crisis 
(2013), the EU’s Global Strategy (2016), and the upcoming new Resilience 
Communication (2017). However, these documents are either not very new 
and/or of more of a declaratory, general political nature. Similarly, also at the 
global level a number of general political commitments have been identified, 
most prominently the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (see 
literature review; see Somali Compact case). While there may be a 
European/EU coordination dimension to the emergence and implementation 
of the New Deal (see the Somali Compact case), this is not a specific 
EU/European coordination initiative. Moreover, existing coordination schemes 
such as the Joint Programming exercises or the Mutual Reliance Initiative 
(see below) do not focus specifically on fragile states.  
Again, the main finding holds that general operational initiatives on 
European coordination towards fragile states have barely been found. 
Moreover, it remains to be seen in the field phase to what extent the above-
mentioned documents effectively inform donors’ and practitioners’ 
coordination practices. 
Despite this sober picture, a number of interesting dynamics are taking 
place that are highly relevant for European coordination in fragile states. 
Indeed, this phase also revealed a growing dynamic for coordination through 
(1) shared analysis and trainings from EU institutions, (2) the emergence of 
trust fund initiatives, (3) the application of joint programming, and most 
notably (4) field-driven coordination initiatives. 
2.2. Shared analysis and trainings 
First, a number of recent initiatives steered from the EU institutions that do 
not qualify as ‘coordination’ narrowly defined, may nevertheless have the 
potential to forge coordination in the medium or longer term. It concerns two 
sets of activities whereby the EU institutions provide services for EU 
member states’ officials and practitioners in terms of analytical capacity. 
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The first set concerns shared analysis of the situation in fragile states, based 
on the premise that a common understanding of the root causes of fragility 
are key to joint action between European donors and practitioners. 
Specifically, within the European Commission (DEVCO B7, Fragility and 
Crisis Management Unit) and the EEAS (Conflict Prevention, Peace-Building 
and Mediation Instruments Division) a number of Conflict Analysis and Early 
Warning System analysis tools have been developed. Based on shared 
analysis, comprehensive EU action would be facilitated. For instance, 
interactive 1-2 days conflict analysis workshops are considered.  
However, it is yet unclear to what extent EU member states have been 
involved in the process of this joint analysis and how successful these have 
been. The ‘Guidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU 
external action’ highlights the relevance of this approach, yet also emphasizes 
the benefits for EU staff and the possible drawbacks of involving other 
stakeholders including EU member states. It is unclear to what extent 
representatives of EU member states and development practitioners have 
been involved in the design and implementation of these shared analyses 
exercises (shared analysis versus joint analysis), and how they evaluate them.  
The second set concerns trainings that are organized in the framework of the 
EEAS-based European Security and Defense College. DEVCO and ECHO 
attempt to integrate respectively the development and humanitarian aid 
perspective into these trainings, which are offered for EU and member states 
staff. An example is the joint DEVCO-EEAS training on ‘Fragility, Security and 
Development in a Changing World’ that is organized with participation from 
the EU Member States. Also trainings on ‘Conflict Analysis’ and ‘Security 
Sector Reform’ include perspectives from DEVCO and ECHO, and are always 
attend by member state participants.  
Again, it is clear that these can potentially play a catalyst role in forging a 
common European approach to fragile states, thereby facilitating coordination 
between European donors and practitioners. Organizers acknowledge the 
relevance of “mixing development people with the military crowd”. However, 
the impact of these trainings remains to be analyzed, as evaluations from a 
development practitioners’ perspective are not available. The fact that none of 
our interviewees mentioned these trainings may indicate that they are still 
insufficiently known within the capitals.7 It seems likely that these trainings are 
still largely directed towards the ‘Brussels bubble’ and that they target more 
foreign policy oriented officials and diplomats, whereas development 
practitioners are not aware of this potentially promising practice of 
coordination. 
2.3. Emergence of Trust Funds 
Second, the emergence of Trust Funds equally provide an opportunity for 
(European) coordination. Pooling European resources under an EU-managed 
                                                             
7 Similarly, joint missions were not mentioned.  
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fund for a specific purpose and/or region has become an increasingly popular 
instruments for cooperation with the Global South in recent years. Noticeable 
examples mentioned by interviewees and relevant for fragile states are the 
Bêkou Trust Fund, the Madad Trust Fund, the Afghanistan Reconstruction 
Trust Fund, and the EU’s Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (that includes 
three regional windows).  
These potentially provide a promising avenue for European coordination, 
specifically targeted at fragile states. For instance, the interviews made it clear 
that the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has allowed for coordination 
between Spain and Italy in Senegal, between Spain and France in Senegal, 
and between Spain and France in Niger. The Bêkou Trust Fund has facilitated 
cooperation between the EU institutions and France, Germany and the 
Netherlands in the CAR.  
The opportunities for cooperation within these relatively new structures could 
certainly be exploited more. However, it should be noticed that these funds 
have not primarily been established for the purpose of coordination. 
Increased European coordination is at best a desirable side effect. Instead, 
flexibility, efficiency and impact have been priority motivations behind the 
creation of trust funds, in response to domestic (European) interests such as 
migration flows in the context of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. 
Interviewees frequently criticized the legitimacy of the trust funds modalities. 
In particular, the Emergency Trust Fund has been criticized by several 
interviewees. It is generally perceived to be limited in transparency of 
decision-making processes at HQ level (e.g. limited input in decision-making, 
unclear technical guidelines…) on the one hand, and for lacking ownership by 
partner country governments (e.g. TF managers based in Brussels) on the 
other hand.8  
Even apart from these critiques, the extent to which the trust funds have been 
a window of opportunity or a missed opportunity for enhanced 
coordination remains to be researched. Interviewees’ responses suggest that 
so far the trust funds have not always been coordination-enhancing and that 
they have not (yet) served as a tool for joint implementation.9 
2.4. Mutual Reliance Initiative 
Another HQ steered initiative that combines the financial resources of several 
donors is the Mutual Reliance Initiative (MRI). Established in 2011, the MRI 
allows AFD, KfW and EIB to co-finance each other’s investment projects in 
EU partner countries. This allows for a larger project finance capacity through 
a structured division of labour. It implies delegation to one ‘lead’ institution by 
the other(s) of most of the work in terms of appraisal and monitoring of a 
given project. Following a test phase in 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
                                                             
8 In this regard the Colombia Trust Fund was cited as a better practice because the trust fund 
manager is based in Bogota. 
9 The finding that Joint Implementation is rarely happening also resonates with the ongoing (not 
yet published) evaluation on Joint Programming (p.22).  
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North Africa and the Middle East, MRI Operational Guidelines have been 
developed.10 The MRI is more modest compared to e.g. the EU Emergency 
Trust Fund for Africa in terms of budgets involved, number of partners (three 
‘like-minded’ development banks: EIB, KfW and AFD) and procedures (mostly 
mutual recognition instead of harmonization). It effectively implements a 
division of labour between the institutions, based on their respective expertise. 
Also the Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the Latin-America Investment 
Facility have been mentioned by interviewees. These constitute blending 
facilities involving several EU member states.  
However, contrary to the abovementioned Trust Funds, the MRI is not 
specifically targeting fragile states, which makes it difficult to be context 
sensitive in its implementation.  
2.5. Application of Joint Programming 
Third, Joint Programming has often been cited as a major approach towards 
European cooperation in fragile states. Although initiatives for joint 
programming date back to the early 2010s, it has now become to be seen as 
normal practice. Joint Programming exercises are still in an experimental 
phase, with only recently a number of divergent practices emerging in some 
countries from which lessons could be drawn. In the interviews, reference was 
often made to Joint Programming in Palestine, which seems to be a ‘best 
case’ example, whereas Joint Programming in other fragile states such as 
Haiti, CAR, Niger or the DRC was considered less successful.  
Perhaps paradoxically, while the political momentum for Joint Programming in 
the EU context may not be as big as it once was, the practice of Joint 
Programming has only just started. Furthermore, there seem opportunities 
to widen the JP exercise by including wider considerations relating to e.g. 
climate change and even security policy, although this equally raises a 
number of challenges.  
There is a wide recognition that JP is not a magic formula that can be applied 
from headquarters’ level, and that this should be primarily steered from the 
field. In those instances where JP appears relatively successful, it builds on 
pre-existing collaboration between donors and/or agencies. It is also generally 
acknowledged that effective JP would require a strong leadership from the EU 
and its Delegations in third countries, and that there is scope for 
improvements in this regard. For instance, it was mentioned that the EU could 
do more to streamline procedures, contracts etc., and also that it could 
provide training sessions for EU member states and their agencies in the field 
(in order to enhance knowledge with practitioners). In general, it remains to be 
seen to what extent Joint Programming can effectively lead to Joint 
Implementation. 
                                                             
10 http://www.eib.org/products/blending/mri/index.htm 
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2.6. Field-driven coordination initiatives 
Fourth, European coordination initiatives on the ground seem to be 
proliferating in several third countries. Indeed, the many examples given by 
interviewees suggest that within fragile states (and other developing 
countries) a diversity of coordination practices between (a number of) EU 
member state donors and agencies, with varying degrees of 
institutionalization, has been initiated in recent years.  
Interviewees most frequently referred to such initiatives, even when 
explicitly asked to focus on European headquarter-centered 
coordination. Cases in point are the AFD-KfW Partnership in Jordan, G13 
and EUROCLIMA (in Latin America), cooperation between Belgium and the 
Netherlands in the policy sector in Burundi, Czech Republic and Slovak 
Republic cooperation plans in the water and sanitation sector in Moldova, 
AECID and IDB cooperation under a Fund to Finance SMEs in Haiti, the 
Cruda programme with France, GIZ and AECID in Lebanon, Turkey and 
Jordan, EU, France and German cooperation in some sectors in Laos, etc.11  
Noticeable initiatives that merit further research are the Gaziantep Initiative 
involving pooled expertise of GIZ and Expertise France (facilitated by the 
EEAS) based in Turkey and implemented in Syria, and the Somali Compact 
involving all donors in the country (see Notes 1.1 and 1.2 in annex). 
The examples given frequently do not concern fragile states. Even if explicitly 
asking for examples from crisis and fragile contexts, interviewees often 
spontaneously came up with examples from other countries. This is probably 
because the best cases are usually not in fragile states as coordinating in 
fragile states is more challenging. Indeed, several interviewees stressed 
that (European) coordination in fragile states involves considerable 
constraints compared to other contexts, not least because of the volatility of 
the situation on the ground and the weakness of the local government(s).  
At the same time, it is widely confirmed that coordination is all the more 
needed in a fragile context. Importantly, the significance of enhanced 
coordination is not put into question (“In fragile contexts it is almost natural to 
work together with other actors”). Interviewees also came up with several 
examples how this could be done, e.g. by concluding more Delegated 
Cooperation agreements. 
In addition, it was often emphasized that in such a context, flexibility for 
local practitioners and diplomats is all the more important. Sufficient 
room of manoeuvre from HQ is considered to be an enabling factor for 
coordination in fragile states. At the same, time, political support from HQ 
level for donor coordination continues to be crucial (although not clarified what 
                                                             
11 In the realm of humanitarian aid, ECHO is involved in various coordination efforts on the 
ground that include practitioners, diplomats and security actors, as part of the EU’s ‘integrated’ 
approach whilst also maintaining its independence. 
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exactly this could entail). Several interviewees emphasized that this is lacking 
and emphasized that HQ should do more to stimulate coordination in the field: 
“coordination is not on the agenda of capitals. It happens at country 
level. This is an obstacle to coordination”  
“we have a joke about the relationship between HQ and the field and 
we define it by delegation by omission. It’s a joke but it reflects this 
laissez-faire attitude”  
“Capitals should intervene more” 
At the same time, the importance of room of manoeuvre from HQ was 
emphasized to allow for bottom-up cooperation initiatives within partner 
countries. These could also be informal coordination (“Whatever works 
informally works well.”) Apart from more political support for coordination 
initiatives, practitioners ask for more flexibility in this regard and less 
administrative requirements. 
When asked for the role of the EU in these local coordination efforts, a wide 
consensus appeared that the EU should play a special role. To be sure, 
officials and practitioners from some EU member states (e.g. France, Spain, 
Italy) seem more inclined to support a strong role of the EU in coordinating in 
fragile states than those based in other member states. Nevertheless, the 
dominant perception is that the EU is not ‘just another donor’. There is 
common ground in the expectation that the EU could and should play some 
sort of facilitating role – not least on the ground and in practical ways. For 
instance, one interviewee suggested the need for common trainings on 
modalities like ‘delegated cooperation’. She voiced a frustration that even 
officials working at the EU Delegation were not fully informed about the 
technicalities of delegated cooperation, which is further complicated by the 
fact that the rules change regularly. A main recommendation was to organize 
trainings on such matters or open up existing trainings to staff of the agencies.  
In sum, whereas there is limited support for a federal state-like authority for 
the EU in development policy (“member states don’t need another UN or 
World Bank”), there seems to be support for a more enabling role (“the EU 
Delegation should not act as an additional member state but should 
coordinate the EU’s approach”). What exactly the EU could do as a ‘service 
provider’ for cooperation in fragile states has not been clarified by 
interviewees in this phase and remains subject for further study. 
3. WHY?  ENABLING AND CONSTRAINING FACTORS 
A large amount of enabling and constraining factors emerged from the 
interviews. While many are context-sensitive, the most important and 
generalizable factors are summarized in Table 1.1. The table also illustrates 
how similar factors can work in both enabling and constraining ways: 
these are indicated on the same line. For instance, politicization can be a 
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driver for coordination in the particular context of Palestine, whereas it can 
also be constraining in that national interests overshadow coordination 
concerns. How it eventually plays out, remains a matter for empirical (field) 
analysis. The table also shows how several explanations are interlinked. For 
instance, individuals’ commitments do matter, but in line with a sociology of 
institutions perspective, this should be seen within a wider institutional context. 
 
Table 1.1: Enabling and constraining factors 
ENABLING  CONSTRAINING 
Characteristics of fragile states 
needs, volatility and complexity 
require quick, flexible and efficient 
(joint) response; “In fragile contexts 
it is almost natural to work together 
with other actors” 
“weak context means there is a 
higher need for coordination, 
especially in the absence of third 
country leadership, therefore we are 
sometimes forced to coordinate” 
 weak state apparatus makes partner 
country ownership of coordination 
efforts makes more complicated 
Politicization and securitization 
high politics interests in fragile 
states may foster coordination 
(Palestine? Afghanistan? 
Emergency Trust Fund? 
 
national interests of member states 
and visibility concerns (national flag; 
donor competition) can make 
coordination more difficult; tendency 
for short-term results 
Interests of donors 
“smaller donors have more incentive 
but less capacity…” 
“We prefer to coordinate with 
European countries because we are 
strongly linked to the EU system.  
We have a preference due to 
common interests.” 
 
“… on the other hand, the bigger 
donors have less incentive and more 
capacity” 
member states’ particular political 
interests in certain countries or 
sectors; “It is a problem with our 
politicians” 
Ideas and identities 
“European family”, shared values 
amongst European member state 
donors and agencies facilitate 
coordination 
“smaller donors can make an input 
where they have special 
 
 
 
“each institution works according to 
its own philosophy” 
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knowledge.” 
Institutions 
EEAS and  
comprehensive/integrated approach 
(incl devt, security, human aid) 
stimulate inter-institutional 
coherence and coordination  
room of manoeuvre and ‘laissez 
faire’ from HQ can facilitate 
coordination 
 
 
EU as a ‘services provider’ (public 
goods for donor community) 
 
some HQ steered initiatives specific 
for fragile states (e.g. Somali 
Compact; TFs; New Deal) 
 
still institutional boundaries within 
HQ, within field, between HQ-field, 
rendering coordination more difficult 
HQ constraints: lack of political 
support form HQ; burdensome 
requirements; or simply no interest in 
coordination (“delegation by 
omission”) 
EU often ‘just another donor’ and 
burdensome requirements; EU trust 
funds not always stimulating 
coordination 
 
some HQ steered coordination 
initiatives (e.g. MRI; JP) not 
specifically designed for fragile states  
Budgets 
limited budgets and economies of 
scale provoke coordination  
 
limited resources and capacities 
make it difficult to engage in often 
time-consuming coordination (“It was 
luxury to coordinate and in fragile 
states we did not have the time for 
that”) 
Individuals 
personalities on the ground 
(practitioners) willing to engage in 
coordination  
Lack of training, knowledge, time or 
commitment (linked to institutional 
incentives) constrains coordination; 
continuity of people is not always 
guaranteed 
 
 
DILEMMA 
COORDINATION FOR WHAT? 
- Aid effectiveness concerns? 
- Political influence? 
- Security and migration interests? 
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Further complicating the analysis is the observation that the purpose of 
coordination is not always clear. In addition to the well-known aid 
effectiveness concerns that have advocated coordination since Paris (2005), 
interviews reveal that also other considerations are at play such as political 
impact with the partner government, and migration and security related 
interests. There are many agendas behind the drive for coordination which 
makes it hard to evaluate the enabling and constraining factors for 
development. Despite the strong case for coordination in fragile states, as 
illustrated in the literature review, coordination may be less development-
friendly if the underlying purposes are of a political, migration or security 
nature. While the politicization and securitization presents a number of 
opportunities for enhanced European coordination in fragile states, it equally 
presents a number of challenges that need to be seriously considered. These 
require careful analysis in the case study phase.  
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III. FIELD RESEARCH 
 
Building on a literature review and headquarter phase, this study focuses on 
European coordination in fragile states based on four country cases: 
Niger, DRC, Haiti and Palestine. Despite numerous constraints against 
coordination, the study identifies 10 interesting practices of coordination in 
these countries. A comparative analysis of these practices, some of which are 
more successful than others, allows drawing lessons on enabling conditions 
for European coordination. This leads to the main finding that successful 
coordination hinges on four conditions: (a) mixing ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ joint 
implementation, (b) involving a small number of like-minded actors, (c) 
finding ways to align with the partner country, and (d) providing 
flexibility for practitioners, while guaranteeing political backing. 
Importantly, each of these should be combined to allow for successful 
coordination. We conclude that the European Union could and should play 
a facilitating role in supporting these four conditions, while also being more 
active in providing common goods and services such as joint analysis, joint 
communication and joint trainings. While this already happens to a limited 
extent, there is much scope for improvement.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
• Building on a Literature Review and Headquarter Analysis on European 
coordination in contexts of crisis and fragility, this phase of the study 
focuses on four country cases: Niger, DRC, Haiti and Palestine  
• For this purpose, we searched for practices of joint implementation and 
provision of common goods and services, from which lessons could be 
drawn 
• The research reveals numerous constraints against European 
coordination in fragile states, and creative examples of coordination are 
very limited  
• Nonetheless, there is a near-consensus that, in contexts of crisis and 
fragility, coordination is all the more necessary  
• Moreover, we identify 10 interesting practices, some of which are more 
successful than others: (1) FISAN (food security, Niger), (2) JFA/BTC-GIZ 
(education, Palestine), (3) AREA C (social infrastructure, Palestine), (4) 
GIBS (health, DRC), (5) FAO (agriculture, Palestine), (6) KINSHASA 
(fragility initiative, DRC), (7) HR/IHL (human rights CSOs, Palestine), (8) 
FCS (health fund, Niger), (9) PARIS (school planning, Haiti), and (10) 
PAFMIR (vocational training, Haiti)  
• These cooperation practices are examined, based on 127 interviews, 
including field research in Niger and Palestine, producing two 
deliverables 
• First, each cooperation practice is analyzed separately, focusing on 
strengths & weaknesses, as well as enabling & constraining factors 
(deliverable: 10 Notes, see annex)  
• Second, we comparatively analyse them with a view to detecting 
enablers for European coordination (deliverable: this report) 
• This research leads to the main finding that successful coordination 
hinges on four factors: 
a. mixing ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ joint implementation 
b. involving a small number of like-minded actors 
c. finding ways to align with the partner country 
d. providing flexibility for practitioners, while guaranteeing political 
backing  
• Importantly, none of these factors is sufficient in itself. There is not one 
solution: the most successful cases show that they should be combined 
• The most successful ‘cases’ are in fact not narrow cases: they form 
clusters of various – soft and hard joint implementation, informal and 
formal coordination – cooperation practices that mutually interact 
• Alignment is particularly important. Working in a fragile context cannot be 
an excuse not to search ways to involve and strengthen the 
government(s). The ‘spirit of Paris’ is relatively strong with donors and 
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practitioners in the field, but waning among a minority of interviewees, 
while more subtle practices of ‘backward alignment’ seem to emerge 
• More (successful) examples of coordination are found in Palestine than in 
the other countries, which can be explained by the country’s more 
enabling environment in terms of governance and development, and the 
donors’ interests to share risks  
• In general, the interplay between institutional and ideational factors is 
key to understanding why some practices work better than others. Further 
in-depth and comparative social science research to better understand 
these factors and their interrelations should be encouraged  
• There is no consensus on the role of the European Union in coordination 
in fragile states. Instead of the donor, coordinator/harmonizer, and political 
force roles, the facilitating role is the most promising one 
• First, the EU should do more to facilitate the four enabling factors 
identified in this study, thereby also supporting smaller coordinating 
groups that have emerged bottom-up within the countries and in which it is 
not directly involved 
• Second, the EU should do more to provide common goods and services 
such as shared infrastructure, shared analysis, joint communication, 
joint missions and joint training. This is the low-hanging fruit for the EU 
to fostering European coordination without engaging in top-down (micro-
)management. 
• Such a facilitator role corresponds with the EU’s raison d’être as a 
supranational institution addressing functional issues and solving collective 
action problems, whilst also reflecting wider and on-going debates on the 
future of Europe 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Building on a Literature Review and Headquarter Analysis phase on 
European coordination in contexts of crisis and fragility, this phase of the 
study involves a field analysis in Niger, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Haiti and Palestine. The main purpose of this phase is to find 
interesting (more or less successful) practices of joint implementation and 
provision of common goods and services, from which lessons could be drawn 
that are relevant for practitioners. Based on 10 practices of European 
coordination in the four countries, we will identify four enablers that should 
be combined to forge successful coordination and draw 
recommendations from these findings.  
Despite this focus on enablers, however, it should be emphasized that, in 
general, creative and innovative examples of coordination between 
practitioners have been limited. Therefore, the next section (Section 2) will 
first elaborate on this general finding, pointing out the various constraints 
against (European) coordination in fragile states. The subsequent sections 
then elaborate on the enabling factors for coordination by outlining the 
methodology behind the research (Section 3) and the main findings (Section 
4). Section 5 reflects on the role that the European Union could or should play 
in this regard. Section 6 formulates conclusions, recommendations and final 
reflections.  
This phase provides two deliverables: 
1. Ten ‘interesting’ cooperation practices are studied more in-depth in 
separate notes. Although they are not necessarily ‘best’ practices, 
analysing their strengths and weaknesses, as well as the enabling and 
constraining factors at play, makes it possible to draw lessons on ‘what 
works’ (and does not work) and formulate recommendations (see 10 Notes 
in annex). 
2. This report provides general findings and lessons than can be drawn 
from comparing these 10 coordination practices (see this report). 
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2. LIMITED COORDINATION: CONSTRAINTS  
2.1. Limits and constraints 
The main purpose of this phase is to find best practices of joint 
implementation and provision of common goods and services, from 
which lessons can be drawn that are relevant for practitioners. What this 
concretely entails is summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, which have been the 
main guidance for the field study interviews. 
Before elaborating on the case studies and main findings, however, it should 
be emphasized that, in general, creative examples of coordination 
between practitioners have been very limited. Although we will identify 10 
‘interesting’ practices of (European) coordination in contexts of crisis and 
fragility, these are exceptions and not all of them are successful.  
First, specific instances of (in)formal and creative coordination practices 
between practitioners from which lessons can be drawn, turned out to be hard 
to find. Even when systematically going through the list of possible practices 
of coordination (see Table 2.1) and the possible provision of common goods 
and services (see Table 2.2) together with the interviewees, the number of 
examples that emerged was very limited. Table 2.10 provides an overview of 
other coordination practices in Niger, Palestine and Haiti that were not 
classified as ‘interesting’ (cf criteria in section 3.1) for the purpose of this 
study. 
Second, existing cooperation initiatives mentioned were usually not of a very 
innovative nature, in the sense that modalities and models were developed 
that could serve as inspiring examples for other sectors and countries. (Even 
the PEGASE in Palestine was not seen as a particularly innovative 
instrument, and also not as one that can be exported to other countries or 
regions.) While this study will show that we can certainly draw lessons from 
these practices, they are generally ‘interesting’ without being particularly 
innovative. 
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Table 2.1: Joint implementation practices (interview guide) 
Soft JI Hard JI 
Joint analysis Budget support 
Cartography Common reporting, financial 
requirements and results-based 
approach 
Joint CS consultation Common funds 
Joint secretariat  Trust funds 
Joint engagement / exit strategies, 
country/sector/ project level  
Division of labour (sectorial, sub-
sectorial, geographic, cross-sectorial) 
Per diems Delegated cooperation 
Note: the categories of “soft JI” and “hard JI” have been created for analytic 
purposes and the reality should be considered as a continuum between soft 
and hard JI 
 
Table 2.2: Provision of common goods and services (interview guide) 
Research capacity Coordination units 
Staff trainings Mutualisation of services 
Remote management Third party monitoring 
Regular security briefings Joint/shared logistics (e.g. office) 
Joint secretariat Joint analysis 
 
On joint implementation: interviewees would usually only indicate the most 
typical instances of coordination such as common funds/basked funds. Even 
the number of delegated cooperation agreements turned out to be limited and 
not all interviewees were fully aware of what delegated cooperation involves. 
The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – established end 2015 to address 
the challenges of migration in African countries – was also frequently 
mentioned in Niger, but then usually in a negative way as it barely involves 
coordination in the field  (see section 4.4 on the Trust Fund as a ‘missed 
opportunity’ for European coordination). 
On common goods and services: interviewees would usually remain silent 
and the discussion would be on which public goods and services would ideally 
be pursued in the future. 
Within each of the four countries, formal structures for sector-wide 
coordination between international donors exist. To various degrees, the 
European Union (EU), its member states and non-members (Norway and 
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Switzerland) are engaging in Joint Programming exercises. However, these 
often remain at the general policy level and implementation has usually not 
started yet. Again, concrete instances of coordination amongst practitioners 
are quasi-absent. 
This general finding may not be surprising as it resonates with the previous 
phases of the study: the Literature Review revealed the small amount of 
studies dealing with joint implementation; phase 1 (see Phase 1 Report, HQ 
analysis) showed that HQ-steered joint implementation is also limited. While 
coordination may be all the more necessary in contexts of crisis and fragility, 
this study confirms that it is also all the more difficult to do in practice. The 
well-known statement that “everyone wants to coordinate, but nobody wants 
to be coordinated” also appeared true during the field phase. For instance, 
several interviewees indicated that they want to do more delegated 
cooperation. However, this was always from the perspective of being on the 
receiving side and benefiting from other donors’ contributions, while the 
appetite for delegating funding to other agencies was much smaller.  
Echoing these two previous phases, some explanations for limited 
cooperation emerge. The most frequently mentioned constraints that 
emerged from 127 interviews during the field phase can be summarised 
through the 4i framework (Table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3: Most frequently cited constraints against coordination 
 European donors and 
practitioners 
Partner county 
Individuals - dependence on committed 
individuals 
- quick staff turnover 
- individual agendas of policy-
makers and officials 
Ideas - different visions on general 
principles and/or approaches 
- waning Paris spirit 
- different visions on general 
principles and/or approaches 
 
Institutions - limited flexibility and no incentives 
from HQ 
- high transaction costs 
- capacity constraints  
- weak donor-wide coordination 
structures 
Interests - political interests HQ 
- domestic politics (populism, 
migration, political sensitivity) in 
Europe 
- competition for resources 
- visibility 
- no interest in coordination 
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2.2. The spirit of Paris 
One noticeable factor is the ‘spirit of Paris’. Interviewees regularly mention 
the Paris agenda on aid effectiveness. When mentioning ‘Paris’, they do not 
literally refer to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness at the Second High-
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. ‘Paris’ symbolizes the principles of 
ownership of and alignment with the partner government, while the 
subsequent conferences of Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) are barely 
mentioned. Also, interviewees would scarcely refer to the ‘New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States’, although ownership and alignment are also 
importance principles in this initiative. Instead, ‘Paris’ spontaneously came 
up in almost every interview, referring to general notions of ownership 
and alignment. Interestingly, we can discern three different perspectives on 
how ‘Paris’ is perceived (Table 2.4).  
• Defending Paris: the majority of European practitioners that we 
interviewed do not dispute the continuing relevance of ownership and 
alignment as key development principles. While recognizing that this is 
extremely difficult in contexts of crisis and fragility, they acknowledge that 
these principles should ideally be pursued and they try to find ways to do 
so. Indeed, we will see that the most successful coordination practices are 
precisely those where continuous efforts are being made to somehow 
involve with the government.  
Also from the side of the partner country, ‘Paris’ was often mentioned as 
what should be the guiding principle in international cooperation. For 
instance, one technical expert in Palestine emphasized that “Paris was not 
stupid, it did not come not out of nothing, it was experience-based” (non-
EU93). In Niger, an interviewee stated: “Il faut que les bailleurs de fonds 
respectent la Déclaration de Paris – je n’ai plus envie de mentionner la 
déclaration – il faut avoir confiance dans le Niger. Si les collaborateurs ne 
sont pas nigériens il faut se méfier » (non-EU81). 
• Criticizing Paris: a minority of European practitioners is critical about 
today’s relevance of the Paris principles, especially in a context of fragile 
states. This provoked more cynical statements, such as “Paris is the 
capital of France”, and “Paris is dead and we’re all fighting to get part of 
the cake” (EU105); or in on the Common Health Fund in Niger “the reason 
for launching it was the Paris Declaration, but now they do not talk much 
about it anymore, it is gone” (EU76). Another European practitioner in 
Niger expressed it as follows: “now coordination is found less important 
than before: the Holy Bible is put aside, on Paris and the partnership 
approach. Decisions come from (the capital) on our table, it is very 
politicized” 
In relation to the Emergency Trust Fund, several interviewees expressed 
the feeling that “we are going backwards in terms of coordination – after 
Paris, Accra, Busan, we talked about mutual responsibility but now we 
said, stop… It is a global trend.” (EU63; translated) 
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Officials in the partner countries are aware of this waning spirit of Paris. 
While dealing with the government is indeed inevitably difficult, this should, 
as one interviewee from the Palestinian government side emphasised, not 
be used as an excuse to engage in parallel activities but rather to assist 
and empower the authorities. “The obligation comes from both sides, but 
more on the donor community because they are the stronger partner”. 
However, the same interviewee deplored a growing tendency with donors 
to “go alone” and engage less with the governmental levels (non-EU112). 
Similarly, in Haiti one interviewee emphasized that “the role of international 
cooperation is to support the authorities and the government” (non-
EU149), and another one stressed that “donors must boost the capacity of 
the government to manage itself (…) this must be a priority” (non-EU35). 
• Paris upside down: amongst those interviewees referring to ‘Paris’, a 
subtle but potentially far-reaching discursive shift is taking place 
whereby the Paris principles are re-interpreted to allow for political 
influence with the partner government. This could also be called 
‘backward alignment’: donors determining what the government’s policy 
should be rather than the other way around. Perhaps without explicitly 
realizing, several interviewees refer to Paris when emphasizing how 
important it is to ‘influence’ or ‘impose’ (sic) our agenda on the policies of 
the third country government. This re-interpretation of the Paris agenda is 
an issue of concern because it could undermine its very developmental 
basis and allow for political interests to overshadow developmental goals. 
Given the weakness of most ministries and officials at different levels of 
government in fragile states, assisting and empowering the government 
without unduly influencing it proves to be dancing on a tightrope.  
 
Table 2.4: Interviewees’ views on ‘Paris’ 
 View What is Paris? 
1. Defending Paris a development principle 
2. Criticizing Paris the capital of France 
3. Re-interpreting Paris a political strategy 
 
2.3 Searching for enabling factors 
Notwithstanding these different views on Paris, there is a near-consensus 
amongst interviewees that (European) coordination is even more 
necessary in a fragile state context. Again resonating with the HQ phase of 
this study (see Phase 1 Report, HQ analysis), the rationale behind 
coordination is barely questioned. While interviewees strongly emphasize the 
various obstacles they are confronted with to engage in more coordination, 
there is a consensus on the need for working more together in various ways. 
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The importance of joint implementation practices and provision of common 
goods and services is explicitly recognized. 
Starting from this premise, this research searched for ‘interesting’ practices 
– if not necessarily best practices or creative examples – of European 
coordination in fragile states that allow us to formulate conclusions on 
enabling factors for coordination. Despite the finding that European 
coordination is generally limited and faced with various obstacles, the four 
countries did reveal a number of interesting cases. Some of these originate 
back to the ‘Paris era’ of the end 2000s (e.g. GIBS in DRC, FCS in Niger, JFA 
in Palestine) whereas other practices of coordination are more recent. While 
they differ greatly in context, topics and modalities, together they illustrate the 
diversity of cooperation instances in fragile states. Moreover, comparing them 
makes it possible to draw general lessons and formulate recommendations.  
Before elaborating on these findings, the next section will explain the 
methodological approach for analyzing and evaluating the 10 cooperation 
practices that are central to this study.  
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3. METHODOLOGY: EVALUATING INTERESTING 
PRACTICES 
Three separate methodological steps have been undertaken in order to 
be able to draw lessons from the examined coordination practices: (1) 
determining which are ‘interesting’ practices for the study, (2) evaluating 
which of these are more or less successful, and (3) explaining why some are 
more successful than others. Table 2.5 summarizes how each question is 
addressed and what output it generates. 
 
Table 2.5: Methodological approach: three-step approach 
Question Approach Output 
1. How to determine 
what constitutes an 
‘interesting practice’? 
Practitioners’ 
involvement. 
Inductive selection 
using 2 criteria 
Identification of 10 
coordination practices 
(Table 2.6) 
2. How to evaluate which 
practices are more 
successful than 
others? 
Classification on 
continuum most-
least successful, 
based on 2 main 
criteria 
- Separate analysis of each 
coordination practice: 10 
separate Notes (annex)  
- Comparative analysis: 
this report (Section 4; 
Table 2.11) 
3. How to explain why 
some are more 
successful than 
others? 
Comparative 
analysis using 4i 
pragmatic 
framework: 
individuals, ideas, 
institutions, 
interests 
Comparative evaluation: 
this report (Section 4; 
Table 2.11) 
 
3.1. What is an interesting practice? 
First, how to determine what constitutes an ‘interesting practice’? In order to 
determine this, we first and foremost focused on concrete instances of 
cooperation that involve practitioners. In line with the general purpose of 
the study, the aim is not to analyse general and political coordination schemes 
such as Joint Programming, but rather to research those specific practices of 
(European) coordination in which practitioners participate and that may enable 
us to draw lessons on joint implementation and provision of common goods 
and services.  
76 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
In addition to this general selection criterion, two additional criteria have 
been taken into account, which are also in line with the general purposes of 
the study. These were not determined beforehand and were developed 
inductively throughout the field research, emerging from the input and 
perception of the practitioners that were interviewed. In order to qualify as an 
interesting practice of coordination, the practice should: 
(1) involve a sufficient number of European donors and practitioners (at 
least three) 
(2) be perceived as interesting by stakeholders in the field.  
Furthermore, at the general level of the case selection, we aimed to provide a 
variation of modalities, countries and policy areas across the cases, in order 
to allow for a comprehensive analysis that illustrates the potential diversity 
and richness of the different contexts, topics and modalities. 
Following this largely inductive approach, 10 practices have been selected 
(out of approximately 25 identified practices, see more in Table X) for further 
analysis in this phase. As will become clear, several of these involve sub-
practices of (European) coordination. These are summarized in Table 2.6, 
which also already includes other basic data on each of the cases: 
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Table 2.6: Interesting practices, overview 
 
Case Emergence Mechanism(s) Membership Instruments mobilized Common goods and 
services 
Strengths Weaknesses 
FISAN 
Food 
security 
Field, 2012 Support for credit 
scheme 
LuxDev, SDC, SK, 
possibly AfD and 
KfW 
Technical assistance; 
linked to EU budget 
support conditions  
capacity building; Joint 
studies; Joint pilot initiatives 
Highest political support 
by the President 
 
Not yet adopted in law; 
Unequal state-donor 
relationship  
JFA/BTC-
GIZ 
Education 
Field, 2010 JFA: Pooled Fund; Del 
cooperation; BTC-GIZ: 
Joint management 
structure  
JFA: BE, FI, IE, NO, 
KfW; BTC & GIZ, 
others (e.g. EU, 
SDC) 
JFA: Budget; Policy 
dialogue; BTC-GIZ: 
technical assistance – 
hiring consultant, co-
funding activities  
JFA: joint analysis; common 
disbursement, procurement, 
audit; BTC-GIZ: Joint 
missions, workshops, 
communication 
JFA: Reduced transaction 
costs, DOL; Good relations 
with ministry; Risk 
sharing; BTC-GIZ: DOL; 
Flexible  
JFA: alignment 
(procurement); BTC-GIZ: 
uncertain relations with the 
PA; weak sector-wide 
coordination  
AREA C 
Social 
infrastr 
HQ & field, 
2014 
Pooled Fund; Transfer 
agreements 
EU (lead), DK, 
FR/AFD, UK  
Budget; Informal technical 
working group 
Joint funding, joint reporting 
etc; information exchange; 
Pol backing 
Risk sharing; less 
transaction costs; informal 
(4 musketeers) 
divisions within EU; 
political sensitivity in 
Europe 
GIBS 
Health 
Field, 2005 Donor wide 
coordination (plenary 
& sub-groups) 
GE, BE, DFID, SE, 
EU, many non-EU  
Meetings; Permanent 
secretary 
Info sharing; common 
positions towards govt; 
common commitments  
Example for other sectors; 
harmonizing admin issues 
Parallel structure, 
alignment; implementation  
 
FAO 
Agriculture 
Field, 2016 Pooled fund EU, AECID, DK, NL, 
SDC, FAO 
Budget; Joint project 
steering committee and 
Programme Management 
Unit 
joint reporting, monitoring 
etc. 
Lower transaction costs; 
influencing Pal & Isr govts; 
critical mass  
Different views; Admin 
complexities; Competition, 
duplication; Alignment 
KINSHASA 
Fragility 
HQ and field, 
2015 
Joint Workshop; Task 
force; reflection group 
EU, BE/BTC, GE, 
DFID, FR/AFD, GIZ, 
KfW, NL, SE 
Budget (COM and BE); 
Facilitated by Acropolis  
information exchange, joint 
analysis; common table, 
action plan? 
Chatham House rules; 
common understanding 
from operational to 
information sharing; lost 
momentum 
PARIS 
Schools 
Field, 2009 Joint working group MTPTC, SDC, IDB; 
AECID, UNICEF 
Centralised & de-
centralised decisions  
Technical plans, practical 
guides; Meeting space; 
Seconded expert 
Scaling up of the initiative; 
alignment; large donors 
technical capacity; long 
process and delays 
FCS 
Health 
Field, 2005 Pooled fund  AFD, WB, AECID, 
UNICEF, GAVI 
Budget Technical assistants; co-
financing  
alignment & ownership; 
Less transaction costs; 
reliability 
Low execution rates; Hidden 
transaction costs; pol 
dialogue 
HR/IHL 
Human 
rights 
HQ & field 
2004 
Pooled fund for 
secretariat 
NL, DK, SE, SDC, NO 
(left) 
Budget Joint secretariat  Stable funding; Risk 
sharing and hiding 
High transaction costs; 
Unclear future; political 
backing 
PAFMIR 
Vocat 
training 
Field 2015 Del cooperation  EU, AFD Budget; missions; joint 
studies, action plans, 
evaluation, communication 
Technical assistants  Lower transaction costs; 
AFD expertise 
time consuming procedures; 
Administ requirements; 
absorption capacity; 
ownership 
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As stated above, the number of ‘creative’ modalities is limited. Cooperation 
often involves a pooled fund and/or information exchange. Delegated 
cooperation and joint studies/analyses also occur frequently. However, the 
study shows that there is significant variation in the way in which different 
modalities work in practice and in how they are (not) combined. Similarly, 
there is considerable divergence in how successful they are, as will be 
elaborated below. 
3.2. How to evaluate successfulness? 
Second, how to evaluate which practices are more successful than others? 
Again, the criteria were largely developed inductively throughout the field 
research. Two main criteria emerged from this, relating to both the ‘perceived’ 
and ‘effective’ relevance of the coordination practice (Table 2.7). 
Table 2.7: Criteria for evaluation of most/least successful practices 
 
The more frequently these criteria are being identified for a specific 
coordination practice, compared to the other practices in the pool of this 
study, the more it will be considered successful. As such a ‘retrospective’ 
research of what has been (considered as) successful has been combined 
with a ‘prospective’ approach on promising practices. Following this approach, 
and instead of developing strict categories, we classify the coordination 
practices alongside a continuum from most to least successful (Table 2.8).  
 
Table 2.8: Continuum: Most and least successful practices  
MOST SUCCESSFUL    LEAST SUCCESSFUL 
 
FISAN-JFA-AREAC 
 
GIBS-FAO-KINSHASA-FCS 
 
PARIS-PAFMIR-HR/IHL 
(1) Stakeholders’ perception of the coordination practice: 
a. How do they perceive the coordination as such? 
b. How do they perceive its impact and relevance? 
c. Do they perceive it as a model for other sectors and/or countries? 
(2) Effective relevance of the coordination practice: 
a. Primary documents, secondary literature and other evaluations 
b. Coordination ‘dynamic’; attracting more participants 
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Several clarifications should be made on this distinction.  
• First, as this is the result of a comparative analysis, the ‘least successful’ 
practices are not necessarily unsuccessful. Given the constraints within a 
certain country and/or sector, they can even be relatively successful. 
However, this distinction is based on a comparison with other practices 
within the same country and within the other countries of this study, 
alongside the above-mentioned criteria.  
• Second, also the most successful practices do contain risks and 
challenges. These can be ‘external’ given the difficult context of crisis and 
fragility, but they can also be ‘internal’ and relate to sub-optimal functioning 
of the coordination mechanisms. While the most successful cases score 
higher on the above-mentioned criteria, the analysis shows that their long-
term sustainability is by no means achieved.  
• Third, there are differences in newness of the coordination practices: while 
some are relatively recent others have existed for a long time. For 
relatively new initiatives (which most practices are), we have taken into 
account to which extent they are promising (again, according to both 
stakeholders’ perception and effective relevance).  
• Fourth, each of the identified coordination practices would merit from 
further, in-depth research into its emergence, functioning and impact. All 
the practices that have been researched have been the subject of 
evaluation studies made by consultants, most of which are unfortunately 
undisclosed (thereby missing an opportunity to provide the ‘common 
service’ of information). Given constraints of time and resources, the 
analysis of each of the ten practices remains inevitably at a rather general 
level. At the same time, however, the variety of issues and countries also 
guarantees the empirical richness of the study, and points to relevant 
cases for further follow-up research. 
In terms of data and methods, we mostly relied on interviews with 
‘stakeholders’. Stakeholders include primarily the European donor and 
practitioner side as well as the governmental/partner government side. Due to 
time constraints, as well as difficulties to identify representative organizations, 
a limited number of non-governmental organizations were interviewed. 
Interviewees include participants in coordination practices (e.g. European 
donors) as well as outsiders (e.g. non-European donors) and government 
officials involved. Given the complexity of the coordination practices and the 
relatively limited amount of cases, we have opted for a qualitative evaluation 
and therefore did not ask for ‘scores’ to assess coordination practices. 
Interviews were semi-structured and usually involved five elements: (1) 
identification of interesting coordination practices, (2) strengths, weaknesses 
and challenges of these practices, (3) enabling and constraining factors, (4) 
role of the EU, and (5) finally recommendations and follow-up. Through 
interview invitations by email and/or preliminary phone calls, interviewees 
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were informed beforehand about the research scope. Depending on the input 
provided by the interviewee, we elaborated on some elements.  
The number of people interviewed is about 37 for Niger, 59 for Palestine, 
21 for DRC and 10 for Haiti, while also some interviews of the headquarter 
phase (57 interviews with representatives of different donors and agencies in 
Brussels and other European capitals) were useful. We have guaranteed 
anonymity to all interviewees. Interviewees have been numbered and are 
referred to as belonging to two broad categories: ‘EU’ (diplomats and 
practitioners from the EU institutions and EU member states) or ‘non-EU’ 
(non-EU countries in Europe and in the partner countries, civil society, 
international organizations, partner country representatives). We have 
sometimes been deliberately vague with interviewee references in order to 
guarantee anonymity. While this approach can make it difficult for the reader 
to understand the background of some analysis, it was deemed necessary for 
at some interviewees because of the sensitivity of information (especially on 
less successful coordination practices). The authors of the study have 
detailed interview minutes; upon request and after the authors have consulted 
the interviewees more information may be provided. While the interviewees 
have provided invaluable data and insights, they cannot be held responsible 
for the analysis, interpretations and remaining errors in this study which 
should be attributed to the authors.  
In addition to gauging the perception of stakeholders, we also relied on 
primary documents (e.g. agreements, memorandums, letters), consultancy 
studies, media coverage and secondary academic literature where these 
sources were available. Through triangulation of these data sources with the 
interviews, in line with the above-mentioned criteria, the coordination practices 
are categorized on the continuum from most to least successful.  
Based on this methodology, 10 separate analyses of the coordination 
practices have been drafted (see Notes in annex). Each of the notes follows 
the same structure: following a background section and basic description of 
the mechanism (according to the template in Table 2.9), the coordination 
practice is evaluated along its main strengths, weaknesses and/or challenges, 
after which explanations (enabling and constraining factors) for its 
(un)successfulness are elaborated. The concluding part includes a summary, 
recommendations and reflections on the EU’s role. We have presented a draft 
version of each note to key stakeholders involved in the coordination 
practice. Most of them have provided feedback on the notes by email, which 
we have integrated in the final version where deemed necessary to improve 
the data and analysis. Again, however, the interviewees cannot be held 
responsible for the analysis and interpretations. 
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Table 2.9: Description of coordination practices: template 
 Mechanism Emergenc
e and 
timing 
Member-
ship 
Scope Formal-
ization 
Instru-
ments 
mobilized 
Provision
s of 
goods 
and 
services 
2. 1  
       
… 
       
2.10 
       
 
However, more coordination practices have been observed, as can be seen 
from Table 2.10. This includes cases that are limited and/or not particularly 
relevant in terms of lesson drawing, although further research into some of 
them (e.g. coordination initiatives in the water sector in Niger and the West 
Bank Protection Consortium in Palestine) may be worthwhile for follow-up 
research. Moreover, some cases involve a cluster of different coordination 
practices – and as will be explained below, this is particularly true for the 
‘most successful’ cases. 
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Table 2.10: Additional example of coordination practices  
 description sector donors involved coordination mechanism 
N
ig
e
r 
Abduction d'Eau Potable multi-villages à 
Kiéché 
water BTC, LuxDev Hard - Co-financing (2015-
2017) 
Support PASEHA Programme d’Appui au 
Sector Eau, Hygiène et Assainissement à 
Diffa & Zinder 
water DK, LuxDev Hard - Co-financing (tbc) 
Renforcement de la coopération dans le 
cadre de la mise en œuvre de leurs projets 
et programmes en lien avec les politiques 
et stratégies au niveau national  en 
matière de petite irrigation  et la mise en 
cohérence et l’harmonisation des 
planifications opérationnelles. 
Irrigation KfW, AFD, IFAD Soft - Memorandum of 
Understanding  (draft 2016, 
not yet adopted) 
Common Fund for the National 
Dispositive on the Prevention  and 
Management of Food Crises 
Food 
security / 
humanit 
FR, IT, ES, CH, US, BE, FAO, 
UNDP, UNICEF 
Hard - Common Fund (since 
mid-2000s) 
P
a
le
st
in
e
 
Funding the Independent Commission for 
Human Rights (Palestinian national 
human rights organization)  
Human 
rights 
SE, NO, DK, NL, CH (lead donor) Hard - Donors’ Union, 
involving joint missions, joint 
evaluation, joint reporting 
Donor coordination for the Municipal 
Development Lending Fund (MDLF)  via 
the Municipal Development programme II 
(MDPII). 
(local) infra-
structure  
AFD; DK via WB + advisor via 
DANIDA; EU via KfW; KfW; GIZ; 
SDC; SE via WB; NL via VNG 
International; BTC; WB 
Hard - Delegated funds 
West Bank Protection Consortium humanit Led by Norwegian Refugee 
Council; DG-ECHO and five EU 
Member States (BE, IT, LU, ES, 
SE).  Five INGO Partners (NRC, 
as lead agency, ACF, ACTED, 
GVC and PUI); IE, DK, FR, LV, 
ET, SK and HR might join 
Hard - Joint framework, joint 
analysis; coordinated 
reporting using ECHO 
methods (since 2015) 
Industrial zones meetings  Industrial 
zones 
JP, AFD and GIZ Soft - Informal meetings 
(quarterly); sharing 
information and best 
practices (since 2013) 
conduct a joint study, including a 
cartography 
Water  KfW and AFD Soft - Joint study (2017) 
Joint office in Gaza for local staff member Gaza GIZ and BTC Soft - Joint office; Service 
delivery agreement (2015) 
Trainings on human rights based 
approach and on human rights defenders 
Human 
rights 
EU-wide (led by EU office) Soft - Joint trainings (2016-
2017) 
The Coalition for Accountability and 
Integrity (AMAN)  
Anti-
corruption 
LU, NL NO Hard - Delegated cooperation 
(Lux  No)  
H
a
it
i 
Delegated funds in education education EU, AFD Hard - Delegated funding (EU 
 AFD) 
Coordination in urban development Urban devt EU, AFD, AECID (not yet official) 
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3.3. How to explain variation? 
Third, how to explain why some are more successful than others? This is 
clearly the most difficult, but also the most important question. We need to 
understand why some coordination practices work better than others to be 
able to draw lessons and formulate recommendations. For this purpose, we 
have taken two methodological steps.  
First, we used the pragmatic 4i’s framework (individuals, ideas, institutions, 
and interests). These explanations apply to both the donor and partner 
countries and can work in enabling or constraining ways. The 4 i’s have been 
addressed throughout the interviews, albeit often indirectly and inductively, 
whereby interviewees were provided the scope to come up with their own 
interpretations. Only at the end of the interview or in the follow-up analysis, 
answers were then classified according to the 4i’s (see Table 2.11). 
The purpose of this classification is not to determine which ‘i’ has more 
explanatory value than others. Rather, it serves as a pragmatic framework for 
analysing how different (f)actors interplay in complex ways. From a sociology 
of institutions perspective, the study does indeed confirm that ‘ideas’ and 
‘institutions’ dimensions are closely interwoven, especially in the best cases, 
which involve both soft and hard joint implementation. However, individual 
and interest-related (f)actors also matter in enabling and constraining ways. 
Second, we engaged in a comparative analysis across the cases and 
countries. Because of the vast diversity of contexts, topics and practices, 
systematic comparisons are impossible and undesirable. Each single 
practice would merit its own in-depth evaluation, something that was not 
possible in the framework of this explorative study. However, the diversity of 
contexts, topics and practices was deliberately pursued by the PN and the 
research team to allow for a wide spectre of insights. What this approach 
loses in terms of generalizability in a strictly positivist scientific sense, can be 
compensated by richer and context sensitive insights. As will become clear 
below, this parsimony-complexity trade-off has indeed revealed several 
interesting common threads throughout the different practices. 
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Table 2.11: Explanatory framework: 4i’s pragmatic and comparative approach 
 enabling & constraining  
 Individuals 
Skills, 
experience, 
commitment, 
relationships 
Ideas 
Ideas and 
ideologies 
about aid and 
development; 
(European) 
identity; like-
mindedness 
Institutions 
Procedures, 
management, 
incentive 
structures, 
capacities, 
flexibility, 
agreements 
Interests 
Political, 
security, 
bureaucratic, 
historical, 
economic, 
influence, 
visibility 
 Donor specific & partner country specific (f)actors 
2.1     
…     
2.10   
 
 
 
Based on this dual methodological approach, whereby the interesting 
practices that emerged from the interviews are comparatively assessed 
throughout the pragmatic 4i framework, we aim to learn why some practices 
are more successful than others. Then, more specific research questions 
become:  
• How can we explain why the Food Security (FISAN) in Niger, Education 
(JFA/BTC-GIZ) in Palestine, and Social Investment (AREA C) cases in 
Palestine are best practices of coordination, compared to the others in the 
sample?  
• How can we explain why the HR/IHL (human rights CSOs) case in 
Palestine and the Professional Training (PARIS) case in Haiti are amongst 
the least successful cases?  
• How can we explain the strengths and weaknesses of the other five 
coordination practices?  
3.4. Conclusion 
This approach enabled us to identify four different factors have emerged 
that correlate highly with the successfulness of a coordination practice: 
(1) having a mix of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ joint implementation; (2) having a small 
number of like-minded actors involved; (3) attempting to align with the partner 
country; and (4) providing flexibility for practitioners while also guaranteeing 
political backing.  
85 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
As will become clear in the next section, and can already be seen from Table 
2.12, it is the combination of these four factors that makes coordination 
practices relatively successful. In general, the interplay between 
institutional and ideational factors is key to explaining why some practices 
are more successful than others. 
Table 2.12 summarizes the extent to which these four factors and 
explanations appear in each of the 10 coordination practices. More bullets 
indicate that the factors are more present for this case. 
 
Table 2.12: Summary 
 
COORDINATION 
PRACTICE 
Soft & 
hard JI 
Small & 
like-
minded  
Align with 
partner 
Flexibility 
& political 
backing 
le
as
t …
…
…
…
…
.
.
…
…
…
…
.
.
…
.
 
m
o
st
 
su
cc
es
sf
u
l 
FISAN      
JFA/BTC-GIZ     
AREA C     
GIBS     
FAO     
KINSHASA     
PARIS     
FCS     
HR/IHL     
PAFMIR      
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4. MAIN FINDINGS: COMBINING FOUR ENABLERS 
The main findings of this study can be summarized as follows:  
 
These four findings are elaborated in this section.  
4.1 Mixing ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ joint implementation 
Going back to the distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ joint implementation 
(Table 2.13), the extent to which various forms of coordination and joint 
implementation is combined correlates highly with the successfulness of the 
cases.  
On the one hand, there are initiatives that mainly involve the establishment of 
a ‘hard’ joint implementation instrument, such as the FCS (health fund) in 
Niger or the ‘delegated cooperation’ on professional training in Haiti (PARIS), 
without being surrounded with softer forms of cooperation (or only to a limited 
extent). On the other hand, there are initiatives like the ‘fragility workshop’ in 
the DRC (KINSHASA) or the ‘school plan’ in Haiti (PAFMIR) that remain 
limited to soft joint implementation.  
The most successful practices combine the two in creative ways: indeed, the 
best practices have in common that they mix soft and hard implementation 
initiatives. They go beyond the creation of a single mechanism, forming 
clusters of various coordination mechanisms that mutually interact.  
• In the case of FISAN, the various pilot projects and joint initiatives (soft 
and hard joint implementation) between the main donors created an 
enabling environment for successful coordination. For example, although 
the Danish representation had physically left Niger in 2014, it continued to 
be active on the ground through delegated cooperation to the SDC. This 
delegated cooperation was used to finance technical experts and pilot 
projects. The same donors, as well as LuxDev, have contributed to a 
number of pilot projects in the same regions of Niger and this enabled 
them to see opportunities for synergies and enhanced coordination. 
Moreover, the fact that donors already have a history of coordinating 
amongst one another bodes well for future and broader cooperation. For 
example, SDC and LuxDev had already established a co-financing 
Most successful coordination practices combine the following four enabling 
factors: 
a. mixing ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ joint implementation 
b. involving a small number of like-minded countries 
c. finding ways to align with the partner country 
d. providing flexibility for practitioners, while guaranteeing political backing 
Inversely, these factors apply to a (much) more limited extent in the less 
successful coordination practices. 
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agreement including modalities for hiring experts and co-financing studies. 
Building on this division of labour between the partners facilitated the 
development of a best practice of coordination, which could later be up-
scaled.  
• The JFA and BTC-GIZ are two examples of interrelated coordination 
practices. While the JFA constitutes a classical pooled fund, it also 
involves joint analysis, and through the participation of Belgium and 
Germany it is also closely related to the BTC-GIZ cooperation. BTC-GIZ 
coordination involves co-financing of activities as well as joint missions, 
joint trainings, joint workshops, joint communication, and informal 
meetings between the team leaders. Other actors such as the EU and 
SDC are involved in some GIZ related activities through delegated 
cooperation, and there is mutual interaction with the donor-wide sector 
coordination in Palestine.  
• The clustering of hard and soft joint implementation initiatives in the AREA 
C case is less dense, although here too there is interaction between the 
informal ‘four musketeers’ meetings and the formal Transfer Agreements 
between the donors and the EU. Also, the whole ‘social infrastructure’ 
cluster forms part of the larger Area C programme of the EU that also 
includes a ‘planning’ and ‘land development/agriculture’ cluster, each of 
which is financed by different groups of European donors. Finally, the 
initiative is strongly embedded within political decision-making in Brussels. 
The Council Conclusions of May 2012, which were also confirmed by the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC), provide the political basis for the 
coordination. 
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Table 2.13: Mixing soft and hard joint implementation 
Coordination 
practice 
Soft JI  Hard JI 
FISAN Lux-Swiss-Denmark 
(core) 
GIZ-AFD 
Joint studies; Joint 
pilot initiatives; 
informal coordination 
 Credit scheme 
JFA/BTC-GIZ Norway-Ireland-
Belgium-Germany-
Finland (+ EU and 
SDC) 
Joint missions; joint 
trainings; joint 
workshops; informal 
meetings; Joint 
communication 
(video) 
 Pooled Fund 
Delegated cooperation 
Co-financing 
AREA C EU – Denm – AFD – 
UK 
Shared analysis; 
informal meetings (4 
musketeers) 
 Transfer agreements 
Council and PSC 
Conclusions 
 
 
The less successful cases display (much) less interaction between soft and 
hard implementation.  
• The GIBS health coordination in the DRC primarily involves the negotiation 
of agreements between donors. For instance, donors have negotiated 
agreements on per diems and primes. However, these agreements remain 
‘soft’ in the sense that they are not legally enforceable, and the 
implementation has indeed lacked behind.  
• In the same country, the KINSHASA fragility initiative bumped against its 
limits when the soft workshop initiative also aimed to achieve hard 
commitments in the form of a joint action plan and operationalization. As a 
result, its ambition was lowered turning into an ad hoc meeting for 
exchange of information.  
• The PARIS case in Haiti is interesting because it shows how the 
establishment of a working group can eventually lead to national plans to 
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be adopted by the government. However, interactions with related 
coordination activities are limited.  
• In contrast to these three coordination practices, the FAO agricultural 
economy cooperation case in Palestine does establish a heavily 
institutionalized system for cooperation. However, it builds on only limited 
soft joint implementation. To be sure, there have been interactions 
between the donors through previous cooperation, e.g between AECID 
and FAO, and a joint Dutch-Swiss field mission to Gaza was actually the 
trigger for this cooperation practice. These provide the potential for more 
clustering of cooperation in agriculture in Palestine. However, while the 
FAO practice partly builds on previous experiences, these initiatives have 
already expired and there are no interactions between different on-going 
coordination practices. 
• As noticed above, the FCS (health fund) is perceived as a financing 
mechanism rather than a coordination mechanism (“sitting together is not 
coordinating”). Instead of mixing several coordination practices, the 
participants in the Fund actually engage in separate health-related 
interventions outside the framework of the Fund, contributing to the 
already significant donor proliferation in the health sector. Interaction with 
wider coordination under the Compact is limited, partly because of several 
deficiencies from which the Compact suffers.  
• The HR/IHL Secretariat in Palestine operates on its own. There is limited 
interaction with ‘soft’ cooperation between the partners vis-à-vis the 
human rights CSOs. The Secretariat illustrates how under some 
circumstances cooperation can result in continuous and time-consuming 
negotiations between the partners to the extent that there is no scope left 
for further cooperation outside the framework and with the eventual 
beneficiaries. 
In sum, what makes some cases successful is that they are not isolated 
cases: they are clusters of various – hard and soft, formal and informal – 
coordination practices at different levels. 
4.2. Involving a small number of like-minded actors 
Achieving such a mix of soft and hard joint implementation activities is easier 
when there is a relatively small number of like-minded donors at the 
centre of the cluster of cooperation activities.  
The field research shows that bottom-up coordination practices between 
about 4-5 donors or agencies are perceived to be more successful than 
grand schemes such as Joint Programming. Joint Programming is 
sometimes seen as a useful exercise (e.g. in Palestine), but others are quite 
critical about the whole exercise. A significant number of interviewees take a 
wait-and-see attitude towards the implementation of Joint Programming in 
Palestine. This interviewee expresses what several others also suggested: 
“it (Joint Programming) took a very long time, and now the challenge is 
to implement it meaningfully; because it is easy for countries to join up 
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to the spirit of Joint Programming, but now it will become more 
challenging: there will be a lot of creative ‘how can we say we are 
aligned’ rather than effectively be aligned” (EU109). 
While interviewees in Palestine were cautiously optimistic about Joint 
Programming (which also includes Norway and Switzerland: the ‘EU+’), in the 
DRC and in Niger questions were raised about the EU’s willingness to 
effectively proceed with the whole exercise. It does not seem to be a priority 
of the EU Delegation in these countries.  
While ideally large-scale coordination such as Joint Programming would be 
combined with smaller initiatives (see previous point), the practitioners that we 
interviewed display (much) more confidence in coordination practices 
amongst a relatively small number of donors. As one interviewee expressed it: 
“in like-minded groups we are more pragmatic: we move on the ground, it is 
less about grand ideas” (EU96). 
However, being a small group is not sufficient: the coordinating 
donors/practitioners also need to be like-minded in terms of ideas and they 
need to form a critical mass in the sector. Ideally, a small number of donors 
embark on coordination efforts that then create a dynamic that attracts more 
members, unless they have sufficient critical mass in terms of budget and/or 
expertise amongst themselves to make a difference.  
These conditions seem fulfilled in the most successful cases. Each of them 
concerns a relatively small number of donors/practitioners and seems to 
generate a dynamic that attracts more members. What matters more than 
the absolute number of participants, is that at least one large donor or agency 
joins the coordination practice that has been instigated by a group of small 
donors. This also fosters further extension of the group (“everybody wants to 
be with the popular folks, a bit like at high school”). In fact, as explained in 
Section 3, attracting more participants forms an element of the selection 
criteria.  
• As for FISAN, besides SDC, Danish Cooperation and LuxDev, also KfW 
and AFD are considering to join the initiative. Such extension to more 
members will be crucial to guarantee the sustainability of the initiative. 
Indeed, the success of FISAN will depend on the contribution of other 
agencies – especially those considered to be the ‘bigger’ agencies in Niger 
– such as AFD, while the colossal size of the World Bank constitutes a 
challenge. For now it seems that the ‘coalition of the willing’ of LuxDev, 
SDC and Denmark have managed to create such a ‘multiplier effect’ 
based on their joint cooperation. Despite relatively smaller budgets, SDC 
and LuxDev displayed pro-activism in their advocacy initiatives by 
engaging in lobbying and pre-implementation/pilot projects, which 
ultimately played an important role to stimulate the interest of so-called 
bigger donors who already expressed an interest to join at a later stage 
(e.g. GIZ and KfW).  
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• As for the JFA, Belgium joined the pooled fund in 2013. Given the 
dominance of the JFPs in terms of budget and expertise (critical mass), 
there is no urgent need for extension of the group to more members. It 
could even distort efficiency and hinder effective coordination. 
• As for AREA C: whereas this was originally an EU initiative, it was quickly 
joined by Denmark and France, and in 2016 also the UK joined, implying 
that a number of significant EU member states participate in this highly 
politically sensitive programme. Importantly, also Germany might consider 
its participation. This would not only enhance the leverage of the social 
infrastructure fund but also constitute an important political symbol about 
Europe’s commitment to the two-state solution (European investments in 
Area C on West Bank). 
Some less successful coordination practices have seen an unchanging or 
declining participation. For instance, Norway left the HR/IHL Secretariat after 
only three months in 2016, which reflects the challenging times in which the 
HR/IHL situates itself. The critical mass of the initiative can be questioned, as 
the Secretariat provides a relatively small share of the organisations’ total 
funding. Other coordination practices are less successful because they may 
lack the critical mass:  
• The contribution of the FCS (health fund) in Niger seems negligible 
compared to what the many other donors (outside the fund) contribute to 
health related projects and programmes. While the Fund might have an 
added value in terms of institution building and in specific niches such as 
sexual and reproductive health, the proliferation of donors makes it difficult 
to have an impact and even the most optimist observers have noted that 
an extension of its critical mass is necessary.  
• The FAO case on agriculture in Palestine is equally challenged by the fact 
that many relevant donors (such as Canada and Australia, as well as 
many NGOs) remain outside the donor coordination framework. However, 
the group does include strong actors such as the EU and the FAO, with 
significant expertise from the Netherlands and budget from Denmark. As 
the implementation has not yet started, it remains to be seen how much 
weight the FAO initiative will have.  
In our pool of cooperation practices, only the health coordination in the GIBS 
(DRC) concerns donor wide cooperation. Cooperation within the GIBS can be 
seen as moderately successful: it has managed to reach agreements on 
important topics such as per diems, primes, contrat unique and medicines, 
however the level of implementation is not always clear. It should also be 
noticed that the agreements within the GIBS are based on consensus 
decision-making within the sub-groups, which include fewer members.  
A key advantage of engaging in cooperation with a small number of donors is 
that this can be based on like-mindedness. This brings us to the ‘ideational’ 
dimension. Shared ideas on how to promote development in a fragile context 
can be seen as the glue that facilitates the cooperation between small groups 
of states. In the most successful cases, there is a clear consensus between 
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the participants on what the root of the problem is and how it should be 
addressed.  
The like-mindedness in these cooperation practices is summarized in Table 
2.14. For FISAN, the like-mindedness situates itself at the level of 
development ideas; for JFA-BTC/GIZ the like-mindedness concerns a 
preoccupation with strengthening government institutions; and for Area C, the 
like-mindedness is based on a clear political statement on the two-state 
solution.  
 
Table 2.14: Like-mindedness in small groups 
 Participants Like-mindedness 
FISAN Luxembourg, 
Switzerland (SDC), 
Denmark, IFAD 
Possibly AfD and KfW 
Developmental: Need for investments for 
small producers in agriculture and food 
sector, at decentralized level; consensus 
that existing systems need to be 
strengthened and that HC3N is central 
JFA-
BTC/GIZ 
Belgium, Ireland, 
Finland, Norway, 
Germany (KfW) 
Institutional: Education should be 
addressed through governance reforms at 
ministry; results-based management 
AREA C EU, Denmark, AFD, UK Political: Two state-solution; social 
infrastructure in Area C should be possible if 
Israel does not formally object  
 
In contrast, the moderately successful cases show less ideational 
convergence.  
• The FAO case in Palestine has started from a common realization by the 
participants that agricultural exports should be promoted through a ‘global 
value chain’ and ‘market oriented’ approach, but through the laborious 
negotiation process it had become clear that the donors had different 
views of what this means and how it should be addressed.  
• Although the success of the fragility workshop can be partly attributed to 
the small number of participants from the “European family”, it quickly 
became clear that belonging to the same family does not mean having 
similar visions. Different member states had different priorities, and 
divergences came to the fore when concrete commitments were required 
for the action plan. 
• Within the GIBS, different ideologies on how to provide health care in a 
fragile state – ranging from horizontal health systems strengthening to 
parallel private sector approaches – have dominated discussions on the 
procurement and distribution of medicines, making the implementation of 
the agreement that was eventually reached precarious. 
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• Cooperation within the FCS (health fund) and the Compact in Niger is 
based on a loose consensus since the Paris-inspired reforms in the mid-
2000s. However in practices there are not many signs of like-mindedness. 
Quite the contrary: both actors advocating horizontal and actors 
advocating vertical approaches to health care are members of the FCS 
and the Compact. While the Compact has in itself a clear vision, it is barely 
known even amongst its signatories. Therefore, in this case the like-
mindedness is limited to paper and does not appear in practice.  
 
Interestingly, like-mindedness does not necessarily mean that all participants 
should be practitioners (or diplomats). In a number of (relatively) successful 
cases (the PARIS example in Haiti, the KINSHASA workshop and the JFA in 
Palestine) the mix of diplomats and practitioners was perceived as an 
advantage, while in the successful case of food security (FISAN) the leading 
actors (SDC, LuxDev) did not make this distinction. In relatively successful 
cases, technical experts did play a key role (e.g. GIBS and medicines case : 
positive and negative experience with consultants ; FAO and study by 
Wageningen University ; PARIS case and SDC seconded architect). 
The cases also confirm the established knowledge (see Literature Review) 
that smaller donors tend to be more favourable towards coordination in the 
countries studied. SDC, LuxDev, BTC/Belgium and Denmark appear in 
several (more or less successful) coordination practices that we have 
analyzed. As relatively small donors and agencies they have a bigger interest 
in being involved in larger groups in order to have an impact (leverage effect). 
Moreover, some of them seem to receive more institutional flexibility (e.g. 
LuxDev, SDC, Denmark) from headquarters compared to larger donors and 
agencies (see below).  
The importance of like-mindedness does not necessarily mean that al 
participants should be EU member states. On the one hand, some relatively 
successful coordination initiatives include non-EU countries such as Norway 
(JFA case) and Switzerland (FAO case). On the other hand, there are 
relatively successful cases that include non-European donors (GIBS case) 
and other organizations (PARIS case). There is no evidence that coordination 
by EU member states would be more successful. In the future Joint 
Programming may progressively allow a convergence of analysis and visions 
among EU member states ; however this has not yet been witnessed in the 
countries of this study (see 4.2 and 5.3). The only case where participants 
were explicitly limited to the so-called « European family » was the 
KINSHASA workshop and its follow-up, where different ideas and interests 
between the EU participants emerged. What seems to matter much more than 
belonging to the EU, is the like-mindedness of the participants.  
In some case, it seems that a European like-mindedness is fostered by 
contrast with other actors such as the World Bank and the UNDP. For 
instance, when it comes to health assistance (GIBS in DRC, FCS and 
Compact in Niger), divergences between a ‘European’ health strengthening 
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versus a ‘non-European’, ‘US’ or ‘multilateral’ vertical approach sometimes 
emerged. However, in general, and also in these specific cases, we could not 
find strong evidence of a distinctively ‘European’ like-mindedness. 
Interviewees also voiced little references to possible impact from China, Brazil 
or South Africa – which may be surprising given the intense policy debates 
that have beld on the emerging non-OECD donors and the changing donor 
landscape.  
Outside the scope of the 10 interesting practices, the research also revealed 
several instances of cooperation activities between the AFD and the KfW. 
Again, this can be seen as the result of both institutions being relatively like-
minded as development banks. It is no coincidence that AFD and KfW, 
which share a similar institutional environment given their role as banks, 
cooperate on several occasions:  
• Already in previous phase (see Phase 1 Report, HQ analysis), AFD-KfW 
cooperation through the Mutual Reliance Initiative was highlighted as an 
interesting HQ-steered example of coordination;  
• In Niger, there is an AFD-KfW Memorandum of Understanding in the water 
sector; 
• In Palestine AFD and KfW co-financed a joint study on cartography of 
water 
• Also in Palestine, both AFD and KfW coordinate informally on their 
industrial zones projects, together with the Japanese cooperation  
In the field, these AFD-KfW cooperation practices are relatively limited and 
isolated. For instance, the jointly financed cartography on the water sector in 
Palestine is not intended to lead to joint projects afterwards. Also, informal 
coordination on industrial zones is merely information exchange, for instance 
sharing experiences on how to address the problems that AFD, KfW and JICA 
face in dealing with Israeli authorities. Nevertheless, a pattern of like-minded 
donors engaging in functional cooperation that is mutually beneficial emerges.  
 
Last but not least, having a small number of like-minded participants is 
not a sufficient condition for successful cooperation. It may be a 
necessary condition, yet there are several examples where cooperation 
between a limited number of donors/agencies sharing similar views has not 
been sufficient.  
• This may be true for the FAO coordination practice; at least judging from 
the difficult negotiations and the perception of participants, while its 
implementation still remains to be evaluated.  
• It certainly applies to the HR/IHL Secretariat in Palestine, where a small 
group of Nordic donors share similar views on the importance of human 
rights CSOs in Israel and Palestine, yet have been confronted with various 
problems.  
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• Similarly, the PAFMIR case on professional training in the agricultural 
sector in Haiti shows how very similar views on how an issue should be 
addressed do not guarantee efficient coordination. 
What has been lacking in these cases, which involve a small number of like-
minded actors, is that the following two conditions are not fulfilled: finding a 
way to align with the government and having sufficient institutional flexibility 
and/or political backing from headquarters. These two additional factors are 
discussed in the remainder of this section.  
4.3. Finding ways to align with the partner country 
Nobody expects full ownership and perfect alignment in fragile states, 
but the research shows that continuous efforts in this direction are key. 
The challenges to guarantee the implementation of the principles of 
ownership and alignment in fragile states are commonly known and often 
emphasized. As mentioned in Section 2, a minority of interviewees even 
express themselves negatively about the relevance of the Paris principles in 
fragile states.  
Nonetheless, the most promising practices of coordination are exactly those 
that have somehow managed to deal with the challenge to involve the partner 
government (Table 2.15). While there does not seem to be a magic formula, 
some sort of alignment with partner country policies seems to be an 
important predictor for successful coordination.  
• In the case of FISAN, there has never been any doubt about the strong 
ownership of the government counterparts. On the one hand, this is due to 
the fact that FISAN is followed closely at the highest political level with the 
office of the President. An interviewee underlined in this context that “the 
success of coordination is based on the will of the state.” On the other 
hand, the FISAN mechanism itself allows donors to align with existing 
government-led initiatives, such as the ANFICT (National Agency for 
Financing Collective Territories) and the BAGRI (National Agricultural 
Bank), which predates the FISAN mechanism. In turn, this reinforces the 
government’s regional strategy for the sector, which sets out the roles for 
these institutions. As such, if and when the donors join the FISAN 
mechanism, they automatically sign up to adhering to Niger’s regional plan 
(at the policy level) and institutions (at the implementation level). 
• Involving the government and its Ministry of Education is the core purpose 
of the JFA. The central goal is indeed to strengthen public management of 
the MoEHE. The strong leadership of the current Minister of Education has 
made this easier to achieve. Equally, BTC-GIZ activities are closely 
aligned to government policies, although the Higher Council for TVET 
might constitute a challenge.  
• As the Area C territory is of existential importance for the Palestinian state, 
the EU’s support to social infrastructure in this area (with the risk of 
demolition by Israeli authorities) connects closely to the government’s 
preferences. Importantly, the European partners work together with a 
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strong semi-governmental institution (MDLF) and with local villages (Local 
Governance Units) for the implementation of the programme.  
 
Table 2.15: Aligning with the governmental level(s) 
Coordinatio
n practice 
Dealing with governmental level(s) 
FISAN Strong support from President 
Involvement of Ministry of Agriculture (technical assistants); 
alignment with HCI3N initiative (High Commissioner for the 
HCI3N involved from beginning) 
The facilities are coherent with existing instruments (eg ANFICT, 
BAGRI): catalyse the already existing national financing 
mechanism through enhanced and active coordination  
JFA-
BTC/GIZ 
Strong and reform-oriented Minister of Education 
Close involvement of Ministry of Education (MoEHE) and 
Ministry of Finance and Planning 
Core goal of JFA is strengthening public management of Ministry 
of Education (ESDP) 
Interaction sector wide (sub-)working groups 
AREA C Closely aligned to political agenda of Palestinian Authority (Area 
C territory); EU-Palestine Agreement 2013; aligned with MoLG 
Action Plan 2012 
Implemented by strong semi-governmental institution of MDLF 
Involvement of Ministry of Local Government 
 
Inversely, those initiatives for coordination among donors and practitioners 
that have not adequately addressed the challenges of dealing with the 
governments seem more vulnerable.  
• Alignment with the government is a risk for the upcoming FAO programme 
in Palestine, which has through its development over the past two years 
been very much donor-centred. It remains to be seen how and to which 
extent the FAO will be able to guarantee ownership and alignment with the 
Palestinian government.  
• In the case of the HR/IHL Secretariat, ownership and alignment is 
inherently difficult, as the supported organizations are by definition critical 
(and should be critical) for the government’s policies.  
The challenge of involving the government is clearly present in the DRC.  
• The KINSHASA workshop on fragility deliberately excluded DRC 
governmental actors and was limited to the “European family”, because 
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otherwise the discussions would become too complicated and sensitive. 
According to some European participants, the workshop has contributed to 
different (more critical) thinking about their relations with the government.  
• Interestingly, the GIBS has to some extent managed to align its work with 
the Congolese government. The GIBS has (accurately) been criticized for 
working totally parallel from the Comité National de Pilotage du Secteur de 
la Santé’ (CNP-SS), which is chaired by the Health Ministry. In theory, the 
CNP (chaired by the Ministry) should be the leading coordination 
organization, but as this platform is not working well, most of the 
coordination takes place in the GIBS. However, the GIBS coordination 
practices that we researched show that donors have continuously 
attempted to align with the government. Institutionally, the five thematic 
sub-groups correspond with the technical committees within the CNP. 
Substantially, coordination efforts on medicines and contrat unique in the 
health sector primarily aim to align with (respectively central and 
provincial) governmental strategies. In the contrat unique, donors are 
experimenting with a ‘virtual basket fund’ that may eventually evolve 
towards a ‘physical’ one, thereby enhancing transparency and alignment 
towards the provinces. Whereas it would be exaggerated to see this as a 
perfect model for alignment in fragile states, it shows that at least to some 
extent, donor coordination can support governmental policies even if it 
formally takes place outside the Paris-style structures. This relatively close 
alignment with the DRC is one of the reasons why GIBS can be see as a 
relatively successful example of donor coordination (and this despite its 
ideological diversity and wide membership, which are constraining factors 
against coordination). 
The GIBS case demonstrates that alignment can be pursued even in 
coordination practices that formally do not include the government; the 
FCS coordination practice, however, makes it clear that alignment is not 
a panacea. Although the common fund for health does provide a significant 
degree of alignment, which is its major strength, its relevance for health 
support in Niger has been relatively limited because of other constraints (e.g. 
limited critical mass, fragmentation of resources, institutional constraints). This 
suggests that alignment may be a necessary but is certainly not a sufficient 
condition for successful coordination.  
In conclusion, the most successful cases all manage to find ways to 
deal with the government, for instance by engaging one of the stronger 
Ministries, or by involving a strong semi-governmental institution. Vice 
versa, the least successful cases largely fail to involve the 
government(s). 
In the context of alignment, the question of budget support always emerges. 
Except from the EU Delegation in Niger and Haiti, only very few donors in the 
four countries considered budget support an adequate modality. In the case of 
Haiti, it was recognised that budget support enabled greater coordination 
between the EUDEL and the few EU MS agencies on the ground, AFD and 
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AECID. In Niger, several European interviewees criticized the EU’s 
preference for budget support. It has also prevented the EU from being 
involved in the FSC (health fund).  
Where budget support has not been used, donors have engaged in a variety 
of pooled funding arrangements. However, pooled funds are certainly no 
guarantee for success. While pooled funds may solve part of the puzzle to 
ensure that the Paris principles are somehow adhered in a context of fragility, 
by providing a ‘middle way’ solution whereby the donors engage with the 
government while keeping an influence on the decision-making and 
implementation, some seem more successful or promising in this regard (e.g. 
the JFA, and to a more limited extent FCS) than others (e.g. FAO).  
Donor engagement through parallel systems most clearly characterizes the 
situation in Haiti, where a prominent Haitian interviewee called his country 
“The Republic of NGOs » and where an interviewee from a prominent EU 
donor country was not aware of the name of the local coordination structure. 
Also in Niger, health interventions outside the FCS (common fund), even by 
some of the members of the FCS, risk undermining the coordination 
mechanism (which is more closely aligned to the government than most other 
interventions). 
From the perspective of alignment, it may not be surprising that the most 
successful coordination practices are found in Niger and Palestine, 
whereas those in the DRC and Haiti score moderately at best. A quick 
glance at the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank shows that 
both Niger and Palestine score much higher on the Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption 
indicators than the DRC and Haiti (see Table 2.16). This partly explains why it 
proves easier to involve the governments in Niger and Palestine. However, 
there are still moderately successful cases in the DRC (KINSHASA, GIBS) 
and cases that are less successful in Palestine (FAO, HR/IHL) and Niger 
(FSC). 
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Table 2.16: Worldwide Governance Indicators for DRC, Haiti, Niger, Palestine 
 
 
In sum, and in line with the previous factor, involving the partner government 
seems a necessary but not a sufficient condition for successful coordination 
practices. Basically, the challenge is not to ignore the inherent weaknesses of 
the partner government by either delegating too much power or engaging in 
parallel systems. Embarking on ministries and (semi-)governmental 
institutions that are already relatively strong, along with commitments to 
further strengthen the governmental side, seems the most promising strategy.  
Interestingly, this factor interrelates with the like-mindedness discussed in 
the previous part, as could be expected from a sociology of institutions 
perspective. Indeed, the most successful examples (e.g. JFA, FISAN) do not 
only exemplify similar ideas on the content of the coordination, they also 
witness a shared vision with and willingness to somehow align with the 
government. 
4.4. Providing flexibility, while guaranteeing political backing 
Resonating with the findings of the HQ phase (see Phase 1 Report, HQ 
analysis), both flexibility and political support are key ingredients for 
successful coordination. The most often cited constraint for coordination 
relates to bureaucratic complexities. Practitioners emphasize that flexibility 
is all the more necessary in the often-volatile context of fragile states. This is 
certainly not a given: none of our interviewees could confirm that within 
his/her institution there would be an institutional incentive in favour of 
coordination (e.g. evaluation reports). Quite the contrary, they often pointed to 
(1) cumbersome procedures required by HQ making it difficult to engage in 
coordination, and (2) institutional constraints that are inherent to the 
coordination mechanisms in the field can also constrain effective coordination. 
Against this discouraging backdrop, coordination tends to depend on 
committed individuals. Their importance was already highlighted in the 
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Literature Review. While we found quite some examples of individuals who 
managed to stimulate coordination despite institutional hurdles, this 
dependence on individual efforts then also constitutes a major challenge for 
the long-term sustainability of the coordination practices. These may well 
collapse when individuals move on to different jobs or countries. Relatively 
frequent staff turnover amongst practitioners is sometimes seen as a 
constraint for coordination (e.g. the follow-up of the KINSHASA fragility 
workshop). Even in one of the more successful examples, the education (JFA-
BTC/GIZ) case in Palestine, participants noticed that much depends on 
individuals’ commitments and that therefore it may be difficult to continue with 
different people on board. In some successful cases, individuals seem to have 
really acted as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ forging European coordination for 
development (e.g. LuxDev and SDC staff in FISAN; e.g. BTC and GIZ 
‘chemistry of persons’ in Palestine). When headquarters are not closely 
scrutinizing and the issues is less politicized, the impact of individuals may be 
relatively large. Experts and consultants can also play important roles (e.g. 
GIBS; PARIS; FISAN). In general, however dependence on committed 
individuals makes coordination vulnerable if it cannot be anchored into 
institutional settings.  
Therefore, and in line with the sociology of institutions perspective, the 
institutional context within which individuals operates is of more 
fundamental importance.  
First, a degree of flexibility within the coordination structures themselves 
(at the field level) is essential. On the one hand, this implies that there should 
be sufficient scope for informal coordination whereby actors get to know each 
other’s expertise, possibilities and limitations. The PARIS case (school 
construction in Haiti) illustrates the advantages of an open and inclusive 
process with limited formalization. Over-formalization can be a major 
constraint for coordination, as one interviewee highlighted: “as soon as we 
formalise, it becomes a gas chamber”.  
On the other hand, the most successful cases seem to show that the following 
institutional factors enable coordination: 
• a clear division of labour (albeit not necessarily formalized) 
• regular meetings (with a clear calendar) 
• a focal point and well-functioning secretariat (perhaps rotating) 
• a relatively short chain of delegation (e.g. delegated cooperation, co-
financing, transfer agreements)  
For instance, coordination on education in the framework of the JFA in 
Palestine allows for a pragmatic and informal division of labour between the 
five participants. Also the rotating chair (focal point), the consensual decision-
making system and the agreement on a clear calendar with fixed meetings 
are institutional factors that contribute to its success. Another example of 
institutional flexibility relates to the AREA C case in Palestine, where 
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Denmark, France (AFD) and the UK delegate funds to the EU Delegation 
through transfer agreements.  
Institutional factors shed a light on why the GIBS forum on health coordination 
in the DRC is still considered a moderately successful practice – despite wide 
membership, diverging ideological positions, and limitations to ‘soft’ 
agreements that are difficult to enforce upon its members. Specifically, the 
GIBS’ success has been attributed to its long-standing existence, its 
permanent secretariat, its structure in sub-groups, and the regularity of 
meetings. Within this context, also the important role and institutional 
memory of the person of the secretary is often emphasized. 
Inversely, the less successful cases also struggle with institutional issues. 
• The FAO case constitutes the clearest example of how bureaucratic 
requirements from headquarters can overly complicate coordination. 
Independently from each other, several participants dubbed the almost two 
years of negotiations between the six partners involved (Spain/AECID, the 
EU, Denmark, Netherlands and SDC as funding partners and ILO as 
implementer) as a “nightmare”. One other interviewee called it a “mess”. 
This specifically related to the five different agreements that the funders 
need to negotiate with the FAO.  
• Similarly, the HR/IHL case in Palestine constitutes an example where 
procedural discussions between donors absorb much of their energy at the 
detriment of efficient coordination. As one participant said, “we are still 
together, but an enormous amount of time goes to settling even very 
simple things… it is extremely time-consuming, even after all those years” 
(EU128). The mechanism is plagued by a leadership vacuum, lacks a 
formal or informal division of labour amongst donors, and involves (too) 
limited delegation to the lead donor (chair).  
• In the PAFMIR case, there were notable complaints about the high level of 
bureaucracy vis-à-vis delegated cooperation with the EU. It was 
highlighted that the process of delegated cooperation with the EU is not 
very flexible, even if the final outcome for the implementing partner is. In 
the worst case, this led to failed attempts of delegating funds. 
Second, a degree of flexibility vis-a-vis headquarters is essential. This can 
be seen in the three successful cases.  
• The coordination dynamic around the food security (FISAN) initiative in 
Niger was launched and stimulated by a number of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
within SDC and LuxDev. Participants stress the importance of regular and 
informal contacts between individuals – for lunches or coffees – to discuss 
specific topics, or for more formal monthly meeting to share information.  
“These meetings are not for taking decisions but better aligning 
ourselves. Every agency has constraints or ideas, and it is important 
that we understand these issues and the red lines. And, then we can 
encourage each other to take various initiatives”.  
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• The FSA/BTC-GIZ story is quite similar. Participants stress the “trust” and 
“good working atmosphere” between the JFPs, which allows for a flexible 
division of labour whereby the partners know each other’s red lines in 
terms of substance and procedures. Similarly, the informal coffee 
meetings between the BTC and GIZ team leaders on TVET are perceived 
as important for the cooperation, for instance because it helps to see 
where partners can help each other by co-funding activities. While one of 
the partners said that he regularly has to justify to headquarters why the 
cooperation is beneficial, this has so far not posed major problems and it 
suffices to emphasize that the agency’s logo appears everywhere. 
• The AREA C case demonstrates that regular, informal meetings of the 
group that calls itself ‘the four musketeers’ (see also conclusions, Section 
6). Again, this is a very straightforward form of delegation as it concerns 
Transfer Agreements from the European member states to the EU. 
Stakeholders involved in these relatively successful cases did not mention 
significant constraints from headquarters and seem to have a sufficient 
degree of autonomy.  
Again, the FAO case would be the counter-example, with the above-
mentioned administrative complexities partly relating to heavy requirements 
from the capitals of some participants. One of the participants was 
complaining that half of his time goes to reporting back to headquarters and 
that he does not have time anymore to do field trips. Also at the ‘EU Office’ in 
Palestine (not officially called ‘EU Delegation’ given political sensitivities on 
the recognition of Palestine), people complained about the additional burden 
that comes with new coordination initiatives (such as joint videos, joint 
missions): “all this is extra work, and there is already heavy pressure from the 
capital” (EU105). 
 
Flexibility from headquarters is not the same as neglect. Political 
guidance from HQ, or at least political backing, is generally considered 
to be necessary. When working in uncertain and volatile situations, it is 
important to have political support from headquarters.  
• EU political support has been a major drive for the AREA C case. 
European coordination on this programme comes from the EU Office in 
Palestine and is politically supported by Council Conclusions of 2012 and 
the EU-Palestine Agreement of 2012 on investment in Area C. Despite the 
legitimate risk that investments may be demolished by Israel and therefore 
subject to criticism at home, the political backing from EU institutions 
facilitates this coordination practice. At the same time, the coordination 
effort has the advantage that one can ‘share risks’ with the other 
participant and ‘hide behind’ each other.  
• This advantage of coordination was frequently mentioned in Palestine, not 
only in relation to the AREA C case but also in relation to education (JFA-
BTC/GIZ) which involves potentially sensitive issues such as building of 
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school infrastructure (e.g. risk of demolition; schools that are named after 
martyrs or terrorists) and curriculum development (risk of politically 
incorrect depictions of the Israeli-Palestine conflict; may include incitement 
against Israel).  
Hiding and risk sharing can therefore constitute enabling factors for 
coordination in fragile states, especially when there is a fear that 
development activities may backlash to domestically sensitive 
discussions. As one participant said in relation to Area C investment: “If 
Israel destroys the infrastructure, it will be EU infrastructure” (EU122). In 
relation to the HR/IHL Secretariat, another one said: “if alone we would be 
even more attacked… As a country alone, you would go for the safe options, 
and not take the political risks” (EU98). Another interviewee put it more 
cynically: “we are all cowards, we don’t want to have our flag there – if it goes 
to the JFA it is the Palestinians doing it.” (EU105) 
 
What happens when political support is lacking, is demonstrated by two 
coordination practices that we studied.  
• Most clearly, cooperation within the HR/IHL Secretariat is seriously 
undermined because of critique from the national capitals (and media). 
Support to Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations has become 
very sensitive in the domestic political context of the European funders 
and has provoked intensive lobby campaigns from the Israeli government 
and organizations such as ‘NGO Monitor’. In addition to the complicated 
bureaucratic process (see above) this is one of the reasons why Norway 
withdrew in 2016 (after having participated for only three months), and 
given the intensive domestic pressure in some countries it seems that 
others might follow.  
• Lack of political support for the KINSHASA fragility initiative also 
contributed to the evaporation of this seemingly promising process. This is 
with the exception of Belgium, where the workshop contributed to 
changing policy lines in Brussels and Kinshasa. 
The Niger country study indicates that there is also a third possible scenario, 
whereby political support for development cooperation can effectively 
increase albeit not in favour of coordination. Several practitioners 
criticized the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa for providing tons of new 
aid for Niger without stimulating coordination amongst donors and without 
involving local stakeholders. Therefore, the Trust Fund is seen not only as a 
missed opportunity for enhancing European coordination, but even as 
an initiative that diverts attention away from on-going programmes in 
Niger and potentially thwarts existing initiatives. According to one 
interviewee, only after five projects had become operational and contracts 
with the Commission had been signed, was the issue that “we urgently need 
to set up a coordination mechanism” (EU51) raised. This statement of one 
interviewee was echoed in several other conversations with European donors 
and practitioners in the field:  
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“There was an asymmetry of information between the headquarters 
and the field. This is a little frustrating. The Trust Fund boosted 
competition instead of coordination between the agencies. We are 
going backwards in terms of coordination.” (EU63; translated) 
This brings us to the question what role the EU could and should play in 
European coordination in fragile states, which will be addressed in Section 5.  
4.5 Summary 
There is no easy answer to the question when coordination works better in 
some cases than in others. This analysis has demonstrated how four factors 
have together contributed to making some coordination practices (e.g. FISAN, 
JFA-BTC/GIZ, AREA C) more successful than others (e.g. HR/IHL, PARIS). 
Importantly, as could already be seen from Table 2.12, the four factors should 
be combined in order to increase the likeliness of successful European 
coordination. None of the above-mentioned factors is sufficient by itself. In 
terms of recommendations, this implies that all of them should be 
pursued together.  
Moreover, the analysis pointed out that these four factors inter-relate in 
complex ways. This raises the question how exactly they do inter-relate, and 
which factors may be more or less important? In order to answer this, we 
have to revert back to the 4i factors of the pragmatic analytical framework 
(Section 3):  
• Individuals: people certainly play a key role. We witnessed many highly 
committed individuals who seem to be relentlessly working for the cause of 
development in difficult circumstances. They usually coordinate in the 
absence of incentives from headquarters to do so, and sometimes they 
even go against guidelines from their capitals (“It may not be the same 
vision as my headquarters, but we feel that we have to fight for the country 
here!”, non-EU155). Some of them manage to punch above their weight 
and can be seen as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and even ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
by forging coalitions between donors and/or with governmental actors. 
When asking about enabling factors for coordination, interviewees often 
started by pointing to “personalities”. However, when continuing the 
analysis it usually became apparent that deeper explanations lay behind 
the individual’s role, and in some cases a dependence on committed 
individuals was even seen as a key challenge for European coordination. 
In line with the sociology of institutions perspective, this strengthens 
the conclusion that individual efforts can only be effective and long-
lasting if they are embedded in a wider ideational and institutional 
context. 
• Ideas: like-mindedness on the analysis of the problem and the proposed 
solutions is key to successful coordination, and this is more likely to be 
achieved when cooperation starts with a small number of donors and 
practitioners. In the same vein, the importance of trust and a good working 
atmosphere was frequently emphasized.  
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• Institutions – donors/practitioners: even if donors and practitioners hold 
similar ideas about what the problem is and what should be done, 
coordination can be jeopardized if the institutional context is not 
favourable. Sufficient flexibility from headquarters and within the 
coordination mechanisms is of crucial importance, while also political 
backing from HQ may be needed. Again, this is easier to achieve in 
smaller groups. Vice versa, when institutional conditions are favourable, 
this provides a more beneficial context for trust and like-mindedness.  
• Institutions – partner government: the institutional context should also 
provide some form of (more or less formalized) alignment with the partner 
country government(s). Despite the inherent difficulties to do so with fragile 
states, the more successful cases are also those that make continuous 
efforts in this regard. 
• Interests: while self-interests are intuitively often perceived as 
constraining factors against coordination, under some circumstances 
coordination can be interest-driven. For instance, this is the case for 
smaller countries that aim to increase their leverage. As mentioned above, 
smaller countries and agencies have played a key role in several (more or 
less successful) coordination practices of this study. Moreover, also larger 
countries can have an interest in coordination, especially when this 
provides an opportunity to share risks and even hide behind each other. In 
volatile and sensitive contexts of crisis and fragility, it is all the more 
important to share risks. For this reason, some interviewees even went as 
far as saying that they prefer being ‘invisible’. However, under less 
favourable conditions, the pursuit of visibility, competition for resources, 
and links with foreign and security policy as well as migration policy 
interests, also risk undermining European coordination for development. 
The interplay between these four i’s explains why some of the coordination 
practices that we examined are more successful than others (see Table 2.12). 
When they are combined in a favourable way, European coordination 
does not involve single practices of cooperation but clusters of various 
cooperation efforts – soft and hard joint implementation, informally and 
formally – in different ways and at different levels. The FISAN, JFA-
BTC/GIZ and AREA C cases – in fact, they are not ‘cases’ but clusters of 
practices – are inspiring practices in this regard and their future impact should 
be followed up closely in further research. 
More generally, it seems that the most successful cases are situated in 
Palestine and Niger, whereas the coordination practices that we examined in 
the DRC and Haiti score moderately at best. This is probably not due to 
selection effects, as we were (albeit not always successfully) searching for 
best practices within the four countries. For instance, the GIBS is often 
considered to be a model of donor coordination in the DRC and PARIS is 
seen as a best practice in Haiti. However, both display challenges and 
weaknesses and they appear as less successful when evaluating them in 
comparison with coordination practices in Niger and Palestine. Also, the 
differences cannot be explained by variation in the absolute number of donors 
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(see Table 2.17): the fact that many European donors are active in Palestine 
may induce a greater need for coordination, but then again there is also a 
relatively large number of donors in the DRC. From a general perspective, 
what seems to matter more when explaining why more coordination has been 
observed in Niger and Palestine are two elements:  
• First, a recipient country specific element: while all four countries are 
fragile states, Niger and Palestine score much higher on governance 
indicators than the DRC and Haiti (see Table 2.16). This provides a more 
enabling working environment for coordination and for aligning with the 
government(s), which has appeared as an important success factor in this 
research. In terms of human development, Palestine scores significantly 
higher on the Human Development Index (ranked 114) than Haiti (163), 
DRC (176) and Niger (187) (UNDP, Human Development Report 2016).  
• Second, a donor country specific element: Palestine is much more 
politicized in the EU’s external action than Niger, Haiti and the DRC. In 
Palestine “even the most naive action has political consequences” 
(EU100) and funding decisions can backfire into domestic political 
debates. Moreover, EU member state representatives admit that “we are 
all here for political reasons” (EU109): given the importance for regional 
and world peace, doing development policy in Palestine is always closely 
linked to a country’s foreign policy profile. While a cynical and realist 
perspective might expect high politicization to constrain coordination, we 
frequently observed the opposite to happen. While it is more difficult to 
realize EU-wide coordination (cf. Joint Programming), European donors 
and practitioners frequently find themselves in smaller groups with the 
need to ‘share risks’ and even ‘hide behind each other’, which are often 
cited as enabling factors for coordination. More recently, Niger and the 
whole Sahel region have become more politicized in the EU’s external 
action because of the focus on migration flows from Africa to Europe since 
the Valletta Summit (one interviewee called migration “the new climate 
change”; EU51). While this politicization has led to a large rise of aid 
budgets flowing to Niger, in this case it has not stimulated coordination 
(quite the contrary, see Section 5). 
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Table 2.17: Overview of EU donors in Haiti, DRC, Niger, Palestine 
HAITI 
Donor   
France 
25,845  
Germany 
15,562  
EU 
Institutions 10,073  
Belgium 
5,204  
Spain 
2,815  
Ireland 
2,297  
Italy 
1,375  
Luxembourg 
0,903  
Sweden 
0,811  
United 
Kingdom 0,594  
Finland 
0,310  
Slovak 
Republic 0,263  
Austria 
0,033  
Czech 
Republic 0,014  
Poland 
0,010  
Slovenia 
.. 
Portugal 
.. 
Netherlands 
.. 
Greece 
.. 
Denmark 
.. 
 
DRC 
Donor   
EU 
Institutions 185,938  
Germany 
109,919  
Belgium 
78,955  
France 
67,640  
United 
Kingdom 36,372  
Sweden 
36,350  
Netherlands 
23,444  
Italy 
10,830  
Ireland 
5,463  
Spain 
4,910  
Finland 
3,404  
Luxembourg 
3,186  
Greece 
0,596  
Austria 
0,304  
Portugal 
0,040  
Poland 
0,014  
Czech 
Republic 0,003  
Slovenia 
.. 
Slovak 
Republic .. 
Denmark 
.. 
 
Niger 
Donor   
EU 
Institutions 134,697  
France 
94,209  
Germany 
26,072  
Luxembourg 
23,636  
Belgium 
18,300  
Denmark 
7,405  
Spain 
5,460  
Italy 
4,342  
Ireland 
2,161  
Sweden 
1,568  
Austria 
0,227  
Czech 
Republic 0,081  
United 
Kingdom .. 
Slovenia 
.. 
Slovak 
Republic .. 
Portugal 
.. 
Poland 
.. 
Netherlands 
.. 
Greece 
.. 
Finland 
.. 
 
Palestine 
Donor   
EU 
Institutions 391,585  
Germany 
91,247  
France 
60,752  
Italy 
58,845  
United 
Kingdom 39,384  
Belgium 
38,530  
Sweden 
27,766  
Denmark 
27,566  
Netherlands 
21,126  
Spain 
16,625  
Finland 
9,892  
Luxembourg 
8,328  
Ireland 
6,380  
Austria 
4,125  
Czech 
Republic 1,243  
Poland 
1,047  
Greece 
0,712  
Slovenia 
0,394  
Slovak 
Republic 0,181  
Portugal 
0,127  
 
Source: OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS); Sector 1000: ‘Total All 
Sectors’, Official Development Assistance, All Channels, Current Prices, 
Commitments, All types (Total), US Dollar (millions), year 2015 
 
As said, however, much variation in level of success situates itself within the 
fragile states, and this can be understood through the interplay of the four 
above-mentioned factors. The next section elaborates on the role that the 
European Union has, could, or should have played in this regard.  
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5. WHAT ROLE FOR THE EU? 
5.1. No consensus 
When asking for the EU’s role in European coordination in the four 
countries, there was no consensus amongst interviewees. With ‘EU’ we 
are referring to the EU institutions, and mainly the European Commission’s 
DG DEVCO and the EEAS. As such we consider the EU as a distinct actor in 
development policy, as stipulated in Article 4.4 of the Treaty for European 
Union. At the same time, we recognize the objective of complementarity 
between EU and member states’ development policies (Article 208) and the 
requirement of the EU and its member states to coordinate (Article 209).  
Interviewees indeed discern the EU as a distinct actor in development, usually 
with reference to the EU Delegation in the country. However, the EU is not 
generally seen to play a coordinating role. While some interviewees 
emphasize that the EU does and/or should play an important role in 
coordinating and even harmonizing, the majority of interviewees say that this 
is not happening (yet), and many of them also do not think that the EU should 
be more active in coordinating, let alone harmonizing. While at the HQ phase 
1 (see Phase 1 Report, HQ analysis) we could still discern a dominant view 
that the EU is not ‘just another donor’ and should play a special role, this 
picture has become more blurred during the field phase. 
The lack of a clear consensus on the EU’s role seems to reflect a more 
existential crisis of European development cooperation and European 
integration in general. In this regard, it is notable that none of our 
interviewees – 57 at HQ level, 127 at field level – spontaneously mentioned 
the new ‘European Consensus on Development’. This is remarkable because 
this document was under revision and discussion within the EU during the 
time of research, and it should therefore have been the ‘talk of the town’ in 
development circles. Moreover, the new Consensus does contain interesting 
commitments to ‘working better together’ and ‘joint implementation’, 
suggesting that at least at HQ level there have been discussions on European 
coordination. However, the new European Consensus appears not to have 
provoked many discussions amongst practitioners. As it seems unlikely that 
there is a true European consensus on development thinking and on the EU’s 
role in this regard, the reason for the European Consensus being a non-issue 
must be either that it is not perceived as being relevant or that there are more 
priority challenges to address. In both scenarios, this is worrisome.  
Similarly, also other grand strategic frameworks developed in 
Brussels/Europe, such as those on the Comprehensive Approach, the EU 
Global Strategy, the New Deal, the Joint Framework Documents, and the 
upcoming Resilience Communication (see Phase 1 Report and Literature 
Review), did not come up in interviews with donors and practitioners. There 
appears a significant gap between documents produced at headquarters’ 
level and the day-to-day practices of diplomats and practitioners in the 
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field. When discussing European cooperation – joint implementation, 
common goods and services – interviewees generally fail to embed their 
analysis and practices within the wider schemes that are developed in the 
capital. The only exception is Joint Programming, which has been assessed 
moderately positive (see Section 4). 
5.2. Conceptual roles: theory and practice 
Against this rather pessimistic backdrop, it makes sense to think more 
conceptually about the EU’s possible role(s) in development and link these 
to the research findings of this study. Conceptually, four different roles for the 
EU can be identified: 
1. Just another donor: This is the project of the 1990s when the EU 
became for the first time legally competent for development cooperation 
(Maastricht Treaty). Following many problems and scandals, the European 
Commission established a proper development policy machinery including 
the Country Strategy Papers, National Indicative Programs, and the 
establishment of EuropeAid.  
Notwithstanding bureaucratic complexities, the EU became a powerful 
donor worldwide.  
2. Coordinator and harmonizer: This is the project of the 2000s when the 
EU started to put less emphasis on ‘giving’ and more on ‘coordinating’. 
Common European actions, approaches and aims were developed 
through various policy documents and instruments, including the 
Barcelona Consensus on Official Development Aid, the European 
Consensus on Development, the Policy Coherence for Development 
strategy, and the document on European Coordination and Division of 
Labour.  
Notwithstanding continuing differences within the EU, a distinctive 
European profile in development has taken shape.  
3. Political power: This is the project of the 2010s when the EU is aiming 
to enhance its foreign and security policy coherence with the Lisbon 
Treaty, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the merger of DG 
Development and EuropeAid into DG DEVCO, the EU and Global Strategy 
etc. Development, foreign and security policy are increasingly 
intermingled.  
Notwithstanding political divisions on some issues, foreign policy 
coherence of the EU has been strengthened at a remarkable pace. 
4. Facilitator: This may be the new project for the EU’s relations with 
countries in the Global South, including fragile states. Without completely 
abandoning the previous roles, the major added value of the EU may 
be to support and enable member state coordination without 
necessarily (1) funding, (2) harmonizing, or (3) politicizing and 
securitizing. In other words, the EU can play a key role in development 
without having large aid budgets, without imposing common visions and 
approaches, and without political force.  
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Nevertheless, the EU’s potentially facilitating role has been 
underexploited.  
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual EU roles 
 
 
While each of these roles has been recognized in the research, the 
facilitating role emerges as the most promising one.  
1. Interviewees regularly referred to the EU as ‘just another donors’. They 
emphasized the significant aid budget of the EU. This makes it an 
important player in the four countries, but not necessarily a force for 
(European) coordination. The EU’s specific and stringent bureaucratic 
procedures are regularly seen as a constraint for being part of coordination 
efforts (even in straightforward coordination practices such as Delegated 
Cooperation, see. PAFMIR case in Haiti). 
2. However, a significant number of interviewees did not see the EU playing 
a major role in European coordination in the field. Even when it comes to 
Joint Programming – the European coordination exercise par excellence – 
doubts were expressed whether the EU is truly trying to make this happen 
in Niger and the DRC. In Palestine, Joint Programming was evaluated 
more positively by a majority of interviewees, although many were 
cautious and even critical about its relevance. In Niger, a key EU staff 
member expressed what also became clear from other interviews:  
“We obviously have a mandate to help coordinate, but in practice I 
would say beyond our discussions at Chef de Cooperation level I don’t 
see that much happening.” (EU57) 
3. When it comes to the political role, some emphasized what they perceived 
as the inability of the EU to come to a clear political consensus on foreign 
policy issues (e.g. in Palestine) whereas others lamented the politically-
driven agendas from Brussels that prioritize migration and security 
concerns over development (e.g. in Niger). Some would hope that the EU 
plays a stronger political role (e.g. in Haiti: “In order to work together, the 
EU must be our reference point … We need one agreement for all fragile 
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states” (EU144); and several interviewees in Palestine), whereas others 
are wary of foreign policy influence from the EU (e.g. several development 
practitioners in Niger).  
4. While interviewees did not spontaneously come up with what we called the 
‘facilitating role’ of the EU, most stated that they would support such a role 
when we mentioned and started discussing this. In abstract terms, this 
means that the EU would support European coordination without 
necessarily contributing with aid (role 1), imposing a model or harmonizing 
(role 2), or making it political (role 3). 
In the remainder of this section, we argue that the facilitating role is the most 
promising one for the EU to pursue. 
5.3. Facilitating role 
What exactly would the ‘facilitating role’ encompass, and what evidence 
have we seen from the research in support of such a role? First, the EU 
can contribute to guaranteeing that the four above-mentioned factors play out 
favourably for European coordination, even if the EU itself is not involved as a 
contributing donor. Second, and more specifically, the EU could provide 
common goods and services that are currently not provided by the member 
state agencies or other actors.  
Forster the four factors for coordination   
Connecting to the main findings of this study, the EU could foster the four 
factors that enable European coordination as shown in this study. 
Instead of imposing coordination on its member states or being on the 
sidelines, it could:  
a. foster synergies between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ joint implementation: 
providing analysis and studies, joint missions (regular excursions making 
donors and practitioners familiar with each other’s programmes within the 
country), joint trainings (e.g. on human rights mainstreaming, on delegated 
cooperation), joint workshops etc. in areas where European countries 
already coordinate or are planning to coordinate; and supporting the 
creation of instruments and action plans where cooperation remains 
limited to ‘soft’ joint implementation 
b. focusing these efforts on cooperation practices of small groups of 
like-minded actors; instead of promoting EU-wide (or EU+) coordination, 
it would be more realistic and promising to facilitate existing bottom-up 
instances of cooperation where a limited number of like-minded countries 
cooperate 
c. in doing so, the EU could stimulate administrative reforms (especially 
in its own workings but also within the member states), thereby reducing 
the bureaucratic burden for practitioners engaging in European 
coordination; at the same time, it should provide political backing where 
necessary 
d. such political support would be particularly beneficial for relations 
with the partner government; most European donors and practitioners 
112 
                                  Improving European coordination in fragile states 
struggle to find ways to align with local government(s). Given its political 
weight and influence, the EU could facilitate political dialogue between the 
coordination groups and the government(s) of the fragile country – even in 
coordination mechanisms where it is not directly involved 
In fact, the EU has already played a facilitating role in the most successful 
coordination practices that we have examined, albeit to a very limited extent 
(Table 2.18).  
• FISAN: through the ‘déclencheur’ for its budget support to the Nigerian 
government, the EU effectively facilitates the FISAN initiative. Without 
sufficient progress on the food security related governance issues, the EU 
will withhold part of its budget for the government.  
• JFA-BTC/GIZ: The EU funds some GIZ activities using delegated 
cooperation. It also plans to organize joint communication (including a joint 
video) in 2017. 
•  AREA C: The EU provides political support to the coordination in this 
politically sensitive area, inter alia through Council Conclusions and an 
agreement with the Palestinian Authority. The EU also organizes the Area 
C Interest Group (which also includes Norway and Switzerland).  
While these examples are limited, they give an idea what the facilitating role 
of the EU could entail. Joint Programming also has the potential to foster the 
four factors that enable European coordination, if they provide relevant joint 
analysis, foster knowledge about existing coordination initiatives, and 
stimulate the latter without imposing EU frameworks. Again, the challenge is 
not to insist on federal models of coordination between the EU/EU+ but to 
leave space for various and flexible forms of coordination, primarily between 
European countries (including Switzerland, Norway and others) and possibly 
including other countries and international organizations.  
 
Table 2.18: EU facilitating role in most successful cases? 
 EU Facilitating Role 
FISAN Déclencheur for EU budget support 
JFA/BTC-
GIZ 
joint communication (video); delegated 
cooperation 
AREA C funding and leading donor; political 
support; EU interest section 
 
 
Providing common goods and services for coordination 
Specifically, on the EU’s facilitating role, we would like to highlight the ‘soft 
joint implementation’ that the EU could facilitate, as this clearly connects to 
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the ‘provision of common goods and services’. We searched for such a 
link in this study, albeit with limited results (see Section 2). Among the 
interviewees, there is a strong consensus on the need for common goods 
and services that are currently underprovided. Although EU member 
states and other donors could equally provide common goods and services in 
development, the EU is particularly well-suited to do so given its position as a 
supranational institution that was created to solve collective action problems. 
Examples of common goods and services are: 
• Sharing infrastructure and logistics: in none of the country studies we 
could find evidence of the provision of common infrastructure and logistics 
(by the EU and/or European countries). The only exception was the brief 
and unsuccessful sharing of a BTC-GIZ office in Gaza. The HQ phase 1 of 
this study focused on the interesting ‘Gaziantep’ coordination practice 
between the EU, GIZ and Expertise France, dealing with deals specifically 
with cross-border operations between Turkey and Syria (see Note 1.1, 
annex). In general, there is much scope for improvement here. 
• Sharing studies and analysis: while the Joint Programming exercise 
involves shared analysis, and some efforts in this regard are also done in 
Brussels at DG DEVCO and the EEAS, the study revealed a need for 
sharing information on various specific and country-related topics. In some 
cases, there is not even a basic ‘cartography’ available, for instance on the 
health sector in Niger. Much to the frustration of researchers, it has 
become clear that on each specific project and programme a (large) 
number of studies, audits and other evaluations exist that are not available 
for the public (and for other donors). In other words, much taxpayers’ and 
development money is being spent to produce knowledge and insights that 
are then available only to the institution that has funded the study (and 
hopefully takes it into account). The EU could promote a more open 
research and information culture and play a leading role in this regard. In 
fact, this would be in line with already existing requirements in the domain 
of EU research policy (e.g. Horizon 2020) providing research funded from 
the public purse should be published open access. This good example 
could be followed in the development policies of the EU and its member 
states. 
• Joint communication: even without issuing Demarches or other Common 
Foreign and Security Policy related statements, the EU can facilitate 
communication of existing coordination schemes in which it does not 
necessarily participate. This is important given the growing need of 
visibility and public support for international cooperation. The only initiative 
in this regard are the joint videos that the EU Office in Palestine has 
recently started to promote, such as the video on what European donors 
do in the water sector and an upcoming video on the education sector.  
• Joint missions: while some interviewees emphasize that there are 
already many joint missions happening, including some organized by the 
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EU, others say that they would like to see more joint missions – not only 
with the Heads of Cooperation but also involving practitioners at all levels 
(EU128). In our study, the FAO case has shown that joint missions (in this 
case the Dutch-Swiss trip to Gaza) can be useful for sparking new 
cooperation initiatives. In general, it seems that joint missions facilitated by 
the EU and involving practitioners are scarce. These should be organized 
more frequently at several stages of the project cycle. The impact of joint 
missions potentially goes beyond the specificities of the programmes that 
are visited: the FAO case shows that it can foster mutual learning about 
each other’s areas of expertise and priorities and contribute to the 
formation of small groups of like-minded individuals and agencies from 
which European coordination initiatives can be built up incrementally. 
• Joint trainings: while the EEAS does organize trainings for EU and 
member state staff at headquarters’ level, the HQ study (see Phase 1 
Report, HQ analysis) already revealed that these remain within the 
‘Brussels bubble’ and are not known amongst practitioners. The field 
research has confirmed this. Instead of being oriented primarily towards 
diplomats, the EU-organized trainings could be widened to also involve 
development practitioners, and more could be done to communicate their 
existence Europe-wide. Moreover, more trainings could be organized at 
field level as well. In our interviews in the four countries, only two trainings 
were mentioned. Concerning a human rights training in Palestine, one 
participant stated that the training was basically limited to giving an 
overview of basic EU documents on the topic (EU128). It remains to be 
seen whether this has started a process on human rights integration in 
cooperation in Palestine (non-EU93). It was also noticed that the process 
lacked inclusivity as it involved mostly EU Heads of Cooperation. The 
other one concerns a human rights mainstreaming training in Brazzaville, 
which was organized for EU staff only. As a coincidence, on EU member 
state diplomat had heard about the training and asked whether she could 
also attend. In the end, there were only two non-EU staff participants at 
the training (EU157).  
Showing the need for more joint trainings, our interviews also revealed that 
in several cases European donors and practitioners were not aware of 
some basic tools of European cooperation. Both in Niger and Palestine, a 
number of European respondents did not know what exactly ‘delegated 
cooperation’ means. A European practitioner in a Latin American country 
(phase 1 research) criticized that the EU staff was not fully aware of what 
Joint Programming involves and that she had to explain it. In sum, there is 
much scope for opening up joint trainings and focusing on what is 
practically relevant for practitioners.  
 
The case for a facilitator role 
Both dimensions of the facilitator role are visualized in Figure 2.2. Such a 
facilitator role for the EU is not only desirable but also feasible.   
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Figure 2.2: EU facilitator role 
 
 
It is desirable because it makes it possible to stimulate the four enabling 
factors that were identified in this study, without engaging in top-down 
management from Brussels or headquarters. While support from 
headquarters is essential and general policy documents are needed, the 
research has made it clear that successful coordination crucially builds on 
clusters of various cooperation practices that have emerged bottom-up 
between donors and practitioners in the field. The facilitator role is also 
feasible because it does not require large political or financial investments. 
The above-mentioned examples through which the provision of common 
goods and services can be facilitated – joint analysis, joint missions, joint 
communication, joint training – constitute low hanging fruit for the EU to 
improve coordination:  
• They appeal to a need that was identified by interviewees in our study; 
• They do not require large budgets and can be organized easily; 
• They do not involve high-profile foreign and security policy visions and 
instruments; 
• Last but not least, they resonate with the EU’s raison d’être as a 
supranational institution that should deal with functional issues and solve 
collective action problems. 
 
This leaves the question of how the EU’s facility role relates to its growing 
assertiveness as a foreign and security power, which will be addressed below. 
5.4. Political power role? 
Finally, how does this facilitating role correspond to the EU’s increasing 
foreign and security profile in third countries? From this study, it appears 
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that this growing political role of the EU and the concomitant politicization and 
securitization of development policy provide opportunities but also 
challenges for development-friendly donor coordination in fragile states.  
The phase 1 HQ analysis already found that politicization can work both as an 
enabling and constraining factor for development-friendly coordination, and 
that it remains up to empirical (field) research to determine how this plays out. 
This phase also elaborated on two cooperation practices that highlight the 
potential opportunities of politicization for European coordination (see Phase 1 
Report, HQ analysis):  
• Gaziantep Initiative: migration and security in the EU’s neighbourhood, 
facilitating soft and hard joint implementation (EU, GIZ, Expertise France) 
(see Note 1.1, annex) 
• Somali Compact: security in fragile state, facilitating HQ steered EU 
coordination in the field (see Note 1.2, annex) 
At the same time, the HQ phase revealed concerns on the politicization and 
securitization of EU development policy. These also emerged during the field 
phase. Most noticeably, the following concerns were raised when discussing 
the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa in Niger: almost unanimous 
concern amongst practitioners that the initiative lacks transparency, that it 
lacks ownership with the government in Niger, and that it prioritizes restrictive 
migration goals before developmental objectives. As such, the Trust Fund is 
not considered a legitimate forum for coordination amongst practitioners. 
Quite the contrary: the EU/Brussels-steered initiative (Valletta Summit of 
European Council; Operational Committee of the TF), the “rush for Agadez” 
and the “migration gold” (EU51) that donors, agencies and NGOs are 
pursuing, risks thwarting existing coordination initiatives on the ground and 
bringing the development landscape in Niger back to the pre-Paris era.  
Then again, the AREA C case on social infrastructure, and to a more limited 
extent the JFA/BTC-GIZ coordination on education in Palestine show how the 
EU’s growing foreign policy profile may be conducive for development-
oriented coordination. The EU has facilitated the necessary political guidance 
for the sensitive issue of investment in Area C (West Bank). Here, the political 
agenda in Brussels coincides with donors’ and practitioners’ activities within 
the field, and as such the EU plays a facilitating role.  
As one interviewee stated on the EU’s role in Palestine:  
“I personally think that there is a need for the EU to take the lead on 
some of these issues, because all countries have bilateral constraints, 
and the EU doesn’t necessarily have that. The EU can represent the 
broad family of development actors here without fear of political 
backfire or trade cuts.” (EU109) 
However, other interviewees did not expect the EU to play such a role 
because divisions between member states would hinder it (e.g. EU105; EU98; 
EU96).  
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Based on these illustrations, we can conclude that the EU’s rising political 
profile should not necessarily contradict development-friendly 
coordination. Indeed, as mentioned above, the EU could play a key role in 
providing the necessary political guidance and backing of cooperation 
practices and in fostering relations with the partner government. High profile 
political crises such as the refugee crisis in Turkey and the security crisis in 
Somalia, and the on-going conflict in Israel-Palestine, can foster European 
coordination, as has been shown in this study. There is however also a risk 
that domestic political agendas and foreign policy interests constrain 
development-friendly coordination, and in this context the challenges 
stemming from populism and elections back in Europe were often mentioned 
both in Niger and Palestine.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“All for one and one for all” (Three Musketeers, Alexandre Dumas) 
Building on a Literature Review and Headquarter Analysis, this study focused 
on European coordination in fragile states based on four country cases: Niger, 
DRC, Haiti and Palestine. The main purpose was to find best practices of joint 
implementation and provision of common goods and services, from which 
lessons could be drawn that are relevant for practitioners.  
We started by outlining the numerous constraints for coordination that have 
been identified during the research. Coordination within fragile countries has 
proved to be an extremely challenging exercise whereby donors and 
practitioners face several external (e.g. crisis and volatility, weak state 
apparatus) and internal obstacles (e.g. administrative hurdles, limited 
institutional incentives, self-interests and competition for resources). 
Coordinating in such a difficult context requires courage, perseverance and 
conviction that this is the best approach.  
Therefore, it is intriguing that – independently from each other – participants in 
three entirely different contexts identified themselves as the ‘three (or four) 
musketeers’: “all for one, one for all”. This is a relevant metaphor because 
the study has shown that successful coordination in contexts of crisis and 
fragility does indeed require participants to be courageous, to be convinced 
that this is best for the common good, and to collaborate in small groups of 
like-minded actors that trust each other, in order to face the numerous 
constraints that they are confronted with.  
However, our research into the four country cases has also made it clear that 
these factors are necessary but not sufficient. Individual commitment, 
ideological conviction and like-mindedness in small groups can only 
entail successful coordination, if certain institutional context factors are 
in place and political backing are provided. These main findings will be 
summarized in the next part of this concluding section. Based on this 
synthesis, we will then formulate a number of recommendations that are 
relevant for European donors and practitioners, and finally we will conclude 
with some ideas on how these issues reflect wider debates on the future of 
the European Union. 
6.1. Main findings 
In general, creative examples of coordination between practitioners have 
been hard to find. This may not be surprising given the constraints that donors 
and practitioners are facing within the countries that were examined. 
Importantly, however, interviewees did not dispute the need for more 
(European) coordination in fragile states. Moreover, following a three-step 
methodological approach, we could identify and evaluate 10 interesting 
practices of coordination in Niger, the DRC, Palestine and Haiti. While 
these are generally not particularly innovative, there is an interesting variation 
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in the extent to which they are successful, and careful analysis leads us to 
draw lessons on when and how European cooperation works. 
With this goal in mind, these 10 coordination practices were examined more 
in-depth, first separately (see Notes 2.1 until 2.10, annex) and then 
comparatively (this report). Despite the diversity of cases, the comparative 
analysis has led to the main conclusion that successful coordination hinges 
on four factors: (a) mixing ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ joint implementation, (b) involving 
a small number of like-minded actors, (c) finding ways to align with the partner 
country, and (d) providing flexibility for practitioners, while guaranteeing 
political backing.  
Importantly, each of these should be combined to allow for successful 
coordination. Reverting to the 4i pragmatic framework and in line with the 
sociology of institutions approach, the case studies show that individuals can 
play an important role if their entrepreneurship is embedded within a 
favourable ideational and institutional context. Interests can play out 
favourably for coordination, especially for small actors (e.g. SDC, BTC) and/or 
when risk sharing is important (e.g. Palestine and Area C), but it has become 
clear that domestic agendas and foreign policy interests can also hinder 
coordination (e.g. Niger and migration).  
More (successful) examples of coordination were found in Palestine than in 
the other countries. This can be explained by country-specific (more enabling 
environment in terms of governance and human development) and donor-
specific (interests to share risks and hide behind each other) factors. 
Coordination proved most difficult in the DRC and Haiti. These countries also 
score much lower on governance indicators than Niger and Palestine, thereby 
again suggesting the importance of government ownership and alignment. 
While there is no clear consensus on the role of the European Union in 
European coordination, we point out that the EU plays at least four distinctive 
roles: just another donor, coordinator/harmonizer, political power, and 
facilitator. These different EU roles also emerge from the case studies, 
although there is not much evidence that the EU fully plays its facilitator role. 
We argue that this is precisely where the EU could do more.  
6.2. Recommendations 
This brings us to the main recommendations that emerge from the research 
findings. Given the importance of the four factors for successful coordination, 
it is obvious that donors and practitioners should actively pursue each of 
these factors. Particular attention should therefore be paid to:  
a. Potential synergies between different – soft and hard, informal and 
formal – clusters of cooperation. A coordination initiative cannot be 
successful in isolation. The most successful coordination practices are 
indeed those that involve several instances of coordination carried out by 
different actors, ranging from joint studies and trainings to pooled funding. 
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b. Forming small groups of like-minded actors, who dispose of a critical 
mass in terms of budget and/or expertise, and/or who manage to 
generate a dynamic that attracts more participants. While some cases 
show that like-mindedness within a small group is not a sufficient condition 
for successful coordination, the most promising cases do not start from 
EU-wide activities but instead from bottom-up cooperation between a 
smaller group of actors. Building trust and shared views on problems and 
solutions is of key importance.  
c. Searching ways to align with the partner government. Although 
challenges are abound, this cannot be an excuse for limiting partner 
government involvement. Despite the risk of ‘backward alignment’, 
whereby donors impose their agenda onto the partner government in more 
subtle ways, donors and practitioners largely recognize the ‘Paris 
principles’ as important. The most successful practices are those where 
continuous efforts are being made to align with local or central 
government(s), for instance through cooperation with one of the stronger 
ministries, through the strengthening of national plans, or through the 
involvement of semi-governmental institutions for the implementation. 
These examples make clear that even in fragile states, it is possible for 
donors to embark on relatively strong and committed (semi-)governmental 
institutions. 
d. Providing institutional flexibility from headquarters and within the 
coordination mechanisms. In this regard, it is important to have a clear 
division of labour (albeit not necessarily formalized), regular meetings (with 
a clear calendar), a focal point and well-functioning secretariat (perhaps 
rotating), and a relatively short chain of delegation (e.g. delegated 
cooperation, co-financing, transfer agreements). At the same time, 
guaranteeing political backing from headquarters is of key importance, 
especially in contexts of crisis and fragility where development 
interventions may be politically sensitive at home.  
Donors and practitioners should thus start small with like-minded partners, 
gradually building up soft and hard joint implementation practices, thereby 
establishing clear but flexible institutions and guaranteeing political support 
back at home, and last but not least attempt to align with government 
partners.  
The European Union could devote itself more to playing a facilitating role in 
forging all of these four factors. Rather than being just another donor, 
imposing EU-wide coordination and harmonization schemes, and enhancing 
its foreign and security policy clout, we argue that in the near future its most 
promising added value lies in the facilitation of the above-mentioned factors. 
This also implies less (micro-)management from Brussels and more 
space for bottom-up cooperation. To be sure, it does not mean that the 
other roles are no longer important; however, as a supranational institution 
whose raison d’être lies precisely in addressing functional issues and solving 
collective action problems, the EU should be particularly well suited to play 
such a facilitative role.  
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In this regard, we pointed to much low-hanging fruit when it comes to 
facilitating ‘soft’ joint implementation for the provision of common 
goods and services. Most interviewees recognized the added value and 
undersupply of common goods and services such as joint analysis, joint 
communication and joint training. While this already happens in the three 
most successful cases, there is much scope for improvement.  
In addition, the EU and its member states should be careful and reflexive 
when combining foreign and security policy agendas with development 
concerns. While coherence in the security-development nexus is to be 
welcomed, enhanced coherence in this regard can be a double-edged sword. 
The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa show how the un-reflexive pursuit of 
domestic agendas in development can lead to less transparency and 
ownership and even impede coordination in the field – thereby returning back 
to the pre-Paris era. On the other hand, some cases in Palestine show that 
the EU’s foreign policy stance can also have a facilitating impact on European 
coordination, by providing the necessary political backing for European 
donors and practitioners to work in contexts of crisis and fragility.  
Finally, more in-depth and comparative research is needed to understand 
the constraints and enablers of European coordination in fragile state. Existing 
studies usually take a technical and financial perspective (e.g. for the purpose 
of audits and mid-term reviews) and focus on single mechanisms (e.g. a 
specific basket fund). There is a need for more thorough social science 
(including political science) research into the ideas, interests, institutions and 
individuals behind European coordination and into its impact on the ground. 
Furthermore, there is a need for comparative research of (European) 
coordination practices within and across countries and/or within and across 
sectors. Due to time and resource constraints, this study has only been able 
to provide a first analysis of how such a comparative research, informed by 
the pragmatic 4i framework and a sociology of institutions perspective, could 
lead to relevant insights on ‘what works, why and how’ on European 
coordination in fragile states. Each of the 10 coordination practices that have 
informed this study would merit more detailed analysis that also evaluates in a 
long-term perspective. Further research should also explicitly take into 
account the role of practitioners and new challenges concerning the 
development-humanitarian nexus and the development-security nexus. The 
results of such scientific studies should be disseminated to a wider audience 
and inform joint trainings and workshops for diplomats and practitioners 
working in the field. 
6.3. Concluding reflections 
This analysis and the ensuing recommendations suggest that the main added 
value of the EU in development cooperation is not in funding or harmonizing. 
Instead of attempting to be one of the world’s biggest donor or imposing EU-
wide models, a better way forward is to stimulate those smaller but 
promising instances of cooperation that are growing bottom-up from 
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like-minded donors and practitioners in the field. These can be EU 
member states, but they could also belong to the EU+ (e.g. Norway, 
Switzerland, perhaps the UK after Brexit), other non-EU countries (e.g. the US 
or Canada) and international organizations (e.g. FAO, ILO, UNDP, WB).  
What matters in this regard is not the territorial scope of ‘Europe’ or 
‘European Union’, but the functional imperative of coordination: what 
group of actors can deliver the ideas (like-mindedness) and critical 
mass (budget, expertise) for effective development policy?  
Such an approach is more realistic than might seem at first sight. The 
importance of effective and functional cooperation has always been at the 
heart of European integration, going back to the founding father of 
‘functionalist’ thinking, David Mitrany, and the founding father of ‘functional 
federalism’, Jean Monnet. Bottom-up coordination whereby various clusters of 
cooperation practices are gradually built up in a mutually reinforcing way, is 
not only what the EU leaders established in the early 1950s with the 
European Coal and Steel Community, it is also the ‘variable integration’ or 
‘multi-speed Europe’ scenario that some European leaders are currently 
advocating in debates on the future of Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
